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3INTRODUCTION TO THE PORTFOLIO: 
VOLUME I
The following portfolio comprises academic, clinical and research dossiers 
containing work completed during the University of Surrey’s Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology programme. Additionally, the portfolio includes three 
appendices of teaching and presentation work which I have undertaken 
during the course of training.
The portfolio, as a whole, reflects the broad scope of experiences afforded 
by the programme. The dossiers cover the application of several 
therapeutic models, including cognitive-behavioural, systemic and 
psychodynamic approaches, as well as neuropsychological assessment 
and reflective practice. They present a range of client groups across the 
lifespan, with various difficulties from mental health to learning disability. 
Issues surrounding diversity, service-user and carer involvement, evidence- 
based practice and the application of theory are incorporated throughout, 
as is an emphasis on the development of research skills.
Please note that all clinical material presented has been prepared with the 
informed consent of the individuals concerned. All names used are 
fictitious and any identifying information has been omitted or changed, in 
order to preserve confidentiality and the anonymity of service-users.
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9PROFESSIONAL ISSUES ESSAY:
Moving beyond the distress/disability of the individual: 
How can clinical psychologists work with local 
communities to reduce the stigma and discrimination 
that lead to social exclusion?
JANUARY 2011 
YEAR 2
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INTRODUCTION
This essay aims to explore how stigma towards mental illness is 
perpetuated in society, and how clinical psychologists can work within 
communities to address this problem and reduce the social exclusion of 
people with such conditions. I will address four major themes which I 
believe are central to achieving these objectives: empowering service- 
users, monitoring language, improving mental health education, and 
personal contact with individuals with mental health problems.
Terms o f reference
The essay title proposes the terms ‘stigma’ and ‘discrimination’, which are 
largely used interchangeably in the literature. Some (e.g. Rose et al.,
2007) define stigma as incorporating a lack of knowledge (ignorance), 
negative attitudes (prejudice), and excluding behaviours (discrimination). 
By this definition, stigma encompasses discrimination and, therefore, would 
be an appropriate umbrella term. Rethink (2004), however, emphasises 
that ‘stigma’ constructs the problem within the individual, whereas 
‘discrimination’ places it within society. Discrimination, therefore, is also a 
viable term. Given the above considerations and lack of agreement 
regarding a single defining term, I will use ‘stigma’ and ‘discrimination’ 
interchangeably.
There is also reference to the distress/disability of the ‘individual’. Where 
possible, I will employ this term, as it avoids defining the mental illness 
sufferer by their condition. However, for ease of reading, I will sometimes 
use ‘service-user’, as it appears most commonly in the current literature. 
This, however, does not come without implications, as we will discover 
later.
I take the ‘distress/disability’ aspect to mean the individual’s suffering as a 
direct result of mental illness (symptoms and impact on quality of life) and 
an indirect result (stigma and discrimination). I will use the terms ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘psychological conditions’ interchangeably to describe this 
experience, in which I include any mental illness defined by the American 
Psychiatric Association (2000).
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In terms of ‘the community’, I take this to represent the general public: 
service-users and non-service-users, as well as the professionals who 
come into contact with these people, especially those working in mental 
health. Specifically, I am interested in schools, mental health teams and 
clinical psychologists.
Lastly, this essay explores how clinical psychologists can help reduce 
stigma. Although I am a trainee, for the purposes of this essay, I will use 
‘we’ and ‘us’ and refer collectively to ‘our’ profession when discussing the 
role of clinical psychology.
Impact of stigma
Despite the commonality of mental illness, it continues to attract damaging 
discrimination (Pinfold et al., 2003). According to the National Institute for 
Mental Health in England (NIMHE, 2004), this is a major issue affecting the 
lives of sufferers; furthermore, their consequent social exclusion, and the 
stress of attempting to conceal their mental illness and its stigma, 
compound the distress of the psychological condition (Thornicroft et al.,
2008). Not only does stigma reduce willingness to seek help, it 
disadvantages people in terms of employment and relationships (Corrigan,
2004). It does not simply originate from external sources: Landino et al. 
(2009) highlight the tendency to internalise social devaluation, whereby 
individuals assume their problems are due to their own irresponsibility, and 
self-stigmatise. This can erode self-esteem, as stigma becomes one’s 
defining characteristic (Vojak, 2009). Sartorius (1998) suggests such 
discrimination against mental illness is the single, greatest barrier to 
improving one’s quality of life.
Stigmatisation shifts society’s focus onto individuals, making it easier to 
blame them for their problems, whilst ignoring contextual, societal factors 
that may have contributed (Vojak, 2009). Hawkins et al. (2001) argue that 
when a problem is constructed as lying with the individual, then so is its 
solution, allowing any sense of collective responsibility to be lifted. Thus, it 
is a matter of social justice that clinical psychologists refocus some 
responsibility back on the community for the inclusion of its members. This
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may result in healthier communities and relief for those experiencing mental 
illness and discrimination (Pinto-Foltz & Logsdon, 2009).
Approaches to reducing stigma
Rethink (2004) outlines two different models underlying approaches to 
stigma reduction. Firstly, the bio-medical model suggests discrimination 
will decrease if mental illness is viewed as a brain disease because others 
will attribute blame to its biological causes, not to the individual. However, 
Angermeyer and Matschinger (2005) claim this is more likely to segregate 
sufferers from society because it intensifies the ‘them-and-us’ divide. 
Likewise, the bio-medical model relies heavily on psychiatric diagnoses and 
classifications, which can negatively influence the attitudes of both the 
public and recipients of such labels (Gray, 2002).
An alternative approach is the psychosocial model, which closes the ‘them- 
and-us’ gap by placing mental health issues on a continuum, thus reducing 
stigma, as problems are located within social structures, not just in the 
individual. In my clinical practice, I adopt this approach to foster 
collaborative relationships with service-users and reduce the power 
imbalance commonly experienced by those seeking treatment. This essay 
will discuss ways in which clinical psychologists can intervene to reduce 
stigma and promote social inclusion from a psychosocial perspective.
REDUCING STIGMA AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
Language
According to social constructionism, language provides a structure for 
conceptualising mental illness, its sufferers, and their stigmatisation, within 
the context of their community; thus, language also has the power to elicit 
change in our thinking towards these issues (Burr, 2003).
As individual clinicians, we can consider how we address people in therapy, 
and our use of terms such as ‘patient’, ‘client’, and ‘service-user’. The more 
traditional use of ‘patient’ can be associated with passivity, whilst casting 
the clinician as the authoritative expert (McGuire-Snieckus et al., 2003). 
However, one could argue that it acknowledges the individual’s suffering,
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and many people prefer this, looking to their therapist for ‘expert’ help: 
Upton et al. (1994) found a majority of psychiatric in-patients preferred 
‘patient’ to ‘service-user’, ‘client’, ‘customer’, or ‘consumer’. However, not 
all people with mental illness are admitted to hospital and, therefore, may 
disagree with this viewpoint.
The introduction of the word, ‘client’ aimed to demedicalise psychological 
disorders and promote a more collaborative relationship between clinicians 
and people with such problems (McGuire-Snieckus et al., 2003). These 
authors found a preference for ‘patient’ over ‘client’ among psychiatric out­
patients, but this depended on the particular health professional seen, and 
upon the age, gender, ethnicity, and diagnosis of the individual. Indeed, 
the use of ‘client’ may still be construed as locating the power of the 
relationship within the professional (McLaughlin, 2010).
An individual’s right to receive treatment and exercise choice was hoped for 
with the term ‘service-user’; however, this still constructs a one-dimensional 
character, and neglects people with mental illness who cannot or do not 
access mental health services (McLaughlin, 2010). An alternative term is 
‘expert of experience’ which, although lengthy, at least respects the 
knowledge the individual brings to therapy, better facilitating a truly 
collaborative relationship with the therapist. The seemingly obvious 
message from such research into naming and labelling is to ask individuals 
how they see themselves and what they would like to be called.
Another way clinical psychologists can reduce stigmatising language is to 
avoid using jargon when discussing mental illness with service-users. Not 
only will this help form collaborative therapeutic alliances, because 
individuals will have a better understanding of what their mental illness 
means to them, it also challenges the medicalised perspective of 
psychological disorders, which can attract stigma. In my practice, I make a 
conscious effort to refer to individuals ‘with schizophrenia’, not 
‘schizophrenics’. ‘Schizophrenic’ categorises that person solely on the 
basis of their illness, and neglects other aspects of their identity, such as 
the fact they might be a mother, or a son, or a teacher, and so on. 
Furthermore, I point out my colleagues’ use of such sweeping labels, in the
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hope they will abandon them for less stigmatising descriptions. One could 
argue that ‘schizophrenic’ is a relatively innocuous label compared to other, 
colloquial terms for sufferers; however, as Vojak (2010) emphasises, the 
use of such language allows other people to think of someone with mental 
illness in a way which makes them different from them (they would not refer 
to their own child in this way, for instance). This maintains the ‘othering’ 
that forms the basis of stigma and discrimination. Vojak provides useful 
examples of exclusive and inclusive language which, although related to 
social work, are just as viable in the arena of clinical psychology. If we are 
vigilant in adopting inclusive, and challenging exclusive, language within 
our teams, we can spread an anti-stigmatising ethos throughout mental 
health services. It makes particular sense for us to harness the power of 
language, given it is the main method through which we conduct our work.
Of course, derogatory slang for mental illness is completely unacceptable, 
but sadly commonplace. Rose et al. (2007) explored the type of language 
used by young people to label mental illness and discovered 250 words or 
phrases, which they categorised according to 6 themes: popular derogatory 
terms (nearly half the items); negative emotional state (no positive states 
mentioned); confusion with physical and learning disabilities (a lack of 
accurate knowledge); use of psychiatric diagnoses (limited); violence (used 
rarely, compared to the researchers’ expectations); and sadness and 
isolation (represented by just two terms). The authors suggest young 
people hold emotionally-charged prejudices against mental illness, which, 
paired with a lack of factual knowledge, are likely to contribute to the 
stigmatisation of mental illness. If we are to successfully reduce stigma in 
our communities and eliminate the use of derogatory language, we need to 
address the issue of ignorance to change people’s attitudes and beliefs.
Education
Lack of knowledge is a major component of stigma. Therefore, one 
strategy to reduce stigma could be education to improve public ‘mental 
health literacy’. This is defined as knowledge about mental illness, which 
allows people to recognise, manage or prevent it (Jorm et al., 1997b). 
These authors provided participants with vignettes about people with 
schizophrenia or depression and found that, although most recognised a
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mental health problem was present, only 39 per cent correctly identified 
depression, and 11 per cent considered this an example of physical illness; 
only 27 per cent correctly identified schizophrenia.
A common misconception held by the public is of increased violence in 
mental illness. Although, in reality, this is only modestly greater than in the 
general population, people think mental illness is frightening due to a 
perceived likelihood of violence; this may also explain their strong desire for 
social distance from people who are mentally unwell (Link et al., 1999). 
Such attitudes are likely to result in stigmatisation, rejection, and reluctance 
on the part of unwell individuals to seek treatment, increasing their chances 
of social exclusion.
From where do these beliefs originate? Wolff et al. (1996) found 32 per 
cent of people in the UK identified the media as their main source of 
information. Unfortunately, mental illness stigmatisation is commonplace 
within this arena: Thornicroft (2006) reported between one- and two-thirds 
of television and newspaper items refer to violence in mental illness. 
Journalists and programme-makers are motivated by what makes 
newsworthy, rather than worthy, stories, dramatising events to create as 
marketable a product as possible, at the expense of accuracy and 
education (Salter & Byrne, 2000). However, these authors suggest ways in 
which clinicians can collaborate with the media to reach the public with 
influential, accurate messages about mental health problems. Although 
their article is directed at psychiatrists, its advice is equally relevant to 
clinical psychologists, who may be called upon to discuss mental health 
issues within the media. At a recent British Psychological Society 
conference (Why isn’t clinical psychology a public-facing profession?’, 8th 
December 2010), Tanya Byron encouraged our profession to be more 
proactive in engaging with the media, and suggested ways in which we can 
do so; these include writing press releases to refute inaccurate or 
stigmatising articles about psychological issues, writing open letters to 
newspapers on pertinent topics, and attending television commissioning 
meetings, as do some members of the British Medical Association. Simply 
presenting at this conference was a way of informing fellow clinicians and 
inspiring us to pass on our knowledge to the general public via the media.
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Printed media can help promote more positive views of mental illness. I 
recently came across a mental health interest magazine, ‘Uncovered’, 
being promoted in a national newspaper (Daily Mail, 6th November 2010). 
The editor has personal experience of mental health problems, and created 
Uncovered as a means of informing the public about mental health issues, 
and empowering individuals. In setting up the magazine, she enlisted the 
advice of the psychologist who helped her overcome her panic disorder, as 
well as the mental health charity, SANE. This is a prime example of how 
clinical psychologists can join forces with the voluntary sector and individual 
service-users to encourage sufferers on an individual level, and, in turn, 
empower and inform others at a societal level. It also appears to achieve 
the fine balance, of which Salter and Byrne write, of adopting eye-catching 
media headlines, but with a more informed and accurate perspective on the 
experiences of mental illness.
Although potentially controversial and unorthodox, clinical psychologists 
with personal experiences of psychological problems could use the media 
to disclose these experiences, helping to bridge the ‘them-and-us’ gap and 
normalise mental illness: as Salter and Byrne posit, such a “‘coming out’ of 
a significant individual might harness the power of stigma to a useful end” 
(2000, p283). However, I would suggest that such a disclosure would 
require significant consideration by the professional, as it may impact upon 
how he/she is viewed by the individuals with whom he/she works 
(colleagues and service-users alike).
Pejorative media portrayals of mental illness can have a particularly harmful 
effect on children, who are still developing their understanding of the world, 
frequently in front of the television (Landino et al., 2009). Mental illness is 
portrayed alongside violence in numerous children’s television programmes 
and films (Wahl, 2003a; 2003b), which include stereotypically negative 
language and actions. Furthermore, young people particularly lack 
accurate knowledge about mental illness, hold more negative attitudes 
towards its sufferers, and are commonly reluctant to seek help for 
psychological issues (Rose et al., 2007). It is therefore important that 
clinical psychologists liaise with school communities to increase mental 
health literacy and reduce discrimination among children and adolescents.
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Some research has evaluated school-based interventions for increasing 
mental health literacy and challenging stigma (e.g. Pinfold et al., 2003; 
2005b; Sholl et al., 2010). These studies support the notion that education 
can positively influence the attitudes of young people towards mental 
illness. However, they also agree that a more important aspect of anti­
stigma interventions is personal contact with someone who has 
experienced psychological problems.
Personal Contact
Pinfold et al. (2003) conducted intervention programmes for UK school 
children based on education and contact. Year 10 pupils from five different 
schools received two 1-hour workshops aimed at increasing mental health 
literacy, promoting well-being and challenging stigmatising language. 
Workshops in Phase I were delivered by mental health professionals, 
whereas Phase II workshops were facilitated by people with lived 
experience of mental illness who, in addition to the educational aspect of 
the intervention, talked about their experiences.
Unfortunately, the effect of this personal experience talk was not evaluated 
at a 6-month follow-up; however, a 1-week follow-up for Phase I and II 
workshops revealed mean positive attitude scores had significantly 
increased. Overall, there was no significant change in desired social 
distance, but the researchers reported an association between receiving 
the personal experience talk and reduced social distance at 1-week follow- 
up. Participants who had had previous contact with someone with mental 
illness were also more likely to have more positive baseline attitude scores, 
implying that personal contact may be an important aspect of stigma 
reduction.
Pinfold et al. (2005b) supported this research in their study of UK and 
Canadian 14-16 year-olds, who received educational workshops delivered 
by people with experience of mental illness. Both programmes significantly 
improved participants’ knowledge and attitudes about mental illness. The 
Canadian adolescents showed significant improvements on all four items 
used to measure desired social distance, and UK adolescents on two of the 
four items. This study reveals short-term improvements in knowledge,
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attitudes and social distance following the inclusion of personal contact in 
anti-stigma interventions.
Most recently, Sholl et al. (2010) delivered an intervention of four weekly 
sessions to a class of 13-14 year-olds. The sessions were facilitated by a 
trainee clinical psychologist and a clinical psychologist, who also had lived 
experience of mental illness. Analysis of their data revealed that personal 
contact with a service-user, as well as accurate information, delivered in a 
collaborative and respectful way, led to a positive shift in participants’ 
attitudes towards mental illness.
Although these studies appear promising for stigma reduction, they 
possess a number of limitations. Firstly, they lack no-intervention controls, 
meaning there could be alternative explanations for the results. Secondly, 
there were no investigations into longer-term effects, so we do not know if 
these interventions would create a lasting change in attitudes and 
knowledge. Thirdly, the use of self-report measures may be confounded by 
participants giving what they perceive to be socially desirable answers.
According to a systematic review by Schachter et al. (2008), these are 
problems common to the majority of research into school-based 
interventions for mental health stigmatisation. They identified the following 
limitations in the current literature: poor reporting quality, a lack of 
randomised control trials, flawed methods, inconsistent approaches to 
evaluating interventions, and inconsistent results. However, they observe 
that personal contact is the common necessary factor for reducing 
stigmatising views towards mental illness, and that contact-based 
interventions should be encouraged. They posit that this sort of contact is 
likely to facilitate empathy in the target audience. This may be due to the 
stimulation of affective responses, which can cause attitude change 
(Couture & Penn, 2006) and the promotion of sameness over difference 
between people who are mentally well versus unwell. Schulze et al. (2003) 
set up meetings between school students and young people with 
schizophrenia, which focused on their similarities, rather than differences; 
the results were positive changes in the students’ attitudes towards, and 
social distance from, people with schizophrenia.
Portfolio -  Volume I
19
So far, I have concentrated on personal contact interventions within 
schools, but there has been research on other community groups too. 
Pinfold et al. (2005a) delivered interventions to police officers and adults in 
other supportive professions, as well as to school children. They also held 
focus groups with service-users and workshop facilitators. All intervention 
groups and facilitators reported that service-user testimonies had the 
largest and most durable effect on reducing stigma in the target audiences.
In a literature review by Thornicroft et al. (2008), direct social contact with 
people with mental illness was deemed effective in reducing discrimination 
among police officers, journalists and the clergy, as well as in school 
children. Another review of the literature by Pinto-Foltz and Logsdon 
(2009) observed repeated reports of the effectiveness of contact and 
education in various community samples and, of the two, personal contact 
appears to have a greater impact on reducing stigmatising attitudes.
As well as directly benefiting anti-stigma interventions, personal contact 
with service-users may also help reduce stigma more indirectly, such as in 
training programmes and courses for health professionals. I believe in this 
benefit, having had the opportunity to work with people with lived 
experience as part of my clinical training. I was enrolled on a ‘placement 
advisory scheme’ (Cooke & Hayward, 2010) during my first year of training. 
This project allocated a ‘placement advisor’ -  a person with lived 
experience of mental illness -  to a trainee clinical psychologist, and they 
met monthly over the course of a year. My advisor and I met with no 
particular agenda in mind, but frequently discussed topics such as service 
provision and clinical practice. I found the experience a useful reversal of 
power relations, as I was in the position of seeking help from someone with 
a mental illness, in order to enrich my understanding of the mental health 
service and how it is perceived by those it intends to help. Having not 
previously had contact with anyone with a psychological condition outside 
of the therapy room, this was extremely useful in opening my eyes to the 
other aspects of an individual’s character, their strengths and qualities, and 
the knowledge they bring to joint working in the field of mental health. It 
would be encouraging to see projects such as these introduced at earlier 
stages of higher education (any mention of the service-user perspective
Portfolio -  Volume I
20
was noticeably amiss in my undergraduate psychology degree). Clinical 
psychologists have the power to promote the importance of personal 
contact with service-users and encourage national courses and training 
programmes to recruit them as part of best practice.
Of course, personal contact with service-users does not only potentially 
benefit the target audience, it also has the advantage of empowering the 
individual with difficulties. By engaging in meaningful activity in this way, 
people may take control of their own recovery and, in turn, show society 
they are perfectly capable of making useful contributions. Stickley (2005) 
considers this essential for true social inclusion.
Empowerment
Service-user empowerment is a major objective of mental health care 
(Hope, 2004). Chamberlin (2005) describes empowerment as the opposite 
of self-stigmatisation; it is therefore an important step clinical psychologists 
can take in reducing discrimination on an individual basis. This can start in 
the therapy room: Thornicroft et al. (2008) suggest the provision of 
cognitive-behavioural therapy to challenge self-stigma. Additionally, this 
treatment adopts a collaborative stance, encouraging recipients to 
participate in the formulation and execution of their therapy, promoting a 
sense of responsibility for their own wellbeing. I have worked with service- 
users to produce Wellness Recovery Action Plans (WRAP: Copeland,
2005), whereby individuals, not their therapists, decide how to keep 
themselves well, based on their expert experience of what works best for 
them. Slade (2009, p17) suggests that completing a WRAP “promotes 
experiential learning and reduces stigmatising distinctions”. Buffington
(2003) evaluated a Minnesota WRAP programme and found that 
participants reported significant perceived increases in their abilities to 
identify and cope with early signs of relapse, make use of community and 
family support, manage medication, take responsibility for their recovery 
and wellbeing, and develop a crisis plan. I believe this not only helps 
reduce individuals’ self-stigma and increase self-esteem, it may also 
heighten their esteem in the public’s eye by normalising their conditions 
and demonstrating a willingness to help themselves.
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On a broader, community level, clinical psychologists can also empower 
individuals by encouraging them to create and participate in user-led 
services (Thornicroft et al., 2008). In a showcase of best practice examples 
of anti-discrimination, Rethink (2003) outlines 18 UK projects, the majority 
of which are run by service-users for service-users. Services such as Mind 
Advocacy help reduce the ‘them-and-us’ gap by promoting the 
psychosocial notion of mental health and illness lying on a spectrum, as 
well as providing practical support for individuals; Speak Up Somerset is a 
newsletter written by service-users and carers, giving a public voice to 
individuals with psychological difficulties; Inside Out promotes other 
characteristics and talents beyond an individual’s illness through the 
performing arts; and New Way Forward tackles the media’s tendency to 
create an unrealistic view of mentally unwell people through its own 
productions of anti-stigma films.
Although these projects should be praised for their worthwhile efforts to 
provide inclusive environments for individuals with mental health needs, 
from my own experience of working with similar groups in the voluntary 
sector, I feel they can attract a stigma of their own: bringing individuals 
together, all of whom have psychological difficulties, does not necessarily 
make them any more included in the wider society, if they are still regarded 
as an out-group by the majority in-group (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Stickley (2005) warns against over-reliance on groups solely for service- 
users, especially those organised by mental health services, because they 
can reinforce the sick-role of their members. He suggests true social 
inclusion results from integrating individuals with mental illness into existing 
group activities within the community. He describes a social inclusion 
workgroup, in which housing association staff collaborate with other 
community members to introduce service-users to the local community 
through a series of practical exercises. Clinical psychologists could play a 
role in ensuring that service-users’ needs are met by conducting SWOT 
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analyses of local 
resources and working alongside community members to facilitate 
education, employment, hobbies, social opportunities, and self-help groups 
to empower individuals (Stickley, 2005). We are in a particularly good 
position to promote participation in such services and projects to the
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individuals with whom we work, due to the robust relationships we build 
through therapeutic interventions, and the positive views held by the public 
towards these forms of treatment (Jorm et al., 1997a).
CONCLUSIONS
Mental illness stigmatisation is common and can have seriously negative 
consequences for those who experience it. An emphasis on the person’s 
culpability shifts society’s sense of responsibility onto the individual and 
away from the community, even though societal factors are likely to 
contribute to mental health problems. Our communities, therefore, need to 
take some responsibility for the inclusion of people with such problems, and 
clinical psychologists certainly have a role for facilitating this process.
Taking a psychosocial perspective, where mental health and illness lie on a 
spectrum, this essay explores four areas in which efforts can be made by 
clinical psychologists working within communities to reduce stigma and 
increase inclusion.
1. By monitoring language used to refer to people with psychological 
conditions, we can promote less stigmatising ways of constructing mental 
illness. On an individual level, we should be consulting service-users to 
discover what their preferences are, keeping them at the heart of our work.
I would encourage clinicians to avoid jargon and all-encompassing labels, 
such as ‘schizophrenic’, which highlight differences between the mentally 
well and unwell, perpetuating ‘othering’ practices, which underlie 
discrimination. Derogatory slang should be avoided at all costs. On a 
community level, clinical psychologists can promote mindfulness of 
language, not only within mental health teams, but in the wider society, 
through use of the media.
2. The media exerts a huge influence on the public’s conceptions of 
mental illness. Unfortunately, it often portrays unrealistic images of people 
with such problems, perpetuating negative stereotypes which cause stigma. 
The overall mental health literacy of the public is relatively poor, so 
education is needed to combat this. Accurate knowledge can help diminish
Portfolio -  Volume I
23
social distance from service-users, as well as raise awareness about what 
they contribute to society. Clinical psychologists can bring this information 
to society’s attention through the media by speaking up about such issues, 
involving service-users in publications which challenge negative 
stereotypes, and even disclosing personal experiences of psychological 
problems to reduce the ‘them-and-us’ gap. Additionally, we can create 
intervention programmes, targeting communities such as schools, police 
forces, and members of the clergy.
3. Mental illness education can be enhanced by personal contact with 
service-users, whose testimonies can increase positive attitudes towards 
people with psychological conditions, and lower social distance from them. 
It may be particularly helpful to introduce this practice in school-based 
interventions because young people show less factual knowledge and more 
negative views about mental illness than do adults. Adult interventions can 
also be useful, and training programmes and courses for mental health 
professions could benefit from personal contact with service-users because 
seeing them out of a therapeutic context helps build a broader picture of 
them as individuals with expertise which they can bring to joint working. 
Clinical psychologists are well placed to promote this sort of contact in a 
wide range of settings. Not only can this benefit members of the general 
public, it can empower the individual with mental health problems.
4. Empowerment is an important antidote to self-stigmatisation: it 
increases self-esteem and aids recovery. It can also raise the regard of 
individuals in the mind of the public, promoting their ability to contribute 
usefully to society, an essential step for social inclusion. Clinical 
psychologists can encourage individuals to create user-led services, and 
work in conjunction with them to promote positive images of people with 
psychological problems. For true social inclusion, it will most likely be 
necessary to integrate service-users into pre-existing social networks, and 
clinical psychologists could identify such opportunities, evaluate any 
potential difficulties, and monitor this progress to ensure smooth transitions.
This is by no means an exhaustive account. There are numerous other 
considerations, which I have not had scope to explore, such as cultural and
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professional biases, which may help or hinder social inclusion. Although 
there are promising indications of how we can help reduce stigma in our 
communities, the evidence on formal interventions is limited and hampered 
by flaws which undermine its reliability and validity. NIMHE (2004) outlines 
six key principles for effective anti-stigma programmes: involving service- 
users, taking multi-level, multi-faceted approaches, addressing behaviour 
change, giving consistent messages, securing long-term planning and 
funding, and properly monitoring and evaluating programmes. Rethink
(2004) provides a comprehensive guide to setting up and evaluating such 
interventions. If we can heed this advice and create, implement and 
evaluate interventions in controlled, empirical studies, we can hope to see 
more robust evidence and ideas for effectively reducing discrimination.
For clinical psychologists, the greatest hurdle may be to look inside 
ourselves and challenge our own attitudes which may, perhaps 
unintentionally, be stigmatising. My personal views on mental illness have 
been shaped by the four areas explored above: education has given me the 
factual knowledge and, through this, I have become aware of the 
significance of language used to discuss this matter; the opportunities I 
have had during training have shown me the benefit of empowering 
individuals to take responsibility for their own recovery, and this is primarily 
influenced by the personal contact I have experienced with service-users 
outside of the therapy room.
No single factor seems sufficient to prevent stigma, but challenging 
discrimination simultaneously on these four sides could make a difference. 
Ultimately, more research is needed in this field, and specific training of 
professionals and service-users may be required to reduce stigmatisation 
and promote inclusion. The best approach for challenging stigma is not yet 
known and, although clinical psychologists may be able to influence 
people’s knowledge, attitudes and beliefs about mental illness, altering their 
behaviour will be a much more challenging task.
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ABSTRACT
There exists an historic rivalry between psychoanalytic psychotherapists 
and practitioners of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). More recently, 
however, these two paradigms have moved closer to a rapprochement, as 
various attempts are made at psychotherapeutic integration in an effort to 
increase the effectiveness of treatment. This paper reviews such attempts, 
with a specific focus on the treatment of depression. Theoretical integration 
and technical eclecticism are explored, with the evaluation of cognitive- 
analytic therapy, multimodal therapy and systematic treatment selection for 
depression. Several other factors are also considered, namely the 
importance of client variables, and factors common to both CBT and 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The implications of integrating these 
separate orientations are explored in terms of clinical practice.
INTRODUCTION
Declaration of Interest
According to members of the Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) 
where I work, there exists a “great schism” between the psychoanalytically- 
minded practitioners, and those who adhere to a traditional CBT approach 
to therapy (J. Le Lievre, personal communication, 29 October 2009). I 
cannot help noticing the obvious segregation at the CMHT, both in physical 
terms (the CBT-orientated Specialist Psychological Therapies team at one 
end of the building, the psychoanalytic Psychotherapy team at the other), 
but also in communication.
It seems to me that members of each team are reluctant to step out of their 
home theoretical frameworks because this could threaten their identities as 
pure “psychoanalytic psychotherapists” or “CBT therapists”. This was 
evident in a conversation I had with R. Brenton, with whom I am planning to 
co-facilitate a CBT group for depression: she explained that she wants to 
provide a less traditional CBT group, incorporating techniques from more 
exploratory rather than prescriptive, psychotherapeutic approaches. Her 
influences include mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Segal et al., 2002) 
and compassionate mind training (Gilbert & Irons, 2005), which, arguably,
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could be called integrative therapies, as they draw upon both CBT 
principles and other, more analytic approaches. Consequently, I 
commented that our group may therefore be rather integrative; R. Brenton 
expressed horror at my suggestion and was quick to set the record straight: 
she is a CBT therapist, and this is a CBT group (personal communication, 
25 November 2009).
The event described above raises a number of important questions for me. 
Firstly, I would argue that the CBT group for depression is verging on the 
integrative side, despite the co-facilitator’s protestations that it is purely 
CBT. If this is true, then how many so-called pure-form clinicians are in fact 
working integratively? Are CBT and psychoanalytic psychotherapies 
already being successfully, but unwittingly, integrated in the treatment of 
depression? And if this integration is not being fully acknowledged, how 
can we begin to study how effective it is as a treatment? What is more, 
how can we define integrative working if different psychotherapists hold 
conflicting views on what constitutes this sort of practice? A further point of 
interest for me, personally, is the defensive response with which the 
prospect of integrated psychotherapy is met by pure-form clinicians such as 
my colleague: what does it mean to be viewed as an integrative therapist? 
I imagine a certain stigma is attached to integrative psychotherapy if it is 
understood as a collection of theoretical fragments rather than a meaningful 
whole, where the therapist is a Jack of all trades, and master of none -  but 
is this the case?
When considering the longstanding rivalry between these two paradigms, 
there are a number of other factors affecting how successfully CBT and 
psychoanalytic psychotherapies might be integrated in the effective 
treatment of depression. Is there any way two seemingly different 
standpoints can combine? How successful are current attempts to 
integrate the two? What are the factors facilitating such an integration, and 
what are the obstacles obstructing a rapprochement between the 
theoretical heavyweights of the world of psychotherapy? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, I reviewed the literature on psychotherapeutic 
integration, according to the following parameters:
Portfolio -  Volume I
34
Parameters of the Literature Review
There is a wealth of literature on psychotherapeutic integration, but much of 
it is disorder-specific, such as dialectical behaviour therapy for personality 
disorder (Linehan, 1993). Due to the type of client I will encounter in the 
aforementioned CBT group, I am interested specifically in reviewing the 
integration literature on depression. For this reason, the following review 
comprises some general information regarding psychotherapeutic 
integration, but with a particular emphasis on treating depression.
Furthermore, the majority of research available involves integrative 
treatment of individuals, rather than group or family work, so I have chosen 
to focus mainly on integration as applied to individual therapy.
Lastly, as the title suggests, I will be discussing the integration of CBT and 
psychoanalytic psychotherapies. CBT employs thought challenging and 
behavioural experiment techniques to guide clients in changing the way 
they think, feel and behave (Beck et al., 1979). Psychoanalytic 
psychotherapies comprise various techniques based on psychoanalysis, 
which aims to illuminate unconscious phenomena in the mind of the 
individual, in order to alleviate mental distress through insight and 
interpretation (e.g. Freud, 1963). These are the two major approaches at 
play where I work, and I am curious as to whether a rapprochement 
between them could be reached if their respective followers opened their 
minds to the possibility of integrating the two.
CBT VERSUS PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY
Old Rivalry, New Rapprochement?
There has traditionally been a rivalry between the two major psychological 
schools of thought: on one side, psychoanalytic psychotherapy, its focus on 
internal experience; on the other, behaviour therapy, its tenets firmly set in 
external realities (Norcross, 2005). In the last thirty years, behaviourism 
has spawned CBT (Beck et al., 1979), which has been hailed as a swift and 
effective treatment for depression (among other disorders), and one that is, 
perhaps, more palatable than traditional psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
(Milton, 2001).
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It would appear that this development has caused further segregation 
between the therapies; as changes in the National Health Service (NHS) 
call for an increase in evidence-based practice (EBP) according to the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2009), we have 
seen the use of randomised control trials (RCTs) soar in recent years. It is 
to these that CBT is particularly well suited (Hughes, 2005). However, 
despite CBT emerging as the therapy of choice for depression in the NICE 
guidelines, on further inspection, its results are not so impressive, with 
relatively poor effect sizes (e.g. Marzillier & Hall, 2009). Despite this, the 
EBP movement has tended to favour CBT since the 1990s, to the exclusion 
of other therapies, especially in treating depression (Parry, 2004). 
Understandably, this has caused significant anxiety amongst non-CBT 
therapists: at a recent psychotherapy conference Peter Fonagy “identified 
four areas of anxiety: research, NICE, IAPT [Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies programme], and CBT” (Conference report, 2007, 
P.9).
Even supporters of CBT report feelings of disillusionment with their chosen 
therapy. Goldfried and Castonguay (1993) argue that CBT can be too 
prescriptive, and that its practitioners may benefit from attending to the 
concept of change, in general, as well as to clients’ emotional and 
developmental experiences. Some features more typical of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy have also been recognised by cognitive-behavioural 
therapists: The founder of CBT, Aaron T. Beck, identified the importance of 
resistance and the transference relationship in therapy (Beck et al., 1990).
In a similar way, some psychoanalytic psychotherapists are disenchanted 
with their home therapy: Strupp (1976) identified reluctance amongst 
psychoanalysts to collaborate with researchers and, consequently, 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy has not profited from psychological 
advances. Other psychologists, such as Appelbaum (1979) believe a 
humanistic approach could improve psychoanalytic practice.
Despite their differences, psychoanalytic psychotherapy and CBT might be 
more open to a rapprochement than initially seems to be the case. 
Recently, the arena of psychotherapy has seen a shift in perspective, from
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pure-form therapists adhering solely to their home theories, to the 
development of a mutual respect between practitioners of differing 
orientations (e.g. Gold, 1996). Perhaps, for psychoanalytic and CBT 
therapists, this is partly due to a common dissatisfaction with their 
respective single-mode approaches to therapy; maybe it is also indicative 
of a professional need to better understand complex psychological 
problems by enhancing one’s own practice with ideas from another 
perspective. Norcross (2005) confirms that movement towards more 
integrated therapy is partly due to disillusionment with single-therapy 
systems.
There seems to be a sound rationale for why CBT and psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy might attempt to integrate, but the field of psychotherapy 
integration is far from simple. To begin with, how can integration be 
defined?
PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION
According to the literature, psychotherapeutic integration can be 
categorised into a number of subtypes, including theoretical integration, 
technical eclecticism, common factors, and assimilative integration (for an 
overview, see Norcross, 2005). Due to the limited scope of this review, I 
will focus on the two main subtypes -  theoretical integration and technical 
eclecticism -  and, within these, review three specific attempts at 
psychotherapeutic integration, which are prevalent in the treatment of 
depression. These are cognitive-analytic therapy, multimodal therapy and 
systematic treatment selection. Following this, I include a section on 
common factors and the importance of issues raised by this topic when 
considering the integration of CBT and psychoanalytic psychotherapies.
THEORETICAL INTEGRATION
Theoretical integration synthesises two or more approaches on the basis of 
their underlying theories, which guide the choice of intervention. The 
resultant therapy is not derived from any one mode of mainstream 
psychology, and may employ a blend of techniques from different therapies
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(Castonguay et al., 2003). The aim is to create a therapy that is more 
effective than its constituent therapeutic parts.
Cognitive-Analytic Therapy (CAT)
One of the best known examples is CAT, an integration of CBT and 
psychoanalytic object relations, originally designed to provide short-term 
treatment for neurotic disorders (Ryle, 1990). According to this model, 
individuals develop procedural sequences, on the basis of experience, 
which direct purposeful action. Normally, these procedures are adaptive, in 
that they are revised if ineffective. An individual with depression, however, 
may have faulty procedural sequences which continue to activate, despite 
being maladaptive. Ryle (1990) also emphasises the importance of 
reciprocal role procedures, which carry emotional states that influence the 
way in which individuals view themselves, other people and the world, and 
how they behave towards those three entities.
During treatment, the client is encouraged to consider the maladaptive 
patterns perpetuating in their relationships -  both with others and with the 
self -  so that they might alter them. The structure of CAT is similar to CBT: 
It begins with developing the therapeutic alliance, socialising the client to 
the model, and gaining an understanding of what has brought them to 
therapy (Denman, 2001). The duration of treatment is similar (CAT is 
typically 16 or 24 sessions long), and it shares such features as the setting 
of homework, the use of formulation and therapist encouragement of 
behaviour change in the client.
There are also some psychoanalytic influences. After the third session, the 
therapist writes the client a reformulation letter, which summarises the early 
experiences that have influenced his/her present maladaptive procedures, 
and it directs the rest of therapy. During the following sessions, faulty 
procedures will be borne out in session as transference and counter­
transference events which are brought to the client’s attention with the aim 
of encouraging new insight and learning. In the penultimate session, the 
therapist gives the client a goodbye letter, summarising the course of the 
therapy. The effects of therapy are evaluated in the final, follow-up session 
three months later (Ryle, 1990).
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Evaluating CAT
In evaluating how effective CAT is as an integrated therapy for depression, 
it is useful to look at those aspects derived from CBT, and those from 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Ryle’s (1990) rationale for this integration 
was to provide a therapy that is less prescriptive than CBT, and less 
authoritarian than psychoanalysis, and in this respect, it seems successful. 
Although CAT possesses an educational style, Denman (2001) argues that 
Ryle would not condone the use of standard models of depression, as is 
often seen in CBT; instead, CAT provides more individualised 
conceptualisations for its clients. In terms of psychoanalytic qualities, CAT 
makes use of analytic features, such as transference, but the collaborative 
nature of the therapy has allowed it to engage the client in a way that 
traditional psychoanalysis -  where “the analyst appears to know the 
content of the patient’s mind and makes interpretations based on a logic 
that is not necessarily revealed to the patient” (Denman, 2001, p.246) -  
does not. In removing itself from this stance, CAT is considered less 
potentially harmful than psychoanalysis, according to Ryle (1994). 
However, one could argue that, in forming collaborative relationships with 
clients, and in actively evaluating and encouraging them, CAT therapists 
lose the psychoanalytic essence of being completely neutral objects 
(Milton, 2001). Milton argues that, in this way, “the analyst is subtly pulled 
into fulfilling the patient’s unconscious scripts” and “remaining a 
transference object” (2001, p.435), which detracts from his/her ability to 
neutrally reflect on the client’s projections. For this reason, Milton believes 
the integration of cognitive and psychoanalytic approaches always results 
in “something more cognitive than analytic” (2001, p.432).
Empirical Evidence for CAT
Of course, it is also necessary to discuss the empirical evidence available 
for CAT. Although this has recently grown, evidence for its treatment of 
depression is far from substantial. Brockman et al. (1987) conducted a 
small RCT comparing CAT for depression with brief psychotherapy. The 
results showed significantly larger effects for CAT on a number of 
measures, but the sample size was relatively small (n = 48), restricting the 
extent to which results can be generalised to a larger population.
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A very recent study has provided practice-based evidence of CAT’s 
therapeutic value: Marriott and Kellett (2009) compared both short-term (7- 
16 sessions) and medium-term (17-30 sessions) CAT with CBT and 
person-centred therapy (PCT) across four CMHTs in an NHS setting. The 
results for CAT were significantly effective and equivalent to both CBT and 
PCT results, and the researchers claim the effect sizes were comparable to 
those from EBP trials. Unfortunately, clients were not randomly assigned to 
treatment type, but were referred on the basis of a screening therapist’s 
opinion; the researchers note that this could have contributed to the equal 
effects of all three treatments, if more complex clients were treated by more 
skilled therapists. Furthermore, they did not record the factors affecting the 
screening therapist’s choice of treatment, something which might have 
illuminated some of the processes involved. Another limitation is the lack of 
a control group, against which to compare treatment effects; this would 
have added credence to the study by showing that results were due to the 
treatments administered. It would also be useful to conduct a follow-up 
study to see if the effects are maintained in the future. Despite these 
methodological limitations, this study paves the way for establishing CAT 
as an effective integrated psychotherapy.
TECHNICAL ECLECTICISM
As opposed to theoretical integration, technical eclecticism disregards 
theoretical origins, preferring to select the most appropriate treatment for 
the client and condition in question. Treatment may comprise a number of 
different techniques that are not theoretically congruent, but their selection 
is based on a systematic method, which considers the therapeutic efforts 
that have been successful in similar cases (Norcross, 2005).
Multimodal Therapy (MMT)
One of the best known examples of technical eclecticism is MMT (e.g. 
Lazurus, 2006), which has as its foundation an assessment of the client’s 
abilities and difficulties, according to seven modalities of functioning, known 
as the Basic ID (Lazarus, 2006). This stands for Behaviour, Affect, 
Sensation, Imagery, Cognition, Interpersonal relationships, and
Drugs/biological functioning. Based on these categories, the therapist 
identifies clusters of problems and chooses appropriate techniques
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accordingly. Treatment comprises whichever techniques (from different 
psychotherapeutic orientations) are likely to be most useful to the client, 
and thus is tailored to the individual. MMT draws heavily on CBT 
techniques, whilst also using a range of others -  among them, 
psychoanalytic -  including client-centred reflection, meditation, imagery and 
fantasy, as well as gestalt empty chair exercises (Lazarus, 2006).
Evaluating MMT
MMT was born of an extensive theory that the effectiveness of 
psychotherapy can be improved by targeting more modalities of 
functioning. Lazarus (2006) argues that merely addressing cognitive and 
behavioural aspects (as in CBT) will likely lead to relapse if other 
modalities, such as sensation and imagery, are not treated. In terms of 
depression, Lazarus (2006) describes the importance of a client’s modality 
firing order, i.e. that, typically, affect is tackled first, closely followed by 
cognition, et cetera. The advantage of MMT is its acknowledgement that 
every client is different and, therefore, this may not be the typical sequence 
of treatment for everyone. Two clients with the same diagnosis of 
depression may present very differently, and respond very differently to 
treatment. This was demonstrated by C.N. Lazarus’ (as cited in Lazarus, 
2006) case study of two clients, each with a diagnosis of depression, which 
he compared to an MMT assessment using the Basic ID. Whereas the 
diagnosis yielded very little information of clinical use, the MMT 
assessment highlighted each individual’s problem areas and offered 
appropriately different therapeutic techniques.
Sadly, the majority of work in support of MMT is based on such case 
studies, rather than empirical research. There is some evidence in support 
of the reliability and validity of MMT concepts, such as the structural profile 
inventory (Landes, 1991) and, of course, many of the techniques employed 
in MMT, such as CBT strategies, are supported by evidence of their 
efficacy in their own right (e.g. Hollon & Shelton, 2001). However, such 
research does not necessarily constitute evidence of their effective use in 
the context of an eclectic therapy, such as MMT. An admirable aim of 
MMT, however, is its attempt to remain at the forefront of 
psychotherapeutic intervention, so that MMT practitioners may endeavour
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to have at their disposal the most effective and up-to-date treatments, 
based on research findings (Lazarus, 2003).
Systematic Treatment Selection (STS)
One model that does benefit from a substantial amount of empirical 
research is Beutler’s (1983) STS, which is based on the notion that certain 
clients fare better in certain types of treatment; therefore, treatment should 
be matched to the client, rather than the other way around. Using this 
system, Beutler created the concept of prescriptive psychotherapy, which 
uses different systems of therapy to provide highly targeted treatment of 
differing lengths and intensities, dependent on the needs of the client 
(Beutler & Harwood, 2000). In this way, it is hoped that increased “efficacy 
and effectiveness of therapy in an efficient, systematic fashion will improve 
treatment outcome and patient productivity while reducing the time in, and 
subsequently the costs of, treatment” (Beutler & Harwood, 2000, p.3). STS 
and prescriptive psychotherapy should be particularly compatible with the 
treatment of depression, as they were developed with this disorder in mind.
Empirical Evidence for STS
A literature review by Beutler et ai. (2000) on the treatment of depression 
led the researchers to create a set of guidelines for treatment selection; 
these were cross-validated on a sample of 289 clients with either 
depression, substance abuse, or the two combined. The results 
demonstrated that depression’s high co-morbidity with other conditions is 
more likely due to depression as a symptom of stress in the individual, 
rather than as an independent psychological disorder. Furthermore, the 
matching of treatment and therapy to client variables was a good predictor 
of effective treatment of depression.
In another study of depression and substance abuse, Beutler et al. (2003) 
compared prescriptive psychotherapy with cognitive therapy and cognitive- 
narrative therapy. Forty clients with co-morbid depression and chemical 
dependence were randomly allocated to one of the treatment conditions, 
and the results demonstrated stronger effects for prescriptive 
psychotherapy over the other two treatments. Prescriptive psychotherapy
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used STS to apply therapeutic techniques based on client variables of 
functional impairment, coping style, resistance level and subjective distress.
Further Evaluation and the Importance of Client Variables
The importance of client variables is difficult to ignore. Some time ago, 
Berg in and Strupp (as cited in Messer & Winokur, 1980) suggested that 
client (and therapist) personality types affect therapeutic outcomes because 
of the way different individuals react to different treatment types. Messer 
and Winokur support this with their finding that “clients may do best with a 
therapist whose perspective and vision match their own” (1980, p.825). 
This was later confirmed by Herman (1998) who, in support of MMT, found 
that clients experienced improved therapeutic outcome when their 
therapists shared similar primary modalities with them.
Two client variables are particularly important: internalising/externalising 
coping styles and reactance (resistance) levels (e.g. Beutler et al., 1991). 
Internalising coping is characterised by self-blame, and externalising coping 
involves blaming others or external circumstances for one’s problems. 
Reactance is a reluctance to follow directives (e.g. Castonguay et al., 
2003). Several studies confirm that internalising clients benefit more from 
insight-oriented therapies, such as supportive therapy, whilst more directive 
treatments, such as CBT, are more appropriate for externalising individuals 
(e.g. Barber & Muenz, 1996). Beutler et al. (1991) conducted a study 
investigating both internalising/externalising coping style and reactance 
levels in 63 depressed clients. Clients were assigned to one of three 
treatment conditions: cognitive therapy, focused expressive psychotherapy, 
and supportive, self-directed therapy. Cognitive therapy was found to best 
suit both externalising and less reactive clients; supportive, self-directed 
therapy provided better outcomes for internalising and more reactive 
clients. At a one year follow-up, these findings were maintained, albeit to a 
lesser extent (Beutler et al., 1993).
Of all the client-treatment interactions, reactance level has been afforded 
the strongest empirical support, with clear evidence that highly reactive 
clients respond better to nondirective treatments, such as supportive 
therapy, and less reactive individuals benefit more from highly directive
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interventions, like CBT. This is supported by a review of 20 studies 
investigating reactance and treatment type, in which 80 per cent of the 
research conformed to the above findings (Beutler et al., 2002).
COMMON FACTORS
Some integrative practitioners create treatments based on the common 
elements of different therapies, in the hope that what is common to all is 
also what is most effective (e.g. Miller et al., 2005). This is based on 
evidence that common factors are more important for successful treatment 
than the aspects that differentiate models. Lambert (1986) discovered that 
30 per cent of outcome variance is due to common factors, with only 15 per 
cent explained by techniques unique to any particular treatment. These 
factors include catharsis, learning new skills, instillation of hope and, most 
importantly, the therapeutic relationship (Constantino et al., 2001). Rogers 
(1961) emphasised the significance of this relationship for therapeutic 
change and identified three core conditions present in all psychotherapy 
which foster this important alliance: genuineness, warmth and empathy.
What do CBT and Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy have in Common?
There are many ways in which CBT and psychoanalytic psychotherapies 
are similar, other than their shared importance of the therapeutic 
relationship. They share the same field of study, see the same types of 
psychological problems, and have a shared aim of trying to alleviate mental 
distress through therapeutic means. In terms of treatment strategies, a 
study on different forms of psychoanalytic therapy (expressive, supportive, 
and a combination of the two) found that supportive interventions account 
for more change than originally hypothesised, and that these particular 
components bear a number of similarities to CBT techniques, including the 
provision of “education in the form of advice, information, or suggestion” 
and “prescription of daily activities”, to name but a few (Wallerstein & 
DeWitt, 1997, pp.147-8).
Blurred Boundaries in Real-life Practice
Some time ago, Fiedler (as cited in Castonguay et al., 2003) observed that 
clinicians do not rigidly follow treatment protocols and are more likely to 
practise similarly rather than dissimilarly to practitioners from other
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psychological disciplines. Rogers was guilty of blurring the boundaries of 
his home orientation of person-centred therapy: Traux (1966) analysed 
transcripts from Rogers’ therapy sessions and found he subconsciously 
reinforced positive thinking in his clients by responding with warmth to their 
positive utterances, and with silence to those that were negative. There is 
also evidence suggesting that some of the effective components of 
psychoanalysis are actually more CBT-based in orientation. Murray and 
Jacobson (1971) found behaviourist principles of operant conditioning are 
present in psychodynamic treatment; this claim is supported by Marmor
(1976) who identified suggestion and persuasion, cognitive learning, 
identification with the therapist, and explicit and implicit support from the 
therapist as other operating factors in psychoanalytic psychotherapies. 
Naturally, this raises the question of what strategies are actually being 
implemented in real-life practice, as opposed to in the clear-cut techniques 
defined in manuals?
Two studies known as the Sheffield psychotherapy projects (Shapiro & 
Firth, 1987; Goldfried et al., 1997) set out to identify the foci of treatment for 
practitioners of CBT and psychodynamic interpersonal therapy (PI). 
Shapiro and Firth (1987) discovered no significant differences between PI 
and a form of CBT they labelled ‘prescriptive therapy’. Goldfried et al. 
(1997) found that, although CBT therapists were more concerned with 
action, and PI practitioners with insight, both shared intervention foci that 
were more similar than dissimilar.
This may explain why, despite years of rival therapies competing to be the 
more effective treatment, there is no empirical evidence to place one 
therapy above another. A meta-analysis conducted by Smith and Glass
(1977) found no significant difference in the effectiveness of the various 
psychotherapies. A sensible response to this knowledge might be to have 
“a specification of factors common to successful treatments and a synthesis 
of useful concepts and methods from disparate therapeutic traditions” 
(Norcross, 2005, p.7).
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CONCLUSION
There exists a sensible rationale for integrating CBT and psychoanalytic 
psychotherapies in treating depression, with disillusionment on both sides 
pushing clinicians towards integrating ideas from other disciplines in order 
to increase the effectiveness of therapy.
There are at least four categories of integration and, although useful 
distinctions, they do not necessarily reveal what happens in the therapy 
room, because real-life boundaries are not so clearly defined. Clinicians do 
not always follow treatment manuals to the letter, and even pure-form 
therapists blur the boundaries between CBT and psychoanalytic treatment. 
Until we can accurately define CBT and psychoanalytic integration, the 
question of how successfully this combination can treat depression will 
remain unanswered.
What we do know is CBT and psychoanalytic psychotherapists are more 
likely to converge than diverge in real-life practice, and share common 
factors and aims which can only facilitate a rapprochement between the 
two. The therapeutic relationship is particularly important to both.
This review has highlighted successful attempts at CBT and psychoanalytic 
integration in the treatment of depression. CAT incorporates CBT and 
psychoanalytic techniques, blending the best of both, whilst leaving their 
potential limitations behind. One caveat is that important characteristics of 
the individual therapies may be lost in the integration; however, CAT is 
supported by empirical evidence that it is as effective as brief 
psychotherapy, CBT and person-centred therapy. This implies that, even if 
it does not include every single ingredient from CBT and psychoanalysis, it 
is just as useful a treatment for depression. Although more research is 
required, CAT has established its value in both clinical trials and real-life 
practice.
As well as theoretically integrated therapies, such as CAT, useful strategies 
for combining CBT and psychoanalytic psychotherapy are derived from 
technical eclecticism. MMT extends the effectiveness of CBT by
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addressing modalities additional to cognition and behaviour, incorporating 
other approaches, such as psychoanalytic techniques. This model is 
grounded in robust theory, but lacks empirical evidence. However, 
numerous case studies support its usefulness in treating depression, and it 
has the advantage of providing clients with tailored treatments, best suited 
to their needs.
STS also accounts for client variables, and benefits from a large evidence- 
base. This model has important implications for clinical practice: not only 
does it present a potentially more economic use of NHS resources by 
utilising the most effective treatments for a particular client, but it places the 
client at the centre of therapy. Clinicians should be striving to treat clients 
in ways that keep their best interests at heart, rather than forcing them to fit 
the psychotherapeutic construct with which the therapist is most 
comfortable.
This review by no means presents an exhaustive account of the integrative 
therapies available for treating depression; there are many more models 
which incorporate CBT and psychoanalytic ideas to greater or lesser 
degrees. As well as common factors, theoretical integration and technical 
eclecticism, I mentioned a fourth category of assimilative integration, which 
has a single-mode system as its foundation, augmenting this with effective 
aspects from other schools of thought (e.g. Norcross, 2005). There has not 
been scope to critique the integrative attempts that fall under this category, 
but it is worth noting that, as a viable form of integration, it mirrors the 
development of a typical clinician’s practice: grounded in a single approach, 
but constantly modified over time with ideas integrated from other 
orientations (Norcross, 2005). As a trainee clinical psychologist, I find it 
useful to think of integration in this way, as a natural evolution of my clinical 
work, as my experience expands. Messer and Winokur observe that “it 
does not take long before students sort themselves out as behaviourally or 
psychodynamically oriented" (1980, p.825) but, for my generation of 
trainees, it would be helpful to know that some integration can be achieved 
and, rather than feeling pressured to subscribe whole-heartedly to one 
orientation over another, we can delve into a pool of therapeutic resources 
and pull out the treatments that best suit each individual client.
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Naturally, there are obstacles to successful integration. The field would 
benefit from more research, and practitioners may require specific training if 
CBT and psychoanalytic techniques are to be integrated reliably, 
consistently and effectively. The greatest obstruction, however, may be the 
stigma attached to this form of treatment by pure-form therapists, reluctant 
to step out of their home orientations. I hope this review goes some way to 
opening their minds to the possibility of a rapprochement. I do not view 
such an integration as a fragmented approach to psychotherapy; we have 
seen that it can be theoretically sound, systematically organised, and 
empirically supported by research. For this reason, I believe there is great 
potential for the successful integration of CBT and psychoanalytic 
psychotherapies in the effective treatment of depression.
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Introduction
As part of our Clinical Psychology training, we (the trainees) engage in 
problem-based learning (PBL) within Personal and Professional 
Development (PPD) groups. In September 2009, we were set the PBL task 
of “The Relationship to Change”: a title to discuss over the coming five 
weeks and on which to create a presentation for our colleagues. At the 
same time, I kept a reflective journal of our progress. What follows is an 
account of the task, my reflections on the processes that took place, and 
how they relate to subsequent clinical experience. I have written in the first 
person (singular) to facilitate my own reflections, and (plural) to indicate the 
shared experiences of my PPD group.
What IS the Problem?
We were told the problem was made purposely ambiguous so that we 
might focus on the process, rather than the function of the task. I was 
particularly scared by this ambiguity and that it was our responsibility to 
define the problem because, at the time, I was “still not sure there IS a 
problem” (reflective journal entry, 22 September 2009). What strikes me 
now is the parallel between the anxiety I experienced when presented with 
this “problem” that did not match my concept of what a problem is, and the 
anxiety clients often feel when given a diagnosis that does not necessarily 
fit with their interpretations of their experiences. I have encountered this 
with a particular client, referred for help with depression, but who is unsure 
what his problem is, or what the solution might be. With hindsight, and 
through the PBL task, I have learnt it is easy to become overly concerned 
with labels, such as “the problem”, or in clinical work, diagnoses. What is 
more important is the means to solving the issue; it matters less which 
route we take, as long as there is an agreement on where we are going. 
This was true of the PPD group: there was a variety of ways we could have 
completed the task, as evidenced by the wide range of processes the other 
groups experienced on their PBL journeys.
One of the most useful strategies we employed was to be goal-oriented and 
set objectives early on in our discussions. This gave us a sense of 
direction and motivated us to persevere. Consequently, I have learnt the 
usefulness of goal-setting with clients. With the aforementioned depressed
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client, he and I have “discarded” his diagnosis for now, as he does not find 
it useful, and we are in the process of creating a “problem list” so he can 
prioritise the specific things with which he wants help.
The Group Process
My PPD group consisted of eight trainees, including me, plus an academic 
tutor as facilitator for the first two sessions. She was meant to return in the 
fifth week, but was unable to and her absence impacted on group 
processes in various ways. Firstly, we felt panic at not having her guidance 
after the initial sessions. However, when this time came, we were confident 
in steering our own meetings, and the fact there was no authority figure 
there to judge us was liberating, helping us relax more in front of each 
other. The flipside of her absence later was that we had “no one there to 
say if we were going in the wrong direction” (reflective journal entry, 20 
October 2009). I realise now there was no wrong or right direction and we 
did well to have faith in the choices we made.
During our sessions, we allocated someone as Chair to guide the meeting, 
time-keep, and summarise our discussions, and someone as Scribe to take 
minutes. These roles rotated each session, so everyone had at least one 
of these jobs at some point over the six weeks. This created a sense of 
fairness and shared responsibility within the group.
The group task itself was difficult because none of us was entirely sure 
what was expected of us. In this respect, it required the facilitator’s 
direction. We had only known each other a day, and I initially lacked 
confidence to make many suggestions. However, as the session 
progressed, I found I developed my own ideas as a result of hearing those 
of other members, and discovered the confidence to be more vocal. I also 
mentally noted when other people referred to comments I had made, as 
this helped me feel I was making a worthwhile contribution. This is 
reflective of my experience of team meetings on placement: I was initially 
quite shy and quiet, but realised from my experiences in the PPD group 
that, as I became better acquainted with my colleagues and more 
established in my role within the team, I would find my voice.
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The outcome of the initial session was a discussion of different types of 
change and how these affect our reactions to change. These included 
whether change is positive or negative, internal or external, gradual or 
instant, desired or not. These ideas were particularly pertinent to us 
because, as new trainees, we were living our own experiences of change, 
transitioning from previous posts to trainee clinical psychologists. It was 
interesting that, although we were almost entirely responsible for this 
change, and it was positive and desired, we still felt fearful, unsure and 
anxious, in the same way someone might react to a negative, external, 
undesired change. The session ended with the allocation of the above 
topics to research for the following week.
For the first three sessions, we continued much as above, doing 
independent research between sessions and presenting our findings at the 
next meeting. Not until the fourth session did we notice a shift in group 
dynamics and in the process of the PBL task itself. There are a number of 
reasons for this: this was the first session we stopped presenting our 
independent findings and began integrating our work into the group as a 
whole: we started working as a team. When co-facilitating therapeutic 
groups in previous clinical work, I have felt as if members are receiving 
individual therapy, but with other people present. To a certain extent, our 
early PPD sessions were reflective of this, with each of us bringing our 
individual ideas, but not spending much time meshing them with other 
people’s. Effective group therapy largely depends on the integrating of 
members’ stories, so the group becomes a dynamic whole, rather than the 
sum of its constituent parts (Bieling et al., 2006). We achieved this in 
session four by relinquishing our individual agendas and picking out the 
themes common to all our findings. In this way we also established the 
direction we wished to take with our presentation. This was a useful 
learning curve for me, as I am currently co-facilitating a therapeutic group: I 
now feel more able to nurture a cohesive group environment by drawing 
together common elements from each client’s experience. This is also 
significant in professional group dynamics, such as within a 
multidisciplinary team. I have seen how this works more effectively as a 
collaborative whole, than when individuals compete with each other to have 
their independent views heard.
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By session four, we had also become well acquainted with each other and 
bonded enough to have the confidence to be creative, or to speak up when 
we disagreed with a suggestion.
We had now decided on the structure of our presentation; we would focus 
on change in the therapeutic setting, as this seemed most relevant to us as 
we prepared to start our first clinical placements. We chose to discuss 
resistance to change, and how we, as therapists, can facilitate change in 
our clients. The models we used are both cognitive and psychoanalytic to 
reflect the diversity of our PPD group and our different areas of interest.
The Presentation
I became nervous just before our presentation, and had fleeting thoughts of 
not going through with it, in case I became so anxious I was unable to 
control it. This was rather apt, considering the change research that 
suggests fear of anxiety is what makes people resistant to changing safety- 
seeking behaviours, such as avoidance (Leahy, 2007). Fears around 
anxiety include the unpleasantness of the experience and the shame of 
being seen to be anxious, which is exactly how I felt at the time.
Leahy (2007) also discusses successful facilitation of change, claiming that 
validating the difficultly of a client’s problem is the first step in effective 
therapy. From my own clinical experience, this is also an important part of 
developing the therapeutic relationship. From an explicit verbal validation 
of their struggle, to a look of understanding, I believe such gestures make 
my clients feel both listened to and able to speak openly with me about 
their problems, and this strengthens our rapport. I also personally 
experienced something like this during the presentation when I became 
nervous during my part: I started to worry that people could tell I was 
anxious and would judge me negatively. At that point, however, I caught 
the eye of a fellow trainee and she had such a kind and comforting look on 
her face, which I interpreted as her understanding of why I was anxious. 
This reassured me and made me consider that “other people’s appraisals 
of my anxiety might be positive rather than negative” (reflective journal 
entry, 26 October 2009). This was also a powerful real-life example of the
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importance of individual interpretations when it comes to our thoughts and 
feelings: something which I am trying to elucidate with my clients.
Final Reflections
We began the PBL task full of anxieties over its ambiguity and how we 
would ever complete it; and, at a time when we did not know each other 
very well, I did not feel confident enough to contribute as much as I would 
have liked. However, as the weeks passed, our friendships developed and 
we became more comfortable with each other and grew independent of our 
facilitator. Our group began to change and, with it, so did the PBL process. 
Identifying an agreed aim was a significant step along the way and, 
although it was important that we agreed on the direction, by concentrating 
more on the process, it was easier for us to let go of our own ideas in 
favour of someone else’s, or of something more important to us as a group.
Many of us acknowledged that we had found previous group work difficult, 
wanting too much to control decisions and actions, but that we had 
managed to collaborate rather than compete in our PPD group. 
Relinquishing that need for control was particularly difficult for me. 
Personally, I felt the reason that I could was trust: trust in the fact that other 
group members were as motivated as I was to do a good job and get the 
work done. We also had common incentives of not wanting to look foolish 
in front of our colleagues, and we shared a similar sense of humour, which 
contributed to how well we gelled as a group. This kept it light-hearted and 
more of an enjoyable, rather than onerous task, and contributed to the 
nature of our presentation, which aimed to be entertaining as well as 
informative. Keeping a sense of humour and using theory over self­
disclosure for the presentation may also have made the task seem “safe”, 
as it kept it at a non-personal, unobtrusive level.
My own beliefs about needing personal control were challenged by the PBL 
problem when I realised the skill and expertise other people bring to a task 
such as this. Each of us could have individually produced high quality 
presentations, but without the diversity of our unique contributions, we 
would not have demonstrated such creativity. This has implications for 
clinical practice and the importance of the multidisciplinary team. As an
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individual practitioner, I might produce sound ideas for therapy, but by 
discussing cases with my colleagues, together we are likely to suggest and 
explore more potential avenues for treatment and subsequently reach the 
best possible solution.
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PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING 
REFLECTIVE ACCOUNT:
Child protection j domestic violence, parenting, 
attachment and learning disabilities
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Introduction
As part of our clinical psychology training, we (the trainees) engage in 
problem-based learning (PBL) within personal and professional learning 
discussion groups (PPLDGs). In September 2010, we were set a PBL task 
concerned with ‘child protection, domestic violence, parenting, attachment 
and learning disabilities’. We had approximately six weeks to discuss a 
scenario set within this topic and create a presentation for our colleagues. 
What follows is an account of the task, my reflections on the processes that 
took place, and how they relate to subsequent clinical practice. I have 
written in the first person (singular) to facilitate my own reflections, and 
(plural) to indicate the shared experience of the PPLDG.
The Problem
The problem centred on the fictitious Staines family and their three year-old 
twins, deemed by social services to be at risk of emotional abuse and 
neglect. Their parents potentially both had learning disabilities, with a 
history of domestic violence also in the family. Our task was to help the 
Court’s decision regarding the children’s future by conducting a full risk 
assessment and considering the best outcome for all concerned and, if 
appropriate, developing a rehabilitation programme for the children. The 
key question was Whose problem is this and why?’.
The Process
Despite the task being fairly explicit, the lack of a formal title unnerved me 
and brought back feelings of uncertainty from our Year One PBL. This had 
seemed fraught with anxiety as we grappled with getting to know one 
another, acclimatising to the different demands upon us as new trainees, 
and understanding our rather ambiguous first task. Now second years, we 
had a year’s experience behind us, had gelled with our cohort and within 
our PPLDGs, and were faced with a more structured, directive PBL.
There was some concern among us about where to start, but we agreed 
that having a more obvious goal to work towards was comforting and 
helped us focus on the task ahead. This reminds me of the importance of 
being goal-oriented in clinical practice, and the benefit of setting an agenda, 
identifying targets and working towards them, as in a cognitive-behavioural
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approach (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995). I found this helpful in my first 
year of training, and it is something I continue to draw upon now, even 
though I am working more systemically and integratively in a Child and 
Family setting.
In our first PBL, it had taken a few weeks for us to properly focus on the 
task, but having already formed a cohesive group, which we knew worked 
well, we seemed to ‘get to the point’ much earlier this time around, 
immediately brainstorming ideas for the presentation format. According to 
Yalom (1995), group cohesiveness is indicated by trust, support and 
acceptance among members, which I believe our group developed over the 
last year, and extended during this PBL. Cohesiveness is also an 
important component of group psychotherapy, and I have subsequently 
attended more to the intra-group dynamics of the therapeutic groups I run. 
By paying more attention to integrating clients’ stories and facilitating a 
trusting, accepting and supportive environment, I hope I have improved the 
effectiveness of my group therapy (see Bieling et al., 2006).
Some of our initial thoughts on the PBL presentation were to create a chat- 
show scenario as a forum for discussing the issues raised by the task. We 
hoped this would strike a balance between entertainment and information; 
however, there were some reservations about the negative connotations 
associated with chat-shows and the risk of stereotyping the Staines family 
as ‘the kind of people’ to feature on these programmes.
This was a significant event in the PBL process as, for the first time, the 
group seemed divided on what action to take. There were members who 
seemed attached to the chat-show idea because of its potential for 
creativity and entertainment; there were those to whom this idea appealed, 
but who also worried about the impact it might have if interpreted negatively 
by our audience (I include myself in this category); and there was one 
member who had the courage to challenge the majority and admit to being 
uncomfortable with this plan of action.
This is by no means an easy feat, as we know from Asch’s (1955) theory of 
conformity and studies of normative social influence: individuals are likely to
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demonstrate public compliance (doing or saying something they do not 
believe in) when faced with a majority opinion, if they wish to be liked or 
accepted by that group. The individual in our group (I shall call her CC, for 
having the courage of her convictions) waited for two PBL meetings to pass 
before speaking her mind because of fears about being a ‘thorn in the 
group’s side’. She felt we were so cohesive a group that disagreeing with 
us would upset the group dynamic and colour our opinion of her as a 
member. However, by challenging the status quo, she exerted a minority 
influence and changed the people around her (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974).
Despite holding similar fears, I had complied with group opinion; but CC’s 
honesty inspired me to air my own reservations and, gradually, others 
followed suit, until we were able to reach a compromise with which we were 
all happy. We decided to retain the idea of a television programme in order 
to engage our audience, but used the BBC’s sensitive and well-respected 
Panorama series as the template for a mini-documentary to explore the 
issues raised by the PBL. CC’s bravery had paved the way for more 
honest communication within the group, and set a precedent for others 
(myself included) previously afraid to speak their minds.
Group Cohesiveness and Groupthink
As previously mentioned, it was felt that our group was already particularly 
cohesive. Last year, I reflected on how PBL had challenged my beliefs 
about needing personal control as I appreciated the different skills that 
other members brought to the task. This reflects the importance of 
multidisciplinary team (MDT) working for producing more useful insights 
into a problem than would one single person or profession. Relinquishing 
personal control allowed me to collaborate rather than compete within the 
group, and this has had the greatest impact on my clinical practice, learning 
to truly work alongside clients and consider the expertise they bring to the 
therapeutic alliance.
Other members agreed with this sentiment, and felt this ability to 
collaborate facilitated group cohesiveness. Additionally, we shared a 
similar sense of humour which helped us gel, but we wondered whether 
keeping matters light-hearted was an avoidance of deeper personal
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bonding, and a way of making the PBL ‘safe’ and unobtrusive. Although, 
compared to other PPLDGs, we felt we had been more task-focused and 
humorous, and less introspective and reflective, our presentation belied the 
deeper processes occurring in the background. In contrast to last year’s 
PBL, this year we had PBL meetings alongside our fortnightly PPLDG, in 
which we decided to trial a new group format: this involved an agenda-led 
business/discussion first half, followed by an experiential second half, akin 
to a psychodynamic group experience. This allowed us to reflect on our 
group dynamics, speak more freely about our feelings, and develop a 
deeper level of trust and understanding of each other, which enhanced 
cohesiveness. Undoubtedly, this had an impact on our relations within 
PBL.
Group cohesiveness, however, is not always useful, as it can lead to a 
phenomenon known as groupthink, whereby members strive to prevent 
conflict and maintain harmony by failing to approach ideas critically and 
evaluatively (Janis, 1972). In our pursuit of group cohesiveness, did we 
abandon individual thinking so as not to upset the balance of our PPLDG?
In retrospect, I can see how we had several risk factors for groupthink, as 
outlined by Janis: these include structural faults, such as homogeneity of 
members (in terms of professional and social background) and an insulated 
group environment (an agreement of confidentiality meant we did not 
communicate with other PPLDGs about their PBL processes); as well as a 
provocative situational context, in the form of a moral dilemma on which to 
base a presentation, which would be judged by colleagues and evaluators. 
Fortunately, CC’s assertions prevented us from slipping into groupthink.
This event has several important implications. Firstly, it supports the 
importance of MDT working, over an homogeneous group of professionals, 
who may be more likely to relate to one another, deindividuate in their 
cohesiveness, and fall into the trap of groupthink. Secondly, it raises 
questions about how group harmony is perceived by members, and how 
this may not always be useful if individuals feel unable to say anything that 
threatens to shatter this dynamic. This has obvious connections to MDT 
working, where it is important to be a united front, but equally so to be able
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to discuss differences of opinion and come to acceptable compromises. 
For this to happen, it is essential for mutual trust between members, so that 
if an important decision needs to be made affecting the entire group, those 
in opposition to the majority feel able to have their say.
Lastly, this experience taught us not to take one another’s feelings for 
granted and assume unanimous agreement; this shows we still have much 
to learn about true collaboration. How easily this could occur with a client, 
even in the face of a strong therapeutic relationship, supported by 
considerable time spent working together and building mutual trust. No 
matter how long I have been working with an individual, and how strong I 
believe our relationship is, I now endeavour to continually check-in with 
how they are feeling and whether therapy is still taking the course they 
want it to.
Diversity
Despite superficially being an homogeneous group, another factor which 
may also have saved us from groupthink is a certain amount of diversity 
among us. Approximately three months after completing the PBL, our 
PPLDG reflected on what we had taught each other and what different 
roles we had taken on, which eventually resulted in a harmonious group 
balance and a successful PBL presentation. This was a useful exercise in 
itself for practising the giving and receiving of feedback, which we will 
increasingly be exposed to, as we progress in our careers and climb the 
leadership ladder.
It became apparent that our group consists of four different kinds of roles: 
the leader, the organised, the sensitive, and the creative. Although each 
individual appeared to more readily identify with one over any others, we 
did not always rigidly stick to these roles. Personally, I believe I took more 
of an organised role, continuing to do a lot of ‘behind the scenes’ work, but 
this time around, relinquishing some of that control to take on more creative 
roles in the forefront. My fellow PPLDG members reflected on the amount 
of information I brought to the presentation, and how I tried to keep our 
group on task. Other members were consistently more creative, producing 
myriad interesting and innovative ideas for the format of our presentation.
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There were also those who, when we became swept up in the excitement 
of a particularly entertaining train of thought, reminded us of the sensitive 
nature of this task, and questioned whether or not our audience would react 
as positively to our depiction of the problem.
Having such a diverse group was essential in creating a balanced 
presentation, which was well received for its thought and consideration, but 
also its engagement and entertainment. Again, this confirms the benefit of 
MDT working to produce balanced ideas leading to best possible 
outcomes.
Just as an MDT has a team manager, so we had a member who appeared 
to fulfil the role of group leader. This was due to this person’s strength of 
character, confidence, reliability and willingness to take charge. However, I 
wonder how much of this role fell naturally to him (both for his personal 
attributes, and being the only male in the group), and how much the rest of 
us imposed this role upon him, so as to avoid taking responsibility 
ourselves. Although many of us would make capable leaders, we agreed 
that, having someone in the group who we believed fulfilled this role better 
than we could, may have caused us to take more passive stances. In 
many ways, I feel I am still looking for someone to lead me in uncertain 
environments, such as the PBL. Learning to take more personal 
responsibility is an important objective for trainee clinical psychologists as, 
one day, we are likely to find ourselves in the leadership role.
My Development
Professionally, the PBL task itself has given me a greater understanding of 
the complexities of psychological work, and an appreciation of the 
interpersonal systems surrounding individual clients (Dallos & Draper, 
2005). This has better equipped me for my current Child and Family 
placement, and I have been able to approach this with confidence and 
knowledge. Of particular pertinence when working with families is the issue 
of consent and information-sharing, and I am now especially mindful of the 
wishes of the child, even when they are below the age of consent (as in the 
PBL task), as well as the perspective of the parents, who may also have
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difficulties that we need to acknowledge, even if the child is at the centre of 
our work.
Personally, the process of PBL has given me greater confidence. Without 
a course team facilitator to lead the PBL, we took turns to chair and scribe 
our meetings, and I discovered that, despite initially being a quieter 
member of the group, I can be a motivating force. During our first PBL, I 
occupied what felt like a powerless position of needing to be validated by 
others; now, I am much more concerned with taking on the more confident 
role of Validator’. My fellow group members have also impacted on this 
part of me: I was the first to validate CC’s position when she set the 
precedent for voicing private concerns, and her honesty encouraged me to 
speak up without fear of rejection. Furthermore, I have learnt to take on 
board the positive feedback I received from others, and carry it forward with 
me to our next task together, whatever that may be.
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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEARNING DISCUSSION GROUP 
(PPLDG): PROCESS ACCOUNT SUMMARY
SEPTEMBER 2010 -  YEAR 1
Clinical psychology trainees engage in PPLDGs, allowing us to contribute 
to our personal and professional development, and that of our colleagues. 
These comprise 8 trainees and a facilitating tutor. Alongside these groups, 
I kept a reflective journal of my experiences of PPLDG. The account 
focuses on the processes we experienced, and how they relate to clinical 
practice. It is structured around themes which emerged from my reflective 
journal: anxiety and uncertainty; group cohesiveness; and complacency 
and re-engagement.
These reflect the processes of our PPLDG: our initial experiences were of 
anxiety, as we began our first problem-based learning (PBL) task, and 
became acquainted with each other. We learned to collaborate, rather than 
compete, and I found the confidence to relinquish my need for personal 
control, and compromise with others in making decisions for the benefit of 
the group. Our first PBL task was a success, and one of the reasons why 
may have been the cohesiveness of our group, which showed evidence of 
trust, support and acceptance, especially in sharing our genograms: a 
personal, and quite exposing experience.
Half-way through, there was a sense of complacency, as we struggled to 
find direction in our remaining sessions. By setting clear objectives and 
taking ownership of our PPLDG, we re-engaged with it, and it became a 
safe environment for discussing placement experiences and cases, and 
sharing knowledge and expertise. Personally, the most important process 
was a shift from me needing to know what to do, to thinking about how to 
do things collaboratively.
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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEARNING DISCUSSION GROUP 
(PPLDG): PROCESS ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
JULY 2011 -  YEAR 2
Year Two saw numerous changes to PPLDG, working with a new facilitator 
and establishing a novel group format with explicit objectives and roles. 
This format incorporated an agenda-led business half, followed by an 
experiential session exploring group processes. The account takes this 
format as its focus, exploring the subsequent processes experienced, and 
their relevance to clinical practice. A central theme is how the group, 
myself, and my clinical practice have developed since Year One, as a result 
of PPLDG.
The new format and identification of aims and roles provided a sense of 
direction and responsibility. We benefited from clinical discussion and 
learning from others’ experiences during the business half, whilst exploring 
group dynamics and self-development in the experiential section. This 
helped cement group cohesiveness, but we also explored ways in which 
cohesiveness can be detrimental if it leads to groupthink. Experiences of 
group conflict helped us develop skills in communication and compromise.
My personal development over the year saw my confidence grow, as I 
began to recognise my own leadership qualities, as a result of feedback 
received within PPLDG. This has encouraged me to be increasingly 
assertive in engaging in more of a leadership role. The consequences for 
clinical practice have been many, both at service and client levels. These 
include a greater appreciation of team dynamics, the role of diversity, and 
the impact of conflict on a service. Furthermore, PPLDG has helped me 
become a more sensitive practitioner, with a better understanding of 
making therapy purposeful, empowering and effective.
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Adult Mental Health Placement: Chichester CMHT & Centurion Ward
• Individual CBT for depression, anxiety, panic, eating disorders, and 
low self-esteem.
• Co-facilitation of CBT group work for depression, drawing on both 
traditional and third-wave approaches, including mindfulness and 
compassionate mind therapy.
• Co-facilitation of talking therapy groups on the in-patient ward for a
range of clients with depression, anxiety and psychosis.
• Neuropsychological testing and use of other psychometric measures.
• MDT working and teaching/presentations to different staff teams.
My first placement as a trainee provided a stable experience of CBT and 
refined my knowledge and experience of cognitive-behavioural skills, which 
I had begun to develop before training. I saw a variety of clients during this 
placement, with a range of difficulties, as I was split between CMHT and in­
patient work. Although I mainly worked from a CBT approach at the CMHT, 
the in-patient work gave me a taste of systemic ideas, such as narrative 
therapy, and prepared me for the more severe end of the mental 
health/illness spectrum. In addition to individual interventions, I co­
facilitated a CBT group for depression at the CMHT and an open, narrative- 
based talking therapy group for heterogeneous problems on the in-patient 
ward. I also had my first experiences of neuropsychological assessment on 
the ward, which brought me into contact with more complex issues, such as 
the impact of schizophrenia on cognition, and the effects of alcohol abuse 
on cognitive functioning. During this placement, I also took part in the 
University’s “placement advisory scheme”, which gave me the opportunity 
to meet with a former service-user on a monthly basis to discuss mental 
health services and service-user and carer perspectives. This was also 
vital to shaping my person-centred, recovery approach to psychological 
intervention and in making me a more compassionate, humanistic 
practitioner.
Child & Family Placement: South-West Surrey CAMHS
• Integrative individual therapy with children and families, drawing on CBT, 
behavioural and systemic models.
• Experience with problems such as anxiety, panic, OCD and autism.
• Creation and leadership of Anxiety Management and Wellbeing 
workshops for both children and adolescents.
• Neuropsychological testing and use of other psychometric measures.
This placement gave me my first experiences of integrative work, as CBT, 
behavioural work and narrative therapy were employed within a wider 
systemic context. This was nurtured particularly by various joint working 
opportunities with family therapists, as well as with the rest of the MDT. As 
well as individual interventions with families, I devised and lead an Anxiety 
Management group for primary-aged children, and a Wellbeing workshop 
for secondary-aged children. Not only did this require a great deal of 
organisational and planning skills, it also provided me with the opportunity 
to supervise more junior members of staff (my co-facilitators were Assistant 
Psychologists); it also gave me an enormous confidence boost with regard 
to presentation, supervision and leadership. Additionally, I took
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responsibility for evaluating the clinical outcomes of these groups, with 
positive results of the effectiveness of intervention. This placement 
provided me with more opportunities for neuropsychological assessment, 
including a complex case involving the effects of both an acquired head 
injury and ADHD. I had the opportunity to use the WISC-MI, WISC-IV, 
WIAT-II, British Ability Scales and TEA-Ch.
Older Adult Placement: Windsor & Maidenhead CMHT
• Individual CBT and Life Review work with a variety of clients and age 
ranges.
• Experience of depression, anxiety, psychosis, Alzheimer’s disease 
and other dementias.
• Neuropsychological testing for dementia assessments.
• Leadership of Cognitive Stimulation Therapy group work with 
dementia clients.
• MDT working and teaching/presentations to different staff teams.
This placement was pivotal in my development as a reflective-practitioner. 
Working mainly with dementia and depression, this was a challenging 
placement in terms of the issues it raised about ageing, physical 
deterioration and mortality, which coincided with my own first experience of 
death in my personal life. I presented my Oral Case Presentation on this 
topic. These experiences greatly increased my resilience and made me 
more compassionate as a therapist, more thoughtful of the wider context in 
which individual therapy sits, and more assertive in having certain needs 
met as both a clinician and a person. It also had practical implications for 
therapeutic work: the greater emphasis on existential issues required an 
adaptation of traditional CBT, with which I was previously more familiar. 
This manifested as integrative work with clients, in the form of Life Review 
from a CBT approach, with aspects of third-wave CBT, such as 
mindfulness. I also had the opportunity to take the lead in facilitating 
Cognitive Stimulation Therapy groups for people with diagnoses of a variety 
of dementias. This greatly increased my confidence in presenting, joint 
working, and planning and organising interventions.
Learning Disability Placement: North-West Surrey CTPLD
• Individual therapy both directly with clients and indirectly with families and 
care homes (CBT and behavioural work).
• Consultation work to care homes: writing and implementing behavioural 
guidelines for clients with challenging behaviour.
• Experience of clients with depression, anxiety, challenging behaviour, 
sexually inappropriate behaviour, and autism.
• Neuropsychological testing and use of other psychometric measures for 
LD diagnosis.
• MDT working and teaching/presentations to different staff teams.
This placement gave me the opportunity to refine my skills in CBT and 
behavioural therapy but also, as a final year trainee, to extend my 
psychological skills beyond therapy and towards more leadership 
responsibilities, such as training and consultation. I was responsible for 
revising and implementing behavioural guidelines for a care home resident 
exhibiting challenging behaviours. This also involved a large amount of 
training staff in behavioural techniques and disseminating information
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throughout different levels of an MDT. Not only has this improved my 
confidence in presentation and teaching skills, but also my standard of 
written work in making guidelines clear, concise and easy to use. I 
conducted functional assessments and further developed my skills in 
neuropsychological testing. This was achieved by completing investigative 
as well as diagnostic cognitive assessments with people with suspected or 
already diagnosed levels of LD. These measures included the WAIS-IV, 
the WMS-IV, the Adaptive Behavioral Scales-RC:2, the Rivermead 
Behavioural Memory Test, and the Vineland ABS-II. Additionally, I had the 
opportunity to engage in a lot of joint working within the MDT, which 
expanded my learning in terms of thinking creatively and integrating well 
within a team.
Specialist Placement: Wandsworth CAMHS-LD
• Individual behavioural and systemic work with an ethnically diverse 
range of clients.
• Co-facilitation of psychoeducational groups with parents of young 
people with autism and severe LD.
• Experience of problems such as autism, ADHD, moderate, severe and 
profound learning disabilities, challenging behaviour and toileting, 
feeding and sleeping issues.
• Service improvement through co-development of a behavioural 
pathway for the MDT.
• Neuropsychological testing and use of other psychometric measures.
• MDT working and teaching/presentations to different staff teams.
I chose this specialist placement due to my interest in developmental 
psychology, and because I thought it would complement the adult LD 
placement I completed alongside it. The cultural and ethnic diversity of the 
client group afforded me numerous opportunities to work with interpreters, 
including Twi, Punjab and Hungarian. I had experiences of managing 
difficult-to-engage, often hostile clients, and this has greatly improved my 
skills and confidence in dealing with adversity. The severe developmental 
disorders and often complex systemic issues surrounding these clients 
called for more integrative practice; most commonly I worked according to a 
behavioural model for issues related to parenting, challenging behaviour, 
toileting, feeding and sleeping, but within a systemic framework which 
included not only the family, but specialist schools, dieticians, social 
services and other involved agencies. During this placement, I further 
honed my neuropsychological and psychometric skills in using measures 
such as the WISC-IV, WNV, Children’s Communication Checklist-11 and 
Vineland ABS-II.
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CASE REPORT 1 SUMMARY 
Short-term cognitive behavioural therapy with a man is his fifties 
presenting with depression and low self-esteem
MAY 2 0 1 0 -YEAR 1
Steve had suffered with depression and low self-esteem since March 2009. 
With no previous experience of mental health problems, this was the first 
time he had undertaken therapy. An initial formulation indicated core 
beliefs of worthlessness and failure, which were maintained by Steve’s 
negative thoughts and avoidance of people and activities he normally 
enjoyed. Shortly after offering Steve CBT for depression, it became 
apparent he might relocate, thus ending therapy prematurely. This 
impacted greatly on treatment planning, but Steve, my supervisor and I 
agreed to work on Steve’s identified aims in whatever therapy time we had 
available. From these, we constructed an action plan to include identifying 
and challenging negative thoughts, behavioural activation to increase 
feelings of pleasure and/or achievement, psycho-education regarding 
physical manifestations of Steve’s mental health difficulties, and relapse 
prevention.
Steve did relocate, so we conducted very short-term CBT over 5 
intervention sessions, which covered the above action points. The main 
critique of the work is the disjointedness of therapy as a whole, due to the 
uncertainty of the length of therapy time available. The brevity of therapy 
also meant there was little scope for reinforcing therapeutic techniques with 
repeated practice, and we did not address the underlying schemas that 
may have made Steve more vulnerable to relapse in the future. Despite 
these concerns, at the time of discharge, Steve showed both subjective and 
objective measures of improvement, and I had learnt much from him about 
the importance of the therapeutic relationship and of being a client-led 
therapist.
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CASE REPORT 2 SUMMARY 
Cognitive behavioural therapy with a lady in her twenties presenting 
with bulimia nervosa and low self-esteem
AUGUST 2 0 1 0 -YEAR 1
Penny had suffered with bulimia nervosa since 12 years old, but was 
referred to me by a dietician due to her worsening eating disorder, and a 
drop in mood and self-esteem. An initial formulation indicated beliefs about 
being stupid, unattractive and incapable, likely to have resulted from the 
break-up of her parents’ marriage when she was younger, a developmental 
disorder which marked Penny as different from her peers, and her parents’ 
subsequently low expectations of her. Struggling to cope with negative 
thoughts and emotions, Penny turned to food for comfort, and withdrew 
from people, which reinforced thoughts of being fat and unwanted. Feeling 
guilty for bingeing, Penny purged and restricted her diet; thus, her eating 
habits were chaotic and uncontrollable, affecting her self-esteem. I offered 
Penny CBT for bulimia and self-esteem and we identified the following 
goals: recognising and challenging negative thoughts, identifying difficult 
emotions and adopting alternative coping strategies to deal with these, 
stabilising Penny’s eating habits, helping her eat in front of others, and 
preventing relapse.
Penny attended 16 intervention sessions which addressed the above action 
points, and she showed subjective and objective improvements by the end 
of therapy and achieved her goals. There is much evidence in support of 
CBT for bulimia, but Penny may have benefited from some additional work 
on interpersonal issues, possibly including family therapy, as well as input 
from a dietician and speech language therapist. However, she greatly 
benefitted from our robust therapeutic relationship, the collaborative nature 
of treatment and a person-centred approach.
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CASE REPORT 3 SUMMARY 
Reducing aggression in a boy with Asperger’s syndrome:
A behavioural-systemic approach
APRIL 2011 -  YEAR 2
Isaac was diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome at five years old; at six, he 
was referred to CAMHS with suspected anxiety. Assessment revealed 
anger, rather than anxiety to be the primary concern. A systemic 
formulation indicated his conduct problems may have stemmed from 
potential disruptions to his attachment to Kathy, compounded by his 
biological father leaving after his birth, and Kathy remarrying and having 
three more children within two years, suffering postnatal depression with 
each. Isaac’s Asperger’s meant he struggled with social communication, 
and was hypersensitive to his noisy home-life. His relationship with his 
step-father, Mark, became strained following an allegation of physical 
abuse; although this was deemed untrue by social services, it hurt Mark 
and affected how he treated Isaac. Kathy lost confidence in her parenting, 
whilst Mark enforced discipline by shouting, resulting in intermittent 
reinforcement of Isaac’s problem behaviours.
Considering these behavioural and family aspects, I offered behavioural 
systemic work to explore family interactions contributing to the problem, 
and aid Kathy’s and Mark’s parenting to modify Isaac’s behaviour. The 
family attended four of eight sessions, then asked to be discharged, 
following subjective and objective improvements. They were motivated to 
resolve their problems, and found behavioural techniques most useful. I 
learned much from them, from the nuances of nurturing three different 
therapeutic relationships in one room, to “letting go” of a family to whom I 
became close. This case was also important in allowing me to divert from 
the safety-net of CBT and integrate other models in a positive way.
Portfolio -  Volume I
84
CASE REPORT 4 (ORAL PRESENTATION) SUMMARY 
Coping with loss: My personal and professional development in an
older adult placement
OCTOBER 2011 -  YEAR 3
Patricia came to the older adults’ team for psychological input for a long 
history of depression. This latest episode presented as negative thoughts 
about the world ending and those close to her dying, triggered by her 
recent eightieth birthday and her husband’s ill-health.
Patricia had several experiences of loss and bereavement during her life, 
for which she felt unable to grieve and express emotion. These included 
deaths of close family members at relatively young ages, the unexpected 
removal of the evacuees with whom she grew up, and discovering that she 
and her husband could not have children of their own. The theme of 
Patricia’s difficulties seemed existential, including a search for purpose, and 
fear of isolation and death (Yalôm, 1980): factors relating to loss.
This was a therapeutic topic with which I was not very familiar, but loss 
became increasingly significant during my older adult placement, given 
issues of later life concerning life span, physical illness and longevity of 
client problems (conference presentation, Friday 17th June 2011). 
Additionally, I had my first experiences of client death during this 
placement, as two of my clients passed away due to natural causes.
Coping with loss, therefore, was a pertinent focus of my professional 
development, but it also arose in my personal life, as my grandmother died 
in July. This was the first time anyone close to me had died, so I faced a 
gamut of emotions never before experienced, whilst seeing clients with 
similar feelings relating to mortality and loss.
These parallel experiences allowed me to reflect upon the similarities and 
differences between personal and professional bereavements, including the 
importance of sharing one’s emotions with others, achieving closure when 
death is unexpected, and negotiating the line between attachment and
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detachment regarding boundaries set with clients, and how these can be 
made permeable without breaching clinical responsibility.
These experiences increased my resilience to loss and made me a more 
compassionate therapist. They also influenced my work with Patricia, as I 
recognised therapy must be tailored to her needs. This resulted in an 
integrative intervention of life review (Butler, 1974) from a cognitive 
behavioural (CBT) perspective (Laidlaw, 2010a; 2010b) with mindfulness 
(Williams et al., 2007). This approach was taken to nurture Patricia’s 
wisdom, compassion and acceptance, where previous traditional CBT 
techniques, such as thought challenging, had failed. It was also an 
opportunity to explore her previously unexpressed emotions, which are 
often overlooked in traditional cognitive work (Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000).
This seemed the case in supervision, where there was little opportunity to 
reflect on client death. My personal bereavement taught me the 
importance of considering how such experiences make us feel, leading me 
to seek reflective practice elsewhere, in order to connect with my feelings 
about my deceased clients and to aid Patricia in expressing her emotions 
over the losses in her life. I also learnt how to keep myself safe as a 
clinician, in terms of recognising my own needs and drawing on my own 
resources to aid my personal and professional development.
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CASE REPORT 5 SUMMARY 
Neuropsychological assessment of a man with epilepsy and
suspected learning disability
MAY 2012-YEAR 3
Derek was 33 years old with epilepsy and assumed LD; he was referred to 
the CTPLD after having unhappy flashbacks, assaulting his father and 
leaving his job. I saw him for cognitive assessment to determine LD, and 
potential psychological intervention for mood. Following initial 
investigations, Derek did not appear depressed and his mood improved 
with changes to his antiepileptic medication. However, he complained of 
memory problems and wanted to know how his cognitive difficulties might 
affect his employment choice. A battery of tests was employed: the TOPF- 
UK tested Derek’s premorbid functioning (epilepsy can impact on cognition 
over time), the WAIS-IV tested current cognitive ability, and the ABS-RC:2 
his adaptive functioning (LD diagnosis depends on deficits in these two 
areas), and the RBMT tested Derek’s memory.
WAIS-IV results revealed an overall low level of cognitive functioning, 
consistent with mild intellectual impairment. ABS-RC:2 scores were good 
compared to other people with LD, but Derek’s weaker areas in this test, 
plus information from interviews, suggested deficits in at least two areas of 
adaptive functioning. He demonstrated moderate memory impairment on 
the RBMT. Surprisingly, Derek’s premorbid functioning was higher than 
expected, suggesting cognitive decline, which could be attributed to 
epilepsy. Epilepsy can affect functioning in several ways, via seizures, 
medication or the syndrome itself. Additional psychosocial factors, such as 
Derek’s mood and trauma, and recent life events, may have affected his 
test performance. Thus, this was not a clear-cut picture of LD and the work 
raised myriad issues to consider as a clinical psychologist.
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SERVICE RELATED RESEARCH PROJECT:
Do process factors operate in cognitive behaviour 
therapy groups? An evaluation of their existence and 
helpfulness to a CBT group for depression
JULY 2010 
YEAR 1
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ABSTRACT
A lack of research into process factors in group therapies (particularly 
cognitive-behavioural (CBT) groups) prompted the current study to 
investigate whether process factors operated within a CBT group for 
depression, and which were the most helpful.
The mixed methods design incorporated quantitative data from a Process 
Measures Questionnaire (PMQ) -  whereby participants rated the 
helpfulness of items representing Yalom’s (1995) process factors -  and 
qualitative data from a focus group. Participants comprised 6 service-users 
attending the CBT group for depression.
Total mean scores for each process were calculated from the PMQ at three 
different administrations, and these were rank-ordered by size change from 
T1 to T3. The calculation of Wilcoxon signed rank-tests revealed 
participants deemed group cohesiveness significantly more helpful at T3 
than at T1, producing a large effect size. Guidance and identification 
showed medium effect sizes.
The focus group was analysed using interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (e.g. Smith et al., 1999) and three superordinate themes were 
interpreted. These illustrated that the group was valued by its members; an 
important reason was the opportunity to share experiences and 
subsequently give and receive support. Acceptance, support and trust 
amongst members are strong indicators of group cohesiveness (Yalom, 
1995); thus the qualitative data helped to illuminate the quantitative 
findings.
The study indicated group processes operated in the CBT group, and some 
were more helpful than others. Illuminating these factors may help improve 
outcome and facilitate clinical change and learning. This information can 
inform how future groups are conducted, by including aspects most 
important to service-users.
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INTRODUCTION
“It is ironic that the most empirically studied group therapy modality 
[cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT)] ignores the group qua group as a 
potential therapeutic agent” (Greene, 2000, p.24). There is a lack of 
research investigating process factors in group CBT, despite their 
importance in other psychotherapeutic groups and empirical evidence 
supporting CBT group intervention. However, Burlingame et al. (2004) 
argue process factors operate in any group therapy, regardless of 
intervention choice, and they have more impact on group members than do 
specific therapeutic approaches. Process factors, therefore, could exist in 
group CBT and, by illuminating them and their importance to group 
members, we might improve the efficacy of this group intervention.
Beck and Lewis (2000) state group processes involve the group as a 
system, including its development and the interactions within it: between 
members, facilitators, members and facilitators, the effect these 
subsystems have on each other, and how they are affected by the whole 
group. However, this explanation does not offer any operational definitions 
of these processes. Yalom (1995) identifies twelve group factors which 
may produce therapeutic change: altruism, group cohesiveness,
universality, interpersonal learning (input), interpersonal learning (output), 
guidance, catharsis, identification, family re-enactment, self-understanding, 
instillation of hope, and existential factors. Yalom argues these operate in 
nearly all group therapies. Bieling et al. (2006) consider seven variables 
which reflect Yalom’s findings, but could be harnessed to improve the 
effectiveness of group CBT: optimism, inclusion, group-based learning, 
shifting self-focus, modification of maladaptive relational patterns, group 
cohesiveness, and emotion-processing in the group setting. The current 
study is based on Yalom’s group processes, bearing in mind Bieling et a/.’s 
additional CBT-specific theories.
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The study aimed to identify whether group processes operated within a 
CBT group for depression and, of these, which were most helpful to group 
members.
The study posited a two-tailed hypothesis that Yalom’s (1995) process 
factors were operating in this CBT group and that some were more helpful 
to participants than others. This information could be used to inform how 
the second half of the group -  and future groups at the service -  are 
conducted in a way most useful to service-users.
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Participants
The sample consisted of 6 service-users attending a CBT group for 
depression: 1 man and 4 women, aged 36 to 49 (m = 41.83, sd = 4.92), all 
White British and with diagnoses of moderate to severe depression. Group 
members were selected during assessment interviews according to 
depression as the primary problem, and ability and desire to work in a 
group context.
Design
A mixed-methods design was employed, incorporating quantitative data 
from a Process Measures Questionnaire (PMQ) and qualitative data from a 
focus group. Participants completed the PMQ at 3 separate points during 
therapy: the first session (T1: pre-therapy), second session (T2) and fifth 
session (T3: mid-therapy). A 20-minute focus group was held with all 
participants at T3.
Process Measures Questionnaire
The PMQ was adapted from Yalom’s (1995) Curative Factors 
Questionnaire (CFQ), a Q-sort procedure for ranking the helpfulness of 
group therapeutic factors. It comprises 60 items, divided into sets of 5, 
conceptualising his 12 process factors. I modified the CFQ into a self- 
report questionnaire, whereby each item is scored by participants on a 4-
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point Likert scale (0 = not helpful, 3 = very helpful), according to how helpful 
they think the items will be in future sessions (for T1 and T2), or have been 
so far (for T3). Participants were unaware of the 12 categories, presented 
only with the 60-item list (Appendix A).
Focus group
The 20-minute mid-therapy focus group discussed participant views on how 
group therapy was progressing. Their informed consent was requested 
(Appendix B). This was an unstructured interview, recorded on a 
Dictaphone, transcribed (Appendix C) and analysed using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA, e.g. Smith et ai, 1999).
Therapeutic group
The group was a 12-session third-wave influenced CBT group for 
depression, based on the interaction between thoughts, emotions and 
behaviour and traditional CBT strategies, such as behavioural activation 
(e.g. Greenberger and Padesky, 1995). It also incorporated third-wave 
techniques, including compassionate mind training (Gilbert and Irons, 2005) 
and mindfulness-based approaches (Segal et ai, 2002). The group was 
facilitated by a CBT therapist, a consultant clinical psychologist, and a 
trainee clinical psychologist.
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ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
QUANTITATIVE
Participants’ scores for the 60 PMQ items were summed to give total 
scores for each of the 12 process factors. These were averaged across the 
6 participants, to give group means (see Table 1). These are represented 
in the bar chart in Figure 1, in which the process factors have been rank- 
ordered by size-change from T1 to T3. The first 5 processes (group 
cohesiveness to interpersonal learning: input) were subjected to a Wilcoxon 
signed rank-test. I nominated these processes for closer inspection 
because their T1-T3 ratings had changed by 1 point or more, and I wished 
to explore whether these changes were clinically meaningful. The small 
sample size (n = 6) meant statistical tests were unlikely to yield enough 
power to determine significant change, potentially leading to Type II error. 
However, the z-value provided by the Wilcoxon test allowed the calculation 
of effect sizes: participants deemed group cohesiveness significantly more 
helpful at T3 (m = 11) than T1 (m = 7.83), z = -2.23, p < 0.05, r = -0.64, 
producing a large effect size. Wilcoxon tests did not show significant 
increases from T1 to T3 for the other 4 processes, but guidance (z = -0.31, 
p > 0.05, r = -0.31) and identification (z = -1.29, p > 0.05, r = -0.37) showed 
medium effect sizes.
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QUALITATIVE
The focus group transcript was analysed using I PA. This method was 
chosen as a means of gaining richer insight into participants’ experiences, 
particularly regarding processes operating in the CBT group. This seemed 
an appropriate approach, given the subjectivity of group therapy 
experiences. Three main themes emerged from the data: positive regard 
for the group, support and sharing, and comparisons to others -  comfort 
and inspiration.
Positive regard for the group
Participants valued their attendance of the group: “I place a lot of 
importance on the group, it’s good”. This was supported by others who 
“see it in terms of where to go from for the next week”, implying it was 
central to guiding their week. Those initially unconvinced of the benefit of 
group therapy were converted by session 5: “I didn’t come with the most 
positive of attitudes, but that has changed now... I’m very surprised that 
I’ve... put as much importance as I do on the group”. High attendance 
levels reflected this positive regard for the group; furthermore, members 
who missed sessions were disappointed: “I feel sad that I missed last 
week”.
Support and sharing
This theme illustrates that participants might have valued the group so 
highly because of opportunities for support and sharing. Support was 
evidenced in the here-and-now of the recording: “A few times this week 
you’ve crept into my thoughts, wondering how you’ve been doing... I hope 
you’re alright”. Participants referred to previous sessions where they 
received support: “I got lots of support from everybody here”; and also 
recognised the significance of giving it: “To try and give a little bit of support 
when you feel you can, that’s an important part”. They also discussed the 
benefits of sharing their problems with others: “I’ve got this opportunity to 
come to the group and talk over things, stuff like that which I don’t get the 
rest of the week”.
Participants appeared to differ in how readily they could share experiences. 
Some were honest about their depression: “I am very open to tell because
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I’ve tried the secretive way and it’s made me very ill”. Others benefited 
from disclosing their problems: “I’ve had to let work know... But I’m lucky 
that they’re very supportive”. Conversely, some members found it difficult 
to share their feelings: “I don’t generally talk about how I feel because I 
don’t want other people to see what I’m like”. Sometimes, this was due to 
negative early experiences: “Growing up, I learned you don’t reveal what 
you feel”, or because of other people’s reactions: “I’d be scared they’d look 
at me differently”. For other participants, keeping feelings secret was a way 
of protecting those they love: “Everyone has their own problems, I don’t 
want to burden them with everything else”.
Nevertheless, the group appeared to have a positive influence on members 
who were more reluctant to share their feelings: “It’s made me toy with the 
idea of telling my family... Coming to the group does make me contemplate 
it more”. Presumably, this was due to positive experiences members 
gained from sharing within, and receiving support from, the group: “It’s kind 
of given me a warm fuzzy feeling actually”.
Comparisons to others -  comfort and inspiration
Group members used the group to draw comparisons between themselves 
and others. Sometimes, this took the form of acknowledging positive 
experiences of others and wanting to achieve these for themselves: “It’s 
like you say, you have a warm fuzzy feeling, I want to feel that”. Group 
members appeared to inspire each other to contemplate change: “Some 
people here are more open about it than I am. I sort of see that and think, 
perhaps I could be a bit more open”.
Participants seemed to draw comfort from comparing themselves with each 
other, discovering their similarities, and demonstrating empathy: “Meeting 
the people here and being able to talk to them and realising that I am 
normal”. This had a normalising effect on members, typically isolated by 
their depression: “You wouldn’t want anyone in the whole world to feel like 
you do, but then it’s kind of a weird comfort that you come to this group and 
there are people who do have an understanding of what you’re going 
through”. This was a helpful aspect of group therapy because “you can
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connect with [the group]. And they don’t judge you here, no one’s judging 
you”.
Two participants made comparisons between the therapeutic group and 
their family contexts. For one, this had not necessarily been a positive 
experience: “I think I’ve had a bit of trouble with groups. My family’s six and 
with parents, that’s eight, there’s eight in here and that”. She seemed to 
draw parallels between being in the group and growing up in a family where 
she felt unable to trust other members. However, she hoped to use the 
group to overcome this: “I fail to trust easily, but I’m hoping that’ll change”. 
For another member, similarities between the group and his family helped 
him contemplate telling relatives about his depression: “We’re a group, you 
know, it’s a bit like my family, the group. So, yeah, it makes me think about 
that”.
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DISCUSSION 
Group cohesiveness
Participants deemed this the most helpful process and one which increased 
most in importance from T1 to T3. Yalom (1995) describes cohesion as 
affecting interpersonal components of nearly all other group factors, and 
Satterfield (1994) considers it to be one of three main processes operating 
in group CBT. Its importance is reflected in the qualitative data, which 
highlighted aspects which would have made group cohesiveness more 
likely: high attendance levels, and high levels of self-disclosure. Yalom 
identifies these as indicators of group cohesiveness, which he defines as 
involving acceptance, support, and trust amongst members. This was true 
of the group, which members considered non-judgmental. They received 
support through having their self-disclosures validated, and through 
meeting others with similar problems. Their trust allowed them to share 
their own experiences and they appreciated feedback from fellow 
members, inspiring them to change their own lives. These may indicate 
reasons why Yalom claims highly cohesive groups show greater self­
disclosure and better outcomes.
Catharsis
This was rated less helpful, according to the quantitative data but, arguably, 
was represented as significant in the qualitative. Although it did not 
explicitly refer to catharsis, the focus group revealed the importance of 
sharing feelings, as opposed to concealing them. Yalom (1995) views 
catharsis as essential for clinical change. However, Bieling et al., (2006) 
argue it may not be so relevant in group CBT because the model does not 
view catharsis as an ultimate goal, rather an initial step on the way to 
clinical change. Given the qualitative evidence for its presence and the 
importance placed on it by Yalom, I am inclined to believe that catharsis is 
a more significant process than the quantitative data indicates. This 
discrepancy may have occurred as a result of limitations of the PMQ, as 
discussed below.
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Other processes
Other processes supported by the quantitative findings and illuminated in 
the qualitative data include universality, family re-enactment, identification, 
instillation of hope, guidance, and altruism. These reflect the processes 
outlined by Bieling et al. (2006) for group CBT, and were deemed present 
and helpful by participants to a greater or lesser extent. As concluded by 
Yalom (1995), lower ranked processes are not necessarily insignificant, just 
less significant than others. It is more difficult to comment on the following 
processes, as there was little evidence of their presence in the qualitative 
data: self-understanding, existential factors, and interpersonal learning 
(input and output). The limitations of the PMQ may have had an effect on 
the discrepancy between the quantitative and qualitative results.
Strengths and limitations
PMQ: This was not received particularly positively by participants who, 
according to the focus group, felt the items were “generic” and “limited”, 
and the questionnaire lengthy. This led them to question its accuracy, and 
impacted on how they completed the questionnaires. There is evidence to 
suggest some participants scored arbitrarily: “I think I just ticked whatever 
box”. As depression sufferers, they may have rated items as less helpful 
than a different client group would have, because of the pessimistic nature 
of their illness. However, this would have been proportional across the 
range of processes and participants.
Despite some negative feedback, the PMQ was devised from a respectable 
source: Yalom is one of the key researchers in the field of therapeutic 
processes and his studies are well validated (Yalom, 1995; Burlingame et 
al., 2004; Bieling et al., 2006). This information was given to participants, 
with emphasis on the fact that the original Q-sort was derived from the 
opinions of service-users, such as themselves. Furthermore, the Q-sort 
has been successfully modified to a self-report questionnaire before (see 
Butler and Fuhriman, 1983). A 4-point Likert scale was chosen to avoid 
participants responding with a mid-range answer to every question.
Service-user inclusion: Participants were also made aware of the
intention of the study to discover what was important to them, regarding
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their group therapy, in order to improve the service they received. Because 
of the limitations of the PMQ to facilitate this, the focus group was added to 
enrich learning about what was helpful about the group. Participants were 
encouraged to air their views at each administration of the PMQ, and were 
asked about when and how frequently they preferred to complete it, and I 
acted on these responses. In this way, the group and the study were very 
much made to suit their members, rather than vice versa.
Mixed methods design: This design provides a useful approach in terms 
of complementarity, as outlined by Greene et al., (1989), who highlight the 
advantages of clarifying the results of one method with the use of another. 
In this case, the quantitative data provided evidence of the most important 
process measures appearing to operate in the group. In an attempt to 
encourage both participants and myself (as both group facilitator and 
researcher) to be more reflexive, the focus group was introduced to obtain 
qualitative data which, overall, supported and illuminated the quantitative 
information. This enhanced the quality and scope of the evaluation.
Scope of study: This could have been further improved. Firstly, a larger 
sample size would have been desirable, but was not feasible in the service. 
Secondly, more fruitful data could have been achieved, had it been 
possible to conduct a further evaluation (PMQ plus focus group) at the end 
of therapy. Due to the length of the group programme, its start date, and 
time available to collect data, it was only possible to evaluate the first half of 
the intervention. However, the focus group suggests that, by this point, 
participants had spent enough time together and in therapy to be aware of 
emerging process factors.
Future research may wish to investigate group CBT processes, such as 
those outlined here, in relation to therapy outcome, for example, as 
represented by pre- and post-therapy Beck Depression Inventory II scores 
(Beck et al., 1996).
Disseminating findings
The results will be disseminated to the service via a team meeting 
presentation on 8th September 2010. My recommendations are as follows:
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Just as the therapeutic relationship is nurtured for effective individual CBT 
(e.g. Leahy, 2008), so the service would benefit from maximising the 
cohesiveness in its CBT groups:
• Pre-therapy: At assessment stage, facilitators may select as
homogeneous a group as possible, to increase the likelihood of 
cohesion. A pre-therapy “meet-and-greet” session could be arranged 
for members to get to know each other in an informal setting.
• During therapy: facilitators should highlight shared experiences among 
members, in order to capture that important feeling of “not being alone” 
in their difficulties. On the basis of this study, we began allowing 
members more time each session to relate to each other how their 
weeks had been, with less facilitator input. This can help foster the 
support and sharing which aids cohesiveness.
• Post-therapy: if possible, at the end of a group therapy programme, it 
may benefit particularly cohesive groups to use the group room to meet 
for several weeks without facilitators, so the end of therapy does not 
mean the dissolution of the cohesive group.
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APPENDIX B:
Participant consent form
UNIVERSITY OF SURREY 
PSYCHO CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
CONSENT TO COURSE WORK ASSIGNMENTS
I understand that ............................................... , trainee clinical
psychologist would like my permission to use information about me to 
complete a course work assignment (service related research project).
I understand that the work will not contain any information that would reveal 
my personal identity i.e. my name, address, when and where the work took 
place, other clinicians involved or other identifying details.
I understand that the only people who look at course work assignments are 
the trainee’s supervisor in this service and the University tutors or 
examiners who are qualified clinical psychologists who work in or for the 
NHS.
I understand that the work will be checked by the trainee’s supervisor to 
ensure that my anonymity and confidentiality have been safeguarded.
I understand that the course work assignments are kept in securely locked 
premises and are not available for public access and are not kept in the 
University library. Assignments are destroyed by the University three years 
after the trainee has successfully completed the training course. If the 
trainee keeps copies of the assignments he/she must keep them securely 
in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s Professional Practice 
Guidelines and the Data Protection Act.
As the assignment is an academic piece of work required by the trainee as 
part of the training course and which does not identify me personally and 
will not form part of my NHS record, I understand that I will not receive a 
copy of it. This is because the emphasis in this assignment is on the 
trainee’s learning process rather than adding clinical information to my NHS 
health record.
I understand that I do not have to allow information about me to be used in 
this way. I can change my mind and refuse my consent at any stage and 
this will have no effect on the treatment offered to me.
Name of Client: Date:
Client’s signature:
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APPENDIX C:
Focus group transcript
Facilitator:
So at the end of last session there was, there were lots of emotions coming 
out of that session. We started to talk about the way you felt, about being 
in a group.... and we were hoping to talk a little bit more about that today, if 
you’re able to share your thoughts about it?
PI:
I think of the start of my week as Wednesday now. I count each week in 
terms of Wednesday. I see it in terms of the basis of where to go from for 
the next week. [To P2]: And a few times this week you’ve crept into my 
thoughts, wondering how you’ve been doing, cos I know you were...
P2:
Oh, cheers.
PI:
...Particularly low last week. A few times you’ve just sort of popped in. I 
hope you’re alright.
P2:
Cheers.
P5:
I’d agree with you there. I think I said earlier, it’s so difficult to think that 
someone else is feeling like that.
Facilitator:
What does it feel like, hearing that?
P2:
Yeah, it’s er, it’s kind of given me a warm fuzzy feeling actually [group 
laughter].
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Facilitator:
That sounds nice!
P2:
Yeah, it is quite nice, but yeah, I sort of knew these were nice people. 
That’s good, cos I mean I sort of think about other people from here as well, 
so, urn, during the week, and this is quite an important part of my week I 
think. You know, cos it’s my health and all that sort of thing, it’s quite a big, 
big thing to try and continue to attend, to get rid of, and er, I kind of, 
sometimes, I do, sort of, you know, it’s “How long is it ’til Wednesday?” kind 
of thing, because I’ve got this opportunity to come to the group and talk 
over things, stuff like that which I don’t get the rest of the week. The rest of 
the week -  unless I meet a friend -  it’s a similar problem, then I don’t get a 
chance to sort of talk about this, this stuff. So sometimes I’m thinking, “Oh, 
it’s Saturday, you know, I’ve still got ages to go ’til Wednesday” kind of 
thing. So, I place a lot of importance on the group, it’s good [pause]. I’m 
not sure I’m having much success, with regards to improving how I feel, but 
it’s a start, it’s better actually coming here and meeting people with similar 
difficulties. That seems helpful.
P3:
So that sounds like it’s a question of finding other people with common 
problems and being able to share, even though you’re not noticing any sort 
of changes within you, it still seems to be important to, it’s quite important, I 
feel, like I said earlier, I really feel, so many times, that I don’t want to be 
here anymore, so I’m prepared to do whatever the group suggests, give it a 
go, so yeah, it’s quite important. And I’m quite pleased with myself to say 
that I do get here every time. I think it’s quite an achievement.
PI:
I was very sceptical, as you know, about how I would cope in a group and 
whether it would be the right thing for me, and I have to say I’m very 
surprised that I’ve adapted as quickly as I have and put as much 
importance as I do on the group.
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P2:
Have you not done a group before?
PI:
No. I don’t generally talk about how I feel because I don’t want other 
people to see what I’m like.
P2:
Yeah.
Facilitator:
How do you think you’ve been able to do that, how have you found the 
reactions of others?
P1:
Good. Um... I hate the fact that there’s others, this is gonna sound bad, 
but that there’s other people here cos it means that there’s other people 
who feel like I do and that’s just wrong, it shouldn’t be like this. But you 
know, I do draw comfort from it.
[pause]
Facilitator:
Um, we talked a bit last week about how people think things are going so 
far, in terms of the group itself and what’s most helpful...
P2:
I think one of the things is, like, there is, you know, like last week, I got lots 
of support from everybody here, and again, this week, and I think, and I try 
and give some support, a little support back, sometimes, to other people, 
even if it’s just acknowledging, perhaps, that you feel the same. I think that 
there’s a lot to be had just from getting that support from other people 
within the group. And to try and give a little bit of support when you feel 
you can, that’s an important part.
Facilitator:
Does that ring true for anyone else?
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P3:
Yes, I think it’s like [P1] said, you wouldn’t want anyone in the whole world 
to feel like you do, but then it’s kind of a weird comfort that you come to this 
group and there are people who do have an understanding of what you’re 
going through, that you can connect with. And they don’t judge you here, 
no one’s judging you.
P4:
I think I’ve had a bit of trouble with groups. My family’s six and with 
parents, that’s eight, there’s eight in here and that. Growing up, I learnt you 
don’t reveal what you feel. I fail to trust easily, but I’m hoping that’ll change.
P2:
So you find it quite difficult to open up?
P4:
Yes. I can intellectually stand aside.
Facilitator:
So it sounds like there are some parallels that you can draw between the 
group and the family in which you grew up?
P4:
I feel sad that I missed last week. It sounds like it was pretty emotional for 
some people and that might have been good for me to experience.
P2:
You really didn’t miss much [group laughter]
P4:
[laughing] But it’s like you say, you have a warm fuzzy feeling, I want to 
feel that [laughter].
Facilitator:
Has the group made anyone else think about themselves in relation to 
other people?
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P2:
It’s made me toy with the idea of telling my family. I don’t, I haven’t, they 
don’t know. It’s something I’ve been thinking about for a long time, but I’m 
still not sure if I should do it really, but it does, coming to the group does 
make me contemplate it more because, you know, we’re in a group, you 
know, it’s a bit like my family, the group. So, yeah, it makes me think about 
that.
P5:
Is it that you’re worried about what kind of response you’d get from them? 
P2:
Yeah, I’d be scared they’d look at me differently. I’d like them to be 
sympathetic, but I’m not sure everybody would be. I’m sure they probably 
would, but you just don’t know. Once you’ve told somebody something, 
you can’t take it back, so...
P5:
So, do you feel that you hide from everybody, apart from when you’re here? 
P2:
I’m, I’m...
P5:
Do you hide who you are?
P2:
I’m less so now, sort of trying to, since coming to the group and stuff like 
that is making me sort of less, not hide so much, I think. I mean sometimes 
I feel, I feel more prone to sort of blurt out something to people now, more 
than I would’ve done in the past. I think, what the hell, just come clean, just 
come out with it because some people here are more open about it than I 
am, I sort of see that and think, perhaps I could be a bit more open and 
stuff. Sort of, tell more people, rather than just holding it in all the time. 
Perhaps it would help.
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Facilitator:
Is that something that you tend to do, hide your true selves from other 
people?
P3:
I’m, I am very open to tell because I’ve tried the secretive way and it’s 
made me very ill and, because you’re feeling really ill and horrible, and then 
you can’t even speak about it so you’re trying to pretend, so I am, now, I 
don’t hide, I don’t hide it from people, and I know that most people don’t 
understand and I’m quite glad they don’t really, cos I wouldn’t want them to 
be, to have an understanding but I still say, yeah, I am. You know, I don’t 
hide it and I’m not secretive about it and I don’t pretend anymore because, 
because I can’t.
P2:
Yeah, I think it was you sort of saying something before, that’s one of the 
things that sort of triggered it for me was that you said you were quite open 
about it and stuff, and you were sort of the opposite in a way, you didn’t 
really have to hide it anymore, didn’t have to think about it.
P3:
I got to the stage where I just couldn’t cos, trying to be the person that 
everyone thinks you are and it was just making me so ill, cos you can’t, you 
have to censor everything you say...
P2:
Mmm
P3:
... And I just couldn’t do that anymore.
P2:
I sort of think sometimes, when I feel myself getting into a bit of a hole, that 
I sort of better come clean because I just need someone to talk to, I sort of 
think, I’m gonna ring up my sister, or someone like that, just to, you know, 
“come out” as it were, sort of, say the truth you know, cos there are times
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when I sort of, you know, feel, sort of, really ill, really need somebody to talk 
to and then I don’t, and it sort of passes, and I go back to hiding.
PI:
I’m sort of in between the two of you, a lot of my family know that I’m 
suffering, but they don’t know the extent because I’m wanting to protect 
them from how I’m feeling, so I sort of go half-way. I can talk to my sister, 
and I can talk to my husband, but I just feel that everyone has their own 
problems, I don’t want to burden them with everything else as well, so they 
sort of have half the knowledge, I’m not having to hide it, but I’m not going 
into great detail. And obviously I’ve had to let work know cos it’s affecting 
my work pattern and things like that, but I’m lucky that they’re very 
supportive.
P6:
I would agree with that. I don’t want to burden other people. Sometimes I 
think, ooh, I’m gonna tell my family, and then I think, well, my mum’s got 
problems, isn’t very well, so I sort of think, perhaps I shouldn’t say anything, 
you know, and you sort of hear other people have got problems, I don’t 
wanna sort of, add to their stuff, so that puts me off.
[pause]
Facilitator:
Does anyone want to comment on how they feel in the group now, as 
opposed to at the start, in our first session a few weeks ago?
PI:
I am better now, I was very sceptical in the beginning um, the only reason I 
agreed to it was because I hadn’t tried it and I’m willing to give anything a 
go once and, so I came on the first week and thought, “Well, if it doesn’t 
work for me, I don’t need to come back again”, I didn’t come with the most 
positive of attitudes, but that has changed now, I do have a much more 
positive attitude towards the group now, meeting the people here and being 
able to talk to them and realising that I am normal.
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P3:
It was quite scary to come in a room full of strangers and, you know, you sit 
and you think, you know, it was a scary thing to do. I, I suppose a bit like 
[P1], I was kind of thinking, “Oh, are they gonna have a magic wand there 
that they’re gonna wave over us?”, but I do feel quite comfortable, you 
know, quite relaxed, when I’m here.
Facilitator:
That’s something that I think you, [P2], said earlier in the group today, you 
mentioned feeling comfortable in the group?
P2:
Yeah, it makes a big difference.
[pause] 
Facilitator:
Just before we finish recording, i ’d really appreciate any kind of comments 
from you about the questionnaires that I’ve given you cos I know that there 
were a few comments from people at the start about how they found the 
questionnaires?
P1:
I just found them generic, it depends on the mood I am on that day and at 
that particular moment really. I don’t feel that they can be really accurate. I 
just, and a lot of the answers, a lot of the questions, I can’t, I feel I can’t 
answer in the very limited scope that you have. I’m sure they’re based on a 
lot of research, but to me they seem of limited use.
P5:
Well, I think I just ticked whatever box, “Oh yeah, that looks about right”.
P2:
It’s quite hard to gauge, I think, I can’t remember what the boxes were, but 
it was like “Less like something, slightly more”, like shades of how you’re 
feeling, it’s quite difficult to say, to grade. It could be different every day, 
probably every few hours [group laughter].
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Facilitator:
I’m just wondering if it’s partly because the questionnaires I gave you were 
at the beginning of the group, do you think some of those attitudes might 
have changed since you’ve had some experience now of being in group 
therapy?
P5:
Yeah, I expect some of the answers might be different. Cos you gave them 
to us on the first week, didn’t you? Yeah, so probably would’ve changed a 
bit, I would think.
Facilitator:
Okay, thank you. Were there any other comments?
P6:
I think they’ll be quite different from what they were at the start.
P1:
Can I just say, I like the groups where we get to talk more, rather than, sort 
of have theory preached at us.
Facilitator:
Does that make it more powerful?
P1:
Yeah, it is, it is. I find those groups are a lot more useful than the ones 
where we’re talked to.
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EVIDENCE OF SRRP FINDINGS HAVING BEEN FED 
BACK TO THE SERVICE
Ezza
D a t e : 16 September 2010
•*V
Holly Winton
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Dear Holly
Re: SRRP Presentation
Thank you for presenting the findings of your SRRP project on processes in CBT groups. Your 
presentation was very clear and succinct I think one or two people were surprised to hear that CBT 
therapists might be interested in group processes. It has certainly been a neglected area and I am 
grateful for your interest in this and for sharing your findings with us. It certainly stimulated a good 
deal of discussion at the end and I am sure this would have gone on for much longer had time 
allowed.
Thank you once again for throwing some light on an area which I am particularly interested in at the 
moment.
With best wishes.
Yours sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
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ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND
Research suggests self-discrepancy is associated with shame, depression 
and anxiety in adults, as well as reduced self-worth. By contrast, the 
literature on adolescent experiences is sparse. This is surprising, given 
adolescence is a time of increased self-evaluation in developing the self 
and relations with others. Of prime interest is how young people’s 
appraisals of themselves and others impact on self-esteem and emotional 
wellbeing. Thus, it is proposed self-discrepancy is associated with shame, 
depression and anxiety, due to its relationship with self-esteem. 
Associated low self-esteem and negative affect could be lessened by 
fostering self-compassion, which engenders tolerance of non-ideal self­
attributes. Thus, it is also hypothesised that self-compassion moderates 
the relationship between self-discrepancy and self-esteem.
METHOD
A cross-sectional questionnaire-based design was employed: measures of 
self-discrepancy, self-esteem, self-compassion, shame, depression and 
anxiety were completed by a community sample of 141 16 to 18 year-olds. 
Data were subjected to correlation, regression, mediation and moderation 
analyses.
RESULTS
Self-discrepancy predicted a small but significant amount of the variance in 
shame, depression and anxiety. However, when self-esteem was entered 
simultaneously into the regression model, self-esteem emerged as the only 
significant predictor of negative affect. Subsequently, it was found that self­
esteem partially mediates the relationship between self-discrepancy and 
negative affect. Self-compassion, however, did not significantly moderate 
the relationship between self-discrepancy and self-esteem.
CONCLUSIONS
Self-esteem has more predictive utility than self-discrepancy on adolescent 
experiences of shame, depression and anxiety, and it partially mediates the 
relationship between self-discrepancy and negative affect. Self­
compassion is a potential protective factor against negative emotion, and 
possible explanations are discussed for why it was not revealed to 
significantly moderate the relationship between self-discrepancy and self­
esteem. Methodological limitations of the study are discussed, as are ideas 
for future research and clinical implications, including promoting self­
compassion to protect self-discrepant adolescents from self-esteem 
damage and negative affect.
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INTRODUCTION
Research background
Adolescence is a critical period for the development of the self, and for the 
emotional wellbeing of young people, as they experience changes in affect 
regulation and self-identity (Schore, 1994). As they become more 
independent of their families, adolescents move towards their peer groups 
for support and acceptance (Buhrmester, 1996), and refine their internal 
systems for relating to the self and others (Gilbert & Irons, 2009). Whilst 
negotiating the above challenges, young people must adapt to a rise in self- 
evaluation and competition with others for social place, as they start 
identifying selves that will be accepted by their increasingly important peer 
groups (Gilbert & Irons, 2009). This is likely to have a number of 
consequences for emotional experiences and self-esteem.
How a young person appraises themselves and those around them has a 
marked impact on their self-esteem and emotional wellbeing (Macdonald,
1994). This is because self-esteem relies on an appraisal of the valence of 
one’s attributes (whether they are good or bad) which, in turn, affects one’s 
mood state (see Mann et al., 2004). Appraisals are normally conducted 
against a set of self-standards, rules and goals, and subsequently, both 
one’s self-perception and the anticipated reaction of others (M. Lewis,
1995). Thus, of critical importance is how adolescents perceive themselves 
against their own set of values as well as against their peers. These 
standards relate to the individual’s cognitions, emotions and actions, and 
are influenced by society and the young person’s culture (M. Lewis, 1995). 
Most importantly, the family of origin will have supported the development 
of an emerging self-identity and self-esteem.
Gilbert and Irons (2009) summarise the literature suggesting that 
individuals who have not developed in safe, loving upbringings are more 
prone to negative self-evaluation and shame. They suggest they may lack 
an internalised model of kindness and warmth from others, which may lead 
to an inability to generate such feelings towards the self (Gilbert, 2000). 
Gilbert and Irons link this to subsequent experiences of self-criticism and
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shame, which alert the individual to instances where they are losing esteem 
within their social group. This strategy is more likely to be activated in 
people who are self-critical and have a negative perception of their own 
attributes and how others evaluate them. Recent interventions, such as 
compassionate mind training (Gilbert & Irons, 2005; Gilbert & Procter,
2006) have been developed to target this problem through the promotion of 
self-compassion (rather than self-esteem). Whereas self-esteem entails an 
evaluation of the valence of the self (either positive or negative), self­
compassion bypasses this personal critique, instead focusing on a non- 
judgmental acceptance of the self, in spite of shortcomings and 
discrepancies. This has been shown to positively correlate with 
psychological wellbeing, and negatively correlate with emotional distress 
(Neff, 2003a; Neff & McGehee, 2010; Neff & Vonk, 2009). Therefore, it 
could be a useful preventative measure for protecting adolescents against 
negative self-perception and associated low self-esteem and negative 
affect.
Project overview
This project is concerned primarily with adolescent self-evaluation and its 
relationships with negative affect. In particular, the study aims to explore 
how negative self-evaluation impacts on experiences of shame in young 
people. These concepts and their real-life applications will be explored in 
the introduction. Firstly, issues pertinent to the self will be outlined, starting 
with an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of self-concept and self­
esteem in adolescence. The importance of self-esteem during this critical 
period, in which self-formation is key, will be investigated. This includes the 
impact of self-esteem on emotional states and, specifically, the effect of low 
self-esteem on depression, anxiety and shame.
As well as exploring emotional states that self-esteem may influence, 
factors which influence self-esteem will be discussed, revealing personal 
evaluation of the self as a critical aspect. Adolescence is a time for 
increased self-evaluation and self-criticism; if the self is perceived to be 
discrepant from a personal ideal, this may lead to emotional distress, 
including depression, anxiety and shame. The core theoretical ideas drawn 
upon in this regard are those presented in Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy
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theory and the associated literature supporting various emotional outcomes 
of different self-discrepancies. Individuals who believe (or think other 
people believe) that they do not live up to the self they want or ought to be, 
are prone to experience negative affect. Of interest in the current research 
is the relationship between different types of self-discrepancy and the 
emotional states of depression, anxiety and shame, and the role of self­
esteem. In understanding these relationships in young people, the 
potential benefits of self-compassion will be discussed. The introduction 
will conclude with a proposed model of the connection between self­
discrepancy, self-esteem, self-compassion and negative affect, after which 
the study’s hypotheses will be presented.
THE SELF
Social construction of the self
Psychologists have long been intrigued by the notion and understanding of 
the self. Theorists posit that the self is informed by the beliefs and 
evaluations people hold about themselves and the world; these dictate who 
they are, what they do, and what they can become (Burns, 1982). Thus, it 
is argued that the self is a social construct, which changes over the course 
of one’s lifetime, within different roles and contexts, and which is informed 
by feedback from, and interactions with, significant others (e.g. Cooley, 
1902; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). Greenwald & Breckler (1985) differentiate 
between the public self, which seeks approval from and is based on the 
reactions of other people, and the private self, which is determined by 
internalised self-standards.
Erikson (1968) conceptualises the evolving nature of the self in his stages 
of psychosocial development. Individuals must successfully negotiate each 
stage in order to crystallise their sense of identity. The adolescent stage 
(12 to 18 years old) is critical for identity formation as, over time, the young 
person moves away from the family of origin and towards membership of a 
peer group, and wider society. Adolescents become increasingly 
sophisticated at evaluating themselves, both from their own perspective, 
and that of other people. Role formation and an integrated sense of self 
begin to develop during this stage through exploration of the world in terms
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of ideals, advances in social interactions and belonging, and establishment 
of morality. The typical adolescent is likely to have their sense of self 
challenged (as well as consolidated) via interactions with and comparisons 
to their peers and other members of their community, as they learn to take 
more responsibility for their own actions. Conflict at this stage may lead to 
role confusion and identity crisis. Higgins (1987) proposes that this occurs 
when there is a discrepancy between how one views oneself and how one 
perceives others to view oneself: an actual/own versus actual/other 
discrepancy. His self-discrepancy theory (SDT) posits a number of 
negative emotional outcomes resulting from different types of discrepancies 
between the actual self and ideal and ought selves, from the standpoint of 
both the self and the other. The self, therefore, cannot be studied simply in 
isolation, but in terms of how it relates to other people (Baldwin & Sinclair,
1996). According to SDT, it is the actual/own self and the actual/other self 
which make up the self-concept.
Mann et al. (2004) differentiate between self-concept and self-esteem as 
two parts of the self. Self-concept refers to the cognitive schema 
organising one’s knowledge and beliefs about personal attributes. This is 
the fundamental building block against which young people view 
themselves and establish their self-identity. Self-esteem is the affective 
and evaluative component of the self, which appraises the valence of said 
attributes. Macdonald (1994) posits that the construction of positive self­
esteem is the most basic task throughout a person’s life, for mental, 
emotional and social wellbeing.
SELF-ESTEEM
What is self-esteem?
Rosenberg (1965) describes self-esteem as an attitude towards the self, 
reflecting the extent to which one likes oneself (Brown & Marshall, 2006). 
Comprising both cognitive and affective aspects (e.g. Swann et al., 2007), 
self-esteem is based on self-referent beliefs and positive and negative 
feelings about one’s qualities. Leary et al. (1995) describe the distinction 
that may be made between trait self-esteem (a person’s average level of
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self-esteem across contexts and time) and state self-esteem (the self- 
evaluation which fluctuates according to daily events).
Self-esteem begins to develop during childhood and adolescence and is 
thought to be largely determined by parental attachment. Unconditional 
parental support and approval is likely to facilitate a sense of competence 
and, therefore, self-esteem, in the developing child. However, negative 
interpersonal experiences, such as poor parenting, low maternal 
acceptance, negative feedback about one’s abilities, and disharmonious 
family relationships, are liable to engender low self-worth (Garber & Flynn, 
2001).
Kernis (2003) discriminates between secure and fragile types of self­
esteem. The former is based on realistic foundations for self-worth, 
independent of constant validation and approval from others. By contrast, 
the latter requires such validation because it depends upon the fulfilment of 
ideals that the individual believes are necessary for them to have worth as 
a person (Deci & Ryan, 1995). This renders their self-esteem more 
vulnerable to threat. The main difference between the two is that fragile 
self-esteem is contingent upon the individual meeting the standards upon 
which their self-worth is based. Self-esteem is likely to drop if these 
standards cannot be met (Deci & Ryan, 1995). Baldwin and Sinclair (1996) 
found that people with low self-esteem associated success with 
acceptance, and failure with rejection by others. The belief that acceptance 
by another is contingent on performance may result in a fragile sense of 
self-esteem. This is supported by Zeigler-Hill et al. (2011), who found that 
individuals with fragile high self-esteem anticipated having stronger 
emotional reactions to social rejection and achievement failure. It is more 
desirable to develop unconditional positive self-regard; this is the basis for 
‘true’ self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995).
Self-esteem may change, however, over the course of one’s lifetime. This 
is as a result of social experience and individual differences in what are 
deemed important aspects of the self, and the meaning people attach to 
these (Pelham & Swann, 1989). Orth et al. (2011) examined the life-span 
of self-esteem and found it increases from adolescence to middle
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adulthood, peaking approximately at the age of 50, and decreasing in older 
age. They also discovered medium effect sizes for self-esteem on life-span 
trajectories of affect and depression (among other life outcomes); thus, 
across the lifespan, self-esteem is moderately negatively correlated with 
negative affect.
Explanations for self-esteem
There is an undisputed link between self-esteem, affect, adjustment and 
health (Leary et al., 1995). High self-esteem has a number of 
psychological benefits. Its correlates include subjective wellbeing, 
happiness and positive affect, and it is thought to act as a buffer against 
negative experiences, such as rejection or failure (see Zeigler-Hill et al., 
2011, for a review).
What is less clear is the mechanism by which self-esteem exerts these 
positive effects. In their presentation of sociometer theory, Leary et al. 
(1995) give an overview of different explanations for why people are 
motivated to maintain self-esteem. They hypothesise a self-esteem system 
for monitoring others’ reactions to the self, in order to alert oneself to the 
possibility of social exclusion. This model has an evolutionary psychosocial 
basis for helping maintain interrelations in order to survive. According to 
sociometer theory, self-esteem is merely the system by which social 
inclusion is monitored, and reductions in self-esteem highlight potential 
changes in one’s inclusionary status, motivating the person to alter their 
behaviour accordingly to maintain social bonds. In support of this theory, 
Leary et al. (1995) found that self-perceptions changed according to how 
included or excluded an individual felt; exclusion resulted in lower self­
esteem. This is a useful explanation of the adaptive function of self­
esteem: that it exists to enhance inclusion by others, rather than for the 
purpose of being evaluated positively, per se. One could argue that 
sociometer theory neglects the importance of the ‘own’ perspective, in 
terms of fulfilling one’s own standards about being a person of worth; 
however, as aforementioned, the self cannot be evaluated in a vacuum as 
others’ perspectives will undoubtedly influence our own.
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Leary et al. (1995) also summarise previous explanations of self-esteem. 
Firstly, there is the possibility that people seek self-esteem for self-esteem’s 
sake, although this provides very little rationale for an adaptive function of 
self-esteem. Secondly, self-esteem may be required to promote 
achievement, motivating the individual to fulfil goals deemed important to 
them or others; but this does little to account for the affective aspect of self­
esteem. Finally, the most common assumption is that people work towards 
high self-esteem in order to increase positive affect and protect against 
stress and negative emotions.
Self-esteem and negative affect
Given the positive impact high self-esteem can have on cognitive and 
emotional states, it stands to reason that low self-esteem should have a 
negative effect on mental health. Low self-esteem is well established as a 
correlate of negative affect. It is known to predict depression in both men 
and women across all age groups, and the reverse direction of effect is 
rarely seen, suggesting that low self-esteem is a cause rather than a 
consequence of low mood (see Orth et al., 2011 for an overview). 
Prospective relations between self-esteem and affect had not previously 
been established, but Orth et al. (2011) provide evidence of self-esteem as 
a predictor of increased positive affect and decreased negative affect. 
Lightsey et al. (2006) summarise key studies which indicate self-esteem as 
a predictor of affective responses and depression. Their own study 
suggests self-esteem plays a small but potentially causal part in negative 
affect, and thus the promotion of self-esteem could be harnessed as an 
intervention to prevent more serious experiences of depression. Lightsey 
et al. employed a two-wave panel design, which implies causality due to the 
presumed cause (in this case, self-esteem) predating the supposed effect 
(negative affect). However, they acknowledge that the study is limited by 
its use of self-report measures, and confirmation of causality is still required 
through the use of experimental research.
Leary et al. (1995) detail some of the reasons why low self-esteem may 
lead to negative affect. Firstly, self-esteem, in itself, ‘feels’ good and low 
self-esteem does not. Secondly, negative emotions may be experienced 
when self-esteem is threatened by disapproval, rejection or exclusion by
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others. In particular, such changes tend to relate to self-referent emotions 
of pride and shame: when self-esteem is lost, people are likely to feel 
foolish, ashamed, inadequate or awkward.
Self-esteem and shame
Gruenewald et al. (2004) investigated threats to the social self, on the basis 
that shame is the primary emotional result of devaluations of the self. Their 
experimental study placed participants in one of two laboratory stressor 
tasks, in which a social evaluation component was either present or absent. 
Individuals in the social evaluation condition demonstrated greater 
increases of shame and greater decreases in social self-esteem.
There are two ways in which individuals can cope with such threats to the 
self from negative evaluation (Baumeister et al., 1996). One is to reject the 
threat, which may elicit aggression towards the source of negative 
evaluation; the other is to accept it, causing self-esteem to be revised and 
consequently demoted, resulting in negative internalised affect and 
withdrawal, such as in shame. This is supported by Olthof et a/.’s (2004) 
approach, which hypothesises that shame is associated with the perception 
of a real or imagined audience negatively evaluating the self, implying the 
“threat of an unwanted identity” (p387). This supposition is made on the 
basis of self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), whereby 
attention is primarily focused either externally on the environment or 
internally on the self. In the case of the latter, individuals compare 
themselves to internalised standards, and any perceived discrepancies are 
likely to result in negative affect. This is supported by Lindsay-Hartz et a/.’s 
(1995) suggestion that shame springs from the threat of an unwanted 
identity: that one is what one does not want to be. This may involve not 
only one’s own perception of an unwanted identity, but the perception that 
others may also view the self in this way (Olthof et al., 2004). In sum, it is 
proposed that damage to self-esteem, resulting from unfavourable self- 
evaluation, is likely to promote the experience of shame.
Both poor self-esteem and shame-proneness are related to a number of 
mental health problems. Negative self-perceptions are key components of 
unipolar and bipolar depressions, dysthymic and dissociative disorders,
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eating disorders, and some personality disorders (see Mann et al., 2004). 
Shame occurs with depression, anxiety, psychosis, eating disorders and 
substance misuse (see Gilbert & Irons, 2005). In particular, there is a 
wealth of evidence suggesting a correlation between shame and 
depression (for an overview see M. Lewis, 1995), and theoretically, there is 
good reason why this might be the case. Seligman’s (1975) learned 
helplessness theory states that depression and low self-esteem may be 
more likely in individuals who make internal, stable and global attributions 
of the self in relation to negative events. In the same way, the experience 
of shame involves internal, stable and global evaluations of the self (M. 
Lewis, 1995), reflecting a helpless attribution style. Tilghman-Osborne et 
al. (2008) give an overview of supporting evidence. In their study 
investigating shame, guilt and self-blame in adolescents, they found that 
shame and characterological self-blame (involving internal, stable, global 
attributions in which an individual blames the self) converged to significantly 
relate to depressive symptoms and cognitions. Thus, by focusing one’s 
attention on the self’s negative aspects in an all-encompassing way, shame 
may facilitate depression (Tangney, 1996). This is consistent with H. 
Lewis’ (1971) theory of shame, which views shame as a product of self- 
evaluation (specifically, a global attribution of the self) and supports the 
assumption that it is maladaptive, increasing vulnerability to mental ill- 
health.
To date, most of the literature in this area has focused on adult experiences 
of self-esteem, shame and mental health, but adolescence may be a period 
of particular vulnerability (Reimer, 1996). Meier et al. (2011) suggest that 
self-esteem increases and becomes more stable and less contingent from 
adolescence to old age. This is supported by Orth et al. (2011), who found 
that, whilst self-esteem increases from adolescence to middle adulthood, 
experiences of negative affect decrease within this period. Such research 
suggests adolescence is a critical period in the development of self-esteem 
and the occurrence of negative affect.
Self-esteem and self-discrepancy
Self-esteem has both affective and cognitive components (Swann et al.,
2007). People’s tendencies to experience positive and negative emotions
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(the affective component), in turn, contribute to global self-esteem, along 
with their specific self-views about their strengths and weaknesses (the 
cognitive component), and the way in which these are ‘framed’ (Pelham & 
Swann, 1989). Framing factors involve the importance and certainty of 
one’s attributes and the discrepancy between people’s actual and ideal 
self-views. Importance refers to how closely one’s self-views are linked to 
personal goals: Pelham and Swann posit that self-views which are 
personally important will more strongly affect one’s self-esteem. Certainty 
refers to how strongly one believes the self-view to be a true representation 
of the self: the more certain one is of one’s self-view, the more heavily that 
perception will contribute to self-esteem. Finally, the third factor 
hypothesised by Pelham and Swann to influence self-esteem is an actual- 
ideal self-discrepancy: the greater this discrepancy, the more negative the 
impact on self-esteem. They tested the influence of these factors by using 
an idiographic approach, asking participants to provide their own examples 
of personally relevant attributes. These responses were compared to 
additional outcomes from measures of positive and negative affect, and 
specific self-conceptions, as rated in comparison to peers. The three 
framing factors (self-view. importance, certainty and discrepancy) were 
found to uniquely predict variance in self-esteem, providing support for self­
discrepancy as a predictor of self-esteem; however, they accounted for less 
variance than the additional affective and cognitive factors tested 
(positive/negative affect and self-conception ratings). Pelham and Swann 
suggest this finding may be a product of the study’s psychometrics. 
Despite this, the research points to individuals’ personal evaluations of the 
self as having a significant impact on their level of self-esteem.
Self-evaluation and subsequently perceived self-discrepancies may also 
have implications for negative affect, including shame. Gilbert and Irons 
(2009) suggest that shame involves more than discrepancy from an ideal, it 
is more concerned with congruence with an anti-ideal. This was posited by 
Carver et al. (1999) in their addition of a feared self-domain to SDT. From 
a sociobiological perspective, humans are more highly attuned to avoid 
danger than to achieve desired goals. Motivational systems drive this 
process by eliciting aversive affect (Leary et al., 1995). According to 
Carver et al., people therefore attend more to negative, rather than positive
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events, striving to avoid an undesired self-state and its associated negative 
affect. Their findings imply that an individual’s self-regulation depends on 
two motivational forces: an approach force, which moves towards a 
reference point (i.e., towards an ideal or ought self), and an avoidance 
force, which moves away from a reference point (i.e., a feared self). They 
maintain that the latter exerts more influence on affect, and therefore, an 
actual-feared self-discrepancy should have significant emotional 
consequences. This is related to Ogilvie’s (1987) study, in which 
discrepancies between undesired and actual selves were strongly positively 
associated with life satisfaction, whereas discrepancies between ideal and 
actual selves were only modestly negatively associated with life 
satisfaction. This may be due to undesired selves, and not ideal selves, 
tending to be rooted in actual experiences of social roles.
The phenomenon of self-discrepancy has important implications for self­
esteem and negative affect, especially shame. These relationships will 
now be explored in greater detail, with an emphasis on specific emotional 
outcomes of different types of self-discrepancy.
SELF-DISCREPANCY 
What is self-discrepancy?
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory (SDT) views the self as a complex, 
cognitive structure, whereby the individual can access only a subset of their 
self information at any given time, dependent on internal and external 
factors (see Fromson, 2006). SDT was one of the first theories to help 
explain people’s vulnerability to different kinds of negative emotions, in 
terms of incompatible self-beliefs. Previous research into relationships 
between the self and affect had not considered different self-domains in 
terms of different standpoints (i.e., own versus significant other). According 
to SDT, these two standpoints impact on the type of emotional 
consequence of differing self-discrepancies.
Higgins argues there are three basic domains of the self: the actual self 
(self-concept) and the ideal and ought selves (self-guides, or personally- 
relevant standards). The actual self represents attributes which individuals
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believe they do possess; the ideal self conceptualises those they would like 
to possess (their hopes, wishes and aspirations for the self); and the ought 
self signifies those they think they should possess (beliefs about duty, 
responsibility and obligations). These are further discriminated by two self­
state standpoints: one's own and that of significant others. Thus, there are 
six possible self-state representations: actual/own and actual/other (self- 
concepts), and ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/other (self­
guides).
Self-discrepancy refers to when an individual’s view of the self differs from 
the self they would ideally like, or think they ought to be, or from the self 
they believe others want them to be, or think they should be. SDT posits 
that different self-discrepancies may have distinct negative emotional 
consequences. Thus, individuals are motivated to eliminate incongruity 
between their self-concept (actual self) and self-guides (ideal and ought 
selves).
Types of self-discrepancy
Self-concept discrepancies between the actual/own and actual/other can be 
understood as an identity crisis. Discrepancies from the own standpoint 
are associated with feelings of guilt, whilst discrepancies from the other 
standpoint are correlated with the experience of shame.
Self-guide discrepancies comprise actual-ideal and actual-ought 
discrepancies; the former are thought to correlate with an absence of 
positive end-states, engendering dejection-related feelings, such as 
depression; the latter may correlate with a presence of negative end-states, 
engendering agitation-related feelings, such as anxiety. Specifically, 
actual/own versus ideal/own discrepancies occur with the belief that one’s 
actual attributes do not match those one hopes to attain. Higgins (1987) 
predicted such a discrepancy would correlate with disappointment and 
dissatisfaction, in the belief that one had not fulfilled personal hopes and 
wishes. Actual/own versus ideal/other discrepancies happen when 
people’s perceived actual attributes are incongruent with what they believe 
a significant other would ideally want them to possess. Such individuals
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may be liable to shame, embarrassment or feeling downcast, in the belief 
that a significant other is disappointed and dissatisfied with them.
The actual/own versus ought/other discrepancy exists when people’s 
perception of the actual self does not match the attributes they believe a 
significant other expects of them. Thus, they may be vulnerable to fear and 
feeling threatened, in anticipation of being punished by others; this may 
also result in resentment of the anticipated pain. Lastly, actual/own versus 
ought/own discrepancies occur when an individual’s perceived actual self is 
not congruent with what they believe their self should represent, which 
Higgins predicts will lead to guilt, self-contempt and uneasiness because a 
personal, moral standard has been overstepped. As such, inherent in each 
self-rating is both the ‘own’ and ‘other’ position, and the latter may 
represent multiple significant others at different times and within different 
contexts.
Self-discrepancy and negative affect
Most of the evidence supporting SDT has come from various collaborations 
between Higgins and the primary researchers in this area: Klein, Strauman 
and Bond. Research suggests that the magnitude of actual-ideal 
discrepancies is related to the intensity of dejection-related emotions, and 
the magnitude of actual-ought discrepancies is related to the intensity of 
agitation-related emotions (Higgins et al., 1986; Strauman & Higgins, 
1987). These findings were also replicated with individuals with depressive 
disorders and social phobias, respectively (Strauman, 1989), and actual- 
ideal discrepancies alone have also been found to correlate with self­
esteem (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Carver et al., (1999) extended the self­
discrepancy literature with their inclusion of the feared self. They found that 
SDT’s proposed association between ought self-discrepancy and agitation 
was only upheld in individuals with greater feared self-discrepancy. 
However, the relationship between ideal self-discrepancy and dejection 
was maintained whether or not individuals demonstrated feared self­
discrepancy. Feared self-discrepancy itself also had separate predictive 
effects on both agitation- and dejection-related emotions. Thus, negative 
affect may arise both from not achieving an ideal, as well as from fulfilling 
an anti-ideal.
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According to M. Lewis’ (1995) cognitive attribution theory, all people have 
standards about what is and is not acceptable for the self and others 
(influenced by family, society and culture). These standards relate to all 
human behaviour, including thoughts, feelings and actions. A cognitive 
evaluative process allows people to reflect on these three and serves as a 
stimulus for self-conscious feelings, whether these are internally or 
externally caused, and whether their outcomes are deemed successes or 
failures. A violation of these personal standards will cause emotional 
distress, even in children as young as three, but levels of affect will vary 
due to some standards being considered more valuable than others. In 
terms of the experience of shame, “the violation of those [standards] more 
central to the definition of the self are more likely to lead to shame” (M. 
Lewis, 1995, p.68). Thus, it stands to reason that self-discrepancies, where 
the self-concept is called into question, are likely to predict negative affect, 
but especially shame.
Self-discrepancy and shame
It is argued that other self-discrepancies outside of the ideal/other and 
ought/own domains described by Higgins, might be responsible for feelings 
of shame and guilt. Theories by Homey (1939) and Piers and Singer 
(1971) postulate that guilt also involves the ‘other’ standpoint, whilst 
Ausubel (1955) and M. Lewis (1979) suggest shame may involve the ought 
domain as well. Historically, shame and guilt have been used 
interchangeably to refer to the unpleasant feelings experienced when an 
individual fails to meet social or moral standards, and which help regulate 
social behaviour (Orth et al., 2006; Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005). However, 
recent research identifies these as two separate constructs, with important 
conceptual differences (Orth et al., 2006; Tangney, 1992).
In the simplest sense, a self/behaviour distinction can be made between 
the focus of shame and guilt, respectively: “the experience of shame is 
directly about the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, the self is 
not the central object of negative evaluation, but rather the thing done or 
undone is the focus” (H. Lewis, 1971, p30). Thus, the source of shame is 
one’s thoughts about oneself: the self has failed to adhere to standards and 
will be negatively evaluated as a whole by others. In contrast, the source of
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guilt is one’s thoughts about one’s behaviour, that it has transgressed some 
moral standard, and impacted on another (M. Lewis, 1995). H. Lewis’ 
theory therefore views shame as being associated with the self and a 
global attribution of the self, and guilt as associated with the other, and a 
specific attribution about a behaviour affecting the other. In a study of 
college students, Tangney (1992) discovered that evaluations of the self 
were almost exclusively found in shame situations, which were associated 
with non-moral issues, whereas guilt was associated with moral 
transgressions.
In a rebuttal of Higgins’ SDT, Tangney et al. (1998) hypothesise and 
provide evidence for shame resulting from any self-discrepancy. They 
summarise a wealth of research supporting H. Lewis’ (1971) theory 
differentiating shame from guilt, highlighting their differences along 
cognitive, emotional and motivational lines. Thus, they suggest that all 
types of self-discrepancies are associated with shame because shame is 
characterised by global, negative self-evaluations. Although Higgins’ 
(1987) study found that there is an effect of self-discrepancy on 
psychological discomfort, Tangney et al. (1998) argue that he is less clear 
about when there is an effect, specifically in relation to shame and guilt. 
Discrepancies which were not predicted to be related to shame or guilt 
were found to be associated with emotions often felt by shame-prone 
people, and reports of feeling shame itself. Likewise, discrepancies which 
were predicted to be related to shame, were not associated with participant 
feelings of shame, and discrepancies predicted to relate to guilt did not 
show this association, but did correlate with worthlessness -  a 
characteristic of shame, rather than guilt (see Tangney et al., 1998).
Overall, Tangney et al. failed to replicate Higgins’ findings in support of 
different self-discrepancies correlating with specific emotional outcomes. 
They conclude that such unique relations may be manifested only under 
certain conditions, but there does appear to be an effect of self-discrepancy 
on affect; what is less clear is when there is an effect. In response to 
Tangney et al., Higgins (1999) suggests that a specific association between 
self-discrepancy and affect relies on the significance of the self-discrepancy 
to self-regulation which, in turn, depends on a self-discrepancy’s
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magnitude, accessibility, applicability and relevance, and its importance to 
the individual. Thus, there may be several factors which influence the 
relationship between self-discrepancy and emotion.
Factors influencing the relationship between self-discrepancy and 
affect
Boldero et al. (2005) argue that not all self-discrepancies produce negative 
emotions. There are various factors affecting the relationship between self­
discrepancy and affect, including cognitive and situational variables; some 
of these are described in Higgins’ (1999) retort to Tangney et a/.’s (1998) 
study. As cognitive constructs, self-discrepancies may vary in their 
availability (whether they are present to process new information) and in 
their accessibility (whether they are used in information-processing).
A self-discrepancy’s availability depends on the magnitude of variance 
between self-state representations that do and do not match. The greater 
the difference between two self-state representations (e.g., actual/own 
versus ideal/own), the larger is the self-discrepancy available. 
Furthermore, the greater the discrepancy, the more intense is the 
accompanying emotion. Availability alone, however, is not sufficient to 
influence affect; the self-discrepancy must be activated, which depends on 
its accessibility.
Accessibility depends on the following factors: how recently the self­
discrepancy has been activated, how frequently it is activated, and how 
applicable it is to the situation. Thus, self-discrepancies are more likely to 
be accessed if they have recently been activated and are activated often, 
and the negative meaning of a self-discrepancy will only be realised in a 
relevant context (i.e., not in an unambiguously positive event). Boldero and 
Francis (2000) measured self-discrepancies as relevant to a test context 
and discovered that self-discrepancy magnitude and relation to emotions 
varied as a function of its relevance. The greater the accessibility and 
applicability, the more powerful is the corresponding affect accompanying 
that discrepancy.
Portfolio -  Volume I
142
Higgins (1999) also identifies a self-discrepancy’s importance to self­
regulation as a pertinent factor affecting the impact on emotion. In an 
earlier study, Higgins (1989) found that beliefs in the negative outcome of 
ideal self-discrepancies (rather than ought self-discrepancies) related more 
to dejection, as did ought (and not ideal) self-discrepancies to agitation.
The topic of moderating variables has recently been extended by 
Gonnerman et al. (2000), who suggest that self-monitoring impacts on 
which affective states are produced by which self-discrepancies. They 
found that high self-monitors (attuned to how they are perceived by others) 
reacted more strongly to discrepancies in the ‘other’ domain, whilst low self­
monitors (attuned to internal beliefs and standards) reacted more strongly 
to discrepancies in the ‘own’ domain. More recently, Fromson (2006) 
distinguishes between private and public self-consciousness. The former 
implies internal self-aspects, such as beliefs, feelings and reactions, 
whereas the latter refers to one’s perception of the self as seen by others. 
Fromson suggests private versus public self-consciousness may moderate 
the relationship between self-discrepancies and affect. His results showed 
that private self-consciousness moderated the relationships between 
specific self-discrepancies and different emotions (public self- 
consciousness did not). The study provides support for SDT, but suggests 
that the link between self-discrepancy and emotion is not as straightforward 
as proposed by Higgins’ original theory.
Self-discrepancy, negative affect and adolescence
Even less is known about self-discrepancy in adolescents, which could be a 
potentially fruitful area of research, given the relevance of self-identity and 
self-evaluation in this age group. Adolescence is a time of many emotional 
and cognitive transitions: Tilghman-Osborne et al. (2008) summarise a 
number of significant changes, including moral development, and 
adolescent egocentrism (potentially heightening self-consciousness and 
shame). Orth et al. (2011) studied the trajectory of shame and other 
secondary emotions across the lifespan and found that the greatest 
differences in self-conscious emotions happen in adolescents, young adults 
and older adults. They relate this to changes in social roles and
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relationships during these times and suggest they herald critical periods for 
the development of self-conscious feelings.
Young people may be particularly vulnerable to self-conscious emotions 
due to increased levels of self-evaluation (Reimer, 1996) and changes in 
affect regulation and self-identity during adolescence (Schore, 1994). As 
they become increasingly independent of their families, adolescents place 
greater value on their peer groups for support and acceptance 
(Buhrmester, 1996); this may exacerbate vulnerability to social comparison 
and negative self-evaluation at a time when they are developing more 
sophisticated systems for relating to others and to the self (Gilbert & Irons, 
2009). In turn, this may increase their vulnerability to self-discrepancy and 
subsequent emotional problems, if adolescents view themselves as not 
being what they want or ought to be. It seems reasonable to suggest, 
therefore, that adolescents are likely to be especially prone to negative 
affect, including shame.
The risk of depression increases dramatically from mid- to late adolescence 
(Gilbert & Irons, 2009) and shame may play a key role in this respect, 
according to Reimer (1996). He suggests that general adolescent mental 
health and wellbeing are affected by peer norms, perceptions and 
behaviours. Thus, the day-to-day experiences of adolescents may expose 
them to a variety of situations, some of which may be shaming. This is 
demonstrated in John et a/.’s (in prep.) recent study in which young people 
completed the Shame Scale for Adolescents (SSA). This measure asks 
participants to identify up to three examples of shaming situations; a large 
number of the adolescents in John et a/.’s study disclosed incidents relating 
to school and peers, highlighting the potential frequency with which young 
people might encounter shame.
School and college may provide everyday environments in which shaming 
experiences are particularly likely, especially in terms of academic 
achievement and social standing. Some adolescent shame experiences 
may be specifically related to self-evaluation around literacy. In a 
qualitative study of school-induced shame by Shelton (2001), adults 
recalled their experiences of humiliation and shame as children and
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adolescents due to language learning difficulties. These experiences can 
further undermine learning and affect psychological development, 
suggesting that educational focus on school examination and performance 
may undermine efforts to improve academic success, and play a key role in 
adolescent shame. Such experiences are also likely to damage 
adolescents’ developing self-esteem.
Preventative measures for adolescent shame
One of the limitations of the current literature and, indeed, H. Lewis’ (1971) 
model of shame, is that it runs the risk of pathologising the shame 
experience. By contrast, M. Lewis (1995) states that shame itself is not 
pathological; instead, he views it from an affective cognitive position (p. 120) 
which identifies shame as a more ‘normal’ experience, manifesting 
differently among different individuals. He suggests shame can lead to 
pathology if repressed or denied. Much shame may be ‘bypassed’ in that, 
although it results from objective self-awareness, it is unacknowledged by 
the individual. M. Lewis states that this unacknowledged shame may still 
lead to difficulties, such as sadness and anger, as the individual chooses to 
focus on these other affective states in an act of “emotional substitution” 
(p. 124). In more prolonged cases of shame, where it is likely to be 
acknowledged, it may lead to more psychopathological forms of depression 
and rage. M. Lewis points out that most research investigating shame has 
focused on these clinical outcomes, but it is important to also account for 
more typical processes, as in unacknowledged shame. Consistent 
emotional substitution may become problematic when individuals avoid 
‘owning’ their shame.
Feelings are an important aspect of developmental psychology, 
pathological or not (Erikson, 1968), so they are likely to be central to the 
promotion of psychological wellbeing, especially in young adults. Gilbert 
and Irons (2005) suggest that shame-proneness is less likely in individuals 
who have internalised a warm, accepting attitude towards the self. M. 
Lewis (1995) proposes that much shame could be eradicated by a 
cognitive-affect programme to increase young people’s positive feelings 
towards themselves. Indeed, in the preceding section, it was argued that 
self-esteem damage promotes shame and other negative affect, and so
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interventions to promote self-worth seem consistent with this. However, 
research in support of the effectiveness of self-esteem enhancement 
interventions has been mixed (Baumeister et al., 2003; Swann, 1996). 
Furthermore, Neff (2009) outlines some potential drawbacks of promoting 
self-esteem, including correlations with narcissism, feelings of isolation 
from others, and judgmental self-evaluation, contingent on comparisons 
with others. Neff and Vonk (2009) review the various benefits of self­
compassion and highlight ways in which it may be a more effective 
intervention than self-esteem promotion. Similarly, Gilbert and Irons' 
(2005) model of self-compassion was developed specifically for combatting 
the experience of shame. As such, the current research considers self­
compassion as a potential tool in the prevention of negative affect and 
shame. In particular, it is interested in the capacity for self-compassion to 
engender a tolerance of self-discrepancy, thus protecting against the 
possible impact of self-discrepancy on self-esteem and negative affect in 
adolescents.
SELF-COMPASSION 
What is self-compassion?
Self-compassion is defined as the ability to show oneself kindness and 
understanding in the face of pain or failure, to perceive one’s experiences 
as part of common humanity, and to achieve mindful awareness, rather 
than over-identification, of difficult thoughts and feelings (Neff, 2003a). In 
the same way that compassion for others is conceptualised, self­
compassion involves feeling moved by one’s own suffering with a desire to 
ease this pain. This takes the form of patience, kindness and non­
judgment in recognising that one’s experiences are part of being human 
and fallible (Neff, 2003a).
What self-compassion is not about is self-pity or passivity (Neff, 2003a; 
2003b). Self-pity involves disconnection from others, as the individual 
becomes immersed in their own problems, which may exaggerate their 
sense of personal suffering. This is known as over-identification. By 
contrast, self-compassion connects the individual with others through 
metacognitive activity, allowing them to relate their experiences to common
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humanity and see their difficulties with greater perspective (Neff, 2003a). 
Neff and Vonk (2009) found a negative association between self­
compassion and ego-focused reactivity. This may be achieved through 
mindfulness, a state of awareness entailing a non-judgmental stance 
towards one’s thoughts and emotions, taking them for what they are, rather 
than their impact on one’s sense of self.
When self-compassion is genuine, it should not lead to passivity either, 
rather the opposite should occur: being non-judgmental of one’s 
weaknesses does not mean they go unnoticed. Without self- 
compassionate awareness, one’s shortcomings may go unchallenged in 
order to protect self-esteem, but a self-compassionate attitude encourages 
change through accurate perception of the problem and a desire to grow for 
optimal mental health and wellbeing (Neff, 2003b). Leary et al. (2007) 
found that self-compassionate participants were more likely to attribute 
negative events to their personal characteristics, but did so in a less 
defensive and distressed manner. Thus, self-compassion is an adaptive 
way of relating to the self, which changes people’s relationships to their 
self-evaluations (Leary et al., 2007; Neff & McGehee, 2010). It may also be 
an important moderating factor in the relationship between feeling one has 
failed to fulfil one’s standards, and subsequent negative emotions, such as 
depression, anxiety and shame.
Self-compassion and self-esteem
Neff (2003b) suggests that self-compassionate people are also often high 
in self-esteem, but there has been some debate about the relationship 
between these two constructs, and their discriminant validity (Leary et al., 
2007). Both involve positive, rather than negative, feelings towards the 
self, but for self-esteem, these feelings are contingent on the self being 
positively evaluated (either by the self or by others), whereas self­
compassion bypasses this evaluation process (Neff, 2003a).
A study by Leary et al. (2007) provides evidence of the ways in which self­
compassion and self-esteem differ in a sample of young adults (aged 17 to 
21). Firstly, self-compassion was related to lower negative affect than was 
self-esteem, including affect following unfavourable feedback. Secondly,
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self-compassion involved a clearer perception of one’s traits, both positive 
and negative, without requiring illusions or defensiveness to protect the self 
(as with self-esteem). These accurate self-perceptions may result in more 
effective behaviour. Thirdly, self-compassion promoted self-regulation in a 
way that self-esteem did not and, fourthly, it led individuals to take 
responsibility for their part in negative events, without becoming 
overwhelmed by negative emotions.
The benefits of self-compassion to mental health and wellbeing are many. 
They include its association with increased life satisfaction, emotional 
intelligence, social connectedness, and mastery, and decreased self- 
criticism, rumination, thought suppression, and psychological disorders 
including depression, anxiety and eating disorders (see Neff & Vonk, 2009, 
for a review). Although self-esteem is also associated with good mental 
health, Leary et al. (2007) found that self-compassion predicts more of the 
unique variance in such outcomes, suggesting that what have previously 
been considered self-esteem effects, may be accounted for by self­
compassion.
Furthermore, Neff and Vonk (2009) showed that self-compassion predicts 
happiness, optimism and positive affect, as does self-esteem; however, 
they also found that self-compassion predicts more consistent self-worth, is 
more strongly negatively correlated with social comparison and self- 
consciousness, and does not correlate with narcissism, whereas self­
esteem does. Additionally, self-compassion was found to be less 
contingent on factors such as social approval, success, and attractiveness. 
These factors are particularly pertinent to the experience of shame, as 
shame may often be brought about by unfavourable social comparison, a 
sense of failure and of being what one does not want to be (Tangney et al., 
1998). The crux of the difference between self-compassion and self­
esteem, therefore, seems to be the absence of self-evaluation in the 
former. This is clearly relevant to shame, which involves intense self-focus, 
disconnecting the individual from the experiences of others, leading to over­
identification with negative self-thoughts and a desire to withdraw and 
isolate the self (M. Lewis, 1995). In contrast, self-compassion fosters a 
sense of common humanity, facilitating change and growth through an
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accurate perception of one’s weaknesses (Gilbert & Irons, 2009). Thus, 
self-esteem and self-compassion are differentially related to shame: 
whereas self-esteem is more likely to be dependent on factors often at the 
root of shame experiences, self-compassion is free of self-evaluation and 
tolerant of failure and, therefore, a seemingly appropriate antidote to 
shame-proneness.
Development of self-compassion
Gilbert’s (2000) model of self-compassion was designed specifically to aid 
individuals high in shame and self-criticism, through compassionate mind 
training (see Gilbert & Irons, 2005). It is rooted in attachment-based 
theories surrounding the early development of self-compassion and self- 
criticism. Bowlby’s (1988) attachment theory assumes early experiences 
influence the development of self-other schemas. Via parental warmth, 
children develop their own affiliative systems for showing warmth in 
interpersonal contexts; this may also be activated towards the self for self­
regulation and soothing in times of stress. Just as early experiences of 
warmth, love, and affection are related to self-acceptance, self-soothing, 
and good mental health, so childhood exposure to threat (via neglect, 
shame, or abuse) is associated with increased self-criticism and negative 
affect (Gilbert et al., 2006). Gilbert (2000) suggests that secure and 
supportive care-giving fosters feelings of connectedness and soothing, 
allowing individuals to relate to themselves in a compassionate way. By 
contrast, insecure and stressful upbringings engender coldness and 
criticism, resulting in a decreased ability for self-compassion. Shame- 
proneness and self-criticism can be viewed as emerging from harsh 
parenting and early experiences of bullying, which may lead not only to a 
presence of self-hostility, but to an absence of self-liking (Gilbert & Irons, 
2009). Thus, tackling an individual’s sense of shame and self-critical 
responses alone may not be sufficient; it may also be necessary to activate 
self-compassion in order to moderate the relationship between early 
experiences and shame.
In support of the above model of self-compassion, Neff and McGehee 
(2010) found that attachment security was associated with self- 
compassionate abilities. Adolescents from close, harmonious families, and
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who demonstrated secure attachment styles, had higher levels of self­
compassion. Conversely, adolescents from stressful, conflicting families, 
and with preoccupied or fearful attachments, had lower levels of self­
compassion. This supports the idea that other-to-self relating provides a 
template for how the individual relates to the self, including their tendency 
towards self-criticism or capacity for self-compassion (see Gilbert et al., 
2006). Gilbert et a/.’s (2006) study showed that self-critics were able to 
generate self-critical images, but struggled to access self-compassionate 
images, whilst the reverse was true of self-reassuring participants. Whilst 
the former was related to depressive symptoms, the latter was protective of 
these, highlighting self-compassion as a potentially useful intervention in 
this area. Neff and McGehee’s (2010) study revealed self-compassion as a 
partial mediator between wellbeing and the following: maternal support, 
family functioning, and attachment style. The advantages of self­
compassion were not confounded by negative family environments, 
suggesting that self-compassion could still be enhanced in the face of 
difficult family relations; thus it could provide an effective target for 
intervention in at-risk adolescents.
Self-compassion and adolescence
In the same way that self-discrepancy and self-esteem experiences may be 
especially relevant to adolescence, so too may there be particular benefit 
from promoting self-compassion in this population. Previously, 
psychological research has focused on raising self-esteem in adolescents 
through school-based programmes, but most of these have proved 
ineffective (Baumeister et al., 2003). Self-compassion is not only correlated 
with the same benefits as self-esteem, but also avoids its potential negative 
corollaries (such as narcissism), and is deemed easy to practise (Gilbert & 
Procter, 2006). The absence of self-evaluation in self-compassion means 
the negative self-judgments involved in teenage anxiety, depression and 
shame could be avoided by promoting this skill in this population. In fact, it 
could be actively embraced as part of a typical adolescent trajectory.
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SUMMARY AND RATIONALE
An individual’s self-concept is of the utmost importance for healthy mental, 
emotional and social development and is shaped by the self-standards 
engendered by one’s family of origin and, later, through interactions with 
peers and other members of one’s community. How one perceives and 
evaluates oneself and others is critical in self-identity formation and in the 
development of self-esteem. Self-esteem may be compromised when an 
individual feels discrepant from the kind of person they want or think they 
should be (or their perception of what others want or think they should be). 
According to the extant literature, self-discrepancies are also related to the 
experiences of depression and anxiety, and especially shame.
Shame has associations with psychological discomfort, mental ill-health 
and interpersonal relationship problems. Despite adolescence being a 
period of particular risk for such difficulties, as well as increasing the 
likelihood of issues relating to the self and shame, there is a dearth of 
research in this area. If shame is likely to lead to difficulties in mental 
health, it is important to direct research and interventions at the adolescent 
population, as they may be especially vulnerable. This may be even more 
pertinent, given research suggesting young people particularly lack 
accurate knowledge about mental illness, hold more negative attitudes 
towards its sufferers, and are commonly reluctant to seek help for 
psychological issues (Rose et al., 2007). Clinical psychology is well placed 
to direct resources not just towards intervention, but to the prevention of 
psychological distress and promotion of mental wellbeing; thus, the 
recruitment of a community sample in the current study is particularly useful 
for illuminating shame and its correlates within a non-clinical population.
Previous interventions for young people have looked at increasing self­
esteem to counteract emotional problems, but self-esteem is dependent on 
self-evaluation, and this is particularly pertinent, not to mention problematic, 
if individuals perceive themselves as self-discrepant. Potentially 
detrimental effects of increased self-esteem have also been outlined and, 
as an intervention for improving psychological wellbeing, it has not always 
been effective. Self-compassion has been forwarded as an alternative
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strategy for reducing emotional distress and improving mental health 
through a more accurate, less judgmental attitude of self-acceptance and 
kindness. As a relatively recent phenomenon in Western psychology, the 
evidence-base for self-compassion is still developing. The literature is 
based largely on correlational links between self-compassion and other 
psychological factors, such as mental health and experiences of shame 
and self-criticism. This study aims to further develop the self-compassion 
research by investigating its protective potential.
The current research proposes a theoretically-driven model of the 
relationships between self-discrepancy and negative affect. Non-ideal self­
states are related to lower self-worth and emotional discomfort; if an 
individual is unable to accept or tolerate such self-discrepancy, one would 
expect it to damage self-esteem, due to the negative evaluation of the self. 
This, in turn, may lead to negative affect as the individual becomes 
depressed, anxious or ashamed about not being the person they want, or 
think they should be. Thus, it is plausible to propose that self-discrepancy 
may be associated with depression, anxiety and shame due to its 
relationship with self-esteem, which is also associated with these negative 
affects in its own right. So far, associations between self-discrepancy, self­
esteem and negative affect have only been studied in adult populations; the 
current study extends the research by focusing on adolescence, a time 
when self-evaluation is likely to be particularly high. Self-discrepancies 
may well be an inevitable part of life, as unattainable standards are likely to 
be set by both the self and others. However, the developing literature on 
self-compassion suggests that individuals who show themselves greater 
kindness are more accepting of non-ideal self-states. Through viewing 
personal imperfections and flaws as part of being human, a self- 
compassionate outlook could act as a protective buffer against self­
discrepancies eroding self-esteem. As such, it is possible that self­
compassion may moderate the relationship between self-discrepancy and 
self-esteem. Again, this has not been studied before with an adolescent 
population.
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The proposed model is expressed diagrammatically in Figure 1. However, 
it is important to note that this combination of variables represents only one 
way of modelling their connections.
Self-discrepancy ------------------------------------► Negative affect
(depression, anxiety, 
shame)
> Self-esteem
(mediator)
Self-compassion
(moderator)
Figure 1: Proposed model of the relationships between self-discrepancy, 
self-esteem, self-compassion and negative affect (self-esteem mediates the 
relationship between self-discrepancy and negative affect, and self­
compassion moderates the relationship between self-discrepancy and self­
esteem).
HYPOTHESES
In summary, the current study aims to increase our understanding of 
negative affect (especially shame) in adolescents by investigating the direct 
relationship between self-discrepancy, self-esteem and depression, anxiety 
and shame, and between these relationships and the phenomenon of self­
compassion. Consequently, the research aims to test the following 
hypotheses:
1. Self-esteem and self-discrepancy will predict negative affect in 
adolescents.
2. Self-esteem will mediate the relationship between self-discrepancy 
and negative affect.
3. Self-compassion will moderate the relationship between self­
discrepancy and self-esteem.
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DESIGN
The study employed a cross-sectional questionnaire-based design, using 
correlation, regression, mediation and moderation analyses. Participants 
from a non-clinical sample completed questionnaire measures in order to 
represent experiences of self-discrepancy, self-esteem, self-compassion 
and negative affect (depression, anxiety, and shame) in the general 
adolescent population.
PARTICPANTS
Recruitment and response
Four sixth-form colleges in the south-east of England were approached by 
email and sent initial information sheets (Appendix A). Of the four, two 
colleges agreed to data collection from their students, at which point 
information sheets for participants were emailed (Appendix B). Both 
colleges invited the researcher to visit them to give a short presentation in 
return for student participation on the same day. Data were collected from 
105 students at college A, across five sessions over two days. Data were 
collected from 53 students at college B in one session. Individuals gave 
written consent in order to participate (Appendix C). Those who did not 
wish to consent left this form blank. Of the 105 participants at college A, 
seven either did not give their consent, or omitted at least one entire 
questionnaire in their pack, and therefore, their data were not used. Of the 
53 participants at college B, 10 either did not give their consent, omitted at 
least one entire questionnaire from their pack, or were over the age of 18 
years old, and therefore, their data were unusable. Thus, a total of 141 
participants provided usable data.
Demographic characteristics
The final sample comprised 141 participants: 96 females (68.1%) and 45 
males (31.9%). Participant mean age was 16.72 (SD .69), with a minimum 
age of 16 and a maximum of 18. Ethnicity information was not formally
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collected; however, the participants recruited for data collection 
represented a predominantly White British population.
ETHICAL APPROVAL
Favourable ethical opinion was granted to this research by the University of 
Surrey Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee (Appendix 
D). Research practice procedures were followed in accordance with the 
Health Professions Council (2008) and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Participants were required to give informed consent to take part, and 
participation was voluntary and confidentiality was ensured. Useful 
information and contact details were provided for any participants 
negatively affected by their participation (although this was deemed 
unlikely) and materials were issued to occupy individuals who did not wish 
to participate, but wanted to dissent discreetly. Participants were fully 
debriefed at the end of data collection (Appendix E) and given the 
opportunity and contact details to ask any further questions about the 
research and their participation.
MATERIALS
Participants were given a duplicate of the aforementioned information sheet 
(Appendix B) at the start of questionnaire administration. The 
questionnaire pack comprised the aforementioned consent form (Appendix 
C), a cover sheet with participant instructions (Appendix F), followed by the 
six measures outlined below (Appendices G-L), and some number and 
word puzzles for those who finished early or wanted to dissent discreetly. 
Following return of questionnaire packs at the end of administration, debrief 
sheets (Appendix E) were given to all participants to explain the full 
purpose of the study.
Questionnaires
Participants were provided with questionnaire packs containing measures 
of self-discrepancy, shame, self-compassion, depression, anxiety and self­
esteem. The literature surrounding aspects of the self suggests that 
idiographic measures (where respondents provide their own examples) are
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more likely than nomothetic measures (where participants respond to 
examples predetermined by the researcher) to capture accurate 
relationships between self-views and psychological consequences (e.g., 
Moretti & Higgins, 1990; Pelham & Swann, 1989). For this reason, where 
possible, idiographic measures were employed in the current study, namely 
in measuring self-discrepancy and shame in adolescents. Participants 
completed the following questionnaires:
Selves Questionnaire (Carver et al., 1999 -  Appendix G)
The Selves Questionnaire was adapted by Carver et al. from the form 
typically used by Higgins (1987). It is a three-part questionnaire which 
describes ought, ideal and feared self-discrepancies and then asks 
participants to list seven of their own ought, ideal and feared traits. These 
are then rated on a Likert scale of 1-7, corresponding to statements ranging 
from I am just like this trait to I am the opposite of this trait. Thus, ought, 
ideal and feared traits are rated against the individual’s perceived actual 
self to produce a representation of how self-discrepant they perceive 
themselves to be. The sum of the seven trait scores gives an overall level 
of self-discrepancy for each type of self (ought, ideal and feared). For each 
self, total scores range from 7-49: higher scores represent higher levels of 
self-discrepancy (note that a large discrepancy would be undesirable for 
the ought and ideal selves, but desirable for the feared self). Carver et al. 
demonstrated good reliability and validity with Cronbach’s alphas of .73 (for 
ought), .75 (for ideal) and .77 (for feared self-discrepancy).
Shame Scale for Adolescents (SSA, John et al., in prep. -  Appendix H)
The SSA is a 19-item measure capturing three dimensions of shame: 
negative evaluation of self, outward expression, and internalised affect. 
Items measuring negative evaluation of self pertain to participants’ thoughts 
about themselves, or what they think others thought about them, when 
considering shaming experiences, for example, I thought “I am nasty”. 
Outward expression items concern participant desires to outwardly express 
their feelings, for example, I wanted to shout and scream. Internalised 
affect items refer to participants’ emotional experience of their shame 
examples, such as, I had a horrible feeling inside. The SSA requires 
participants to write up to three of their own examples of times in which
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they felt shame; they hold these in mind whilst rating the 19 items on a 
Likert scale of 0-3, corresponding to statements ranging from not at all to a 
lot Total scores range from 0-57, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of shame. John et al. (in prep.) demonstrated good reliability for the 
scale, with an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .93, and alphas of .91, .76, and 
.84, respectively, for each of the aforementioned dimensions of shame. 
John et al. also reveal the SSA to be a valid measure of shame in 
adolescence, with good criterion and construct validity: they found it was 
significantly positively correlated with another adolescent shame scale, and 
with a measure of negative affect and a measure of anger, and significantly 
negatively correlated with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.
Self-Compassion Scale (SCS, Neff, 2003a -  Appendix I)
The wording of the SCS was modified slightly from the original version for 
easier understanding amongst children and young people (K.Neff, personal 
communication, January 2011). This measure comprises 26 items which 
are rated on a Likert scale from 1-5, corresponding to statements ranging 
from almost never to almost always. The items make up six subscales in 
total: three positive (self-kindness, common humanity and mindfulness) and 
three negative (self-judgment, isolation and over-identification). Items on 
the latter three are reverse-coded, and the sum of all 26 items produces an 
overall level of self-compassion. Total scores range from 26-130 and 
higher scores represent higher levels of self-compassion. Neff and 
colleagues have demonstrated good reliability and validity of the SCS. Neff 
(2003a) found it to possess good construct validity, with significant 
correlation coefficients with other scales measuring similar constructs. The 
measure has also demonstrated good reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.92 (Neff & Vonk, 2009); this is also consistent with adolescent and young 
adult participants, with alphas of .90 and .93, respectively (Neff & 
McGehee, 2010).
Patient Health Questionnaire for Adolescents (PHQ-A, Johnson et al., 
2002 -  Appendix J)
This scale is a modified version of Spitzer et al.’s (1999) PHQ (a brief 
depression severity measure), adapted for use with adolescents. It 
comprises nine depression-related items to be rated on a Likert scale of 0-
Portfolio -  Volume I
157
3, corresponding to statements ranging from not at all to nearly every day. 
The sum of all item scores produces an overall level of depression, falling 
into one of five ranges (none, mild, moderate, moderately severe and 
severe). Total scores range from 0-24, with higher scores representing 
higher levels of depression. The validity and reliability of the PHQ is 
already well established (e.g. Kroenke et al., 2001; Kroenke & Spitzer, 
2002; Lowe et al., 2004). Lee et al. (2007) report a Cronbach’s alpha of .80 
for the PHQ-9, on which the PHQ-A is based. It has also demonstrated 
good reliability and diagnostic validity in adolescent populations (Johnson 
et al., 2002), as has the PHQ-A (Richardson et al., 2010). Hoek (2012) 
reports a Cronbach’s alpha of .75 for the PHQ-A.
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment-7 (GAD-7, Spitzer et a/., 
2006 -  Appendix K)
The GAD-7 is a seven-item screening and severity measure of generalised 
anxiety, although it also has moderately good operating characteristics for 
panic, social anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorders. Items are rated 
on a Likert scale of 0-3, corresponding to statements ranging from not at all 
to nearly every day, their sum gives an overall level of generalised anxiety, 
falling into one of four ranges (minimal, mild, moderate, and severe). Total 
scores range from 0-21; higher scores represent higher levels of anxiety. 
The GAD-7 has shown good levels of reliability and validity in adult 
samples. Spitzer et al. found the GAD-7 to have good reliability, as well as 
criterion, construct, factorial, and procedural validity. Lowe et al. (2008) 
also supported the measure’s reliability and validity and demonstrated its 
internal consistency (alpha .89). Dear et al. (2011) report Cronbach’s 
alphas between .79 and .91.
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE, Rosenberg, 1965 -  Appendix L)
This is a 10-item scale measuring global self-esteem. Items relate to 
overall feelings of self-worth and are rated on a Likert scale of 1-4, 
corresponding to statements ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. The five positively worded items are reverse-coded, and the sum 
of all item scores gives an overall level of self-esteem. Total scores range 
from 10-40 with higher scores indicating higher levels of self-esteem. The 
RSE is suitable for use with adolescents, as it was originally developed for
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self-esteem assessment within this population. It has demonstrated good 
reliability and validity, with Cronbach’s alphas of .74 and .77 (McCarthy & 
Hoge, 1982) and .89 (Hagborg, 1993) in previous studies. Hagborg 
demonstrated high correlation of the RSE when compared to other 
measures of self-esteem, thus supporting its validity.
PROCEDURE
Data collection and debriefing
Information sheets had been emailed in advance to the colleges to give to 
participants. On the day of data collection, these information sheets were 
provided again, along with consent forms, and participants were given 
approximately five minutes to read these. Once consent had been gained, 
participants received their questionnaire packs and had approximately 30 
minutes to complete the measures detailed above. Participants completed 
questionnaires individually, but whilst in groups of approximately 20 
students at a time.
The questionnaire packs were collected after the time allowance, and after 
ensuring that participants were satisfied they had finished answering the 
measures. Consent forms were separated from the questionnaires in order 
to anonymise data. Debrief sheets were given and individuals had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the study.
At this point, the researcher delivered a presentation to all participants (for 
college A, this was on the research project itself, and in college B, on 
clinical psychological aspects of depression, as requested by the colleges). 
In each session, the researcher’s presentation was delivered after the 
return of all questionnaire packs to avoid affecting the data (data collection 
after the presentation may have been influenced by participants 
subsequently having more insight and information than their peers). All 
participants received the presentation, regardless of their decision to 
consent or not.
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Statistical analysis
The data were initially screened using tests of normality and distribution, 
and descriptive statistics were run. In investigating the hypotheses, 
correlation and regression analyses, including mediation and moderation, 
were conducted. Cases of missing data were excluded on a pairwise 
basis. Analyses were conducted using the statistical programme SPSS, 
version 19.0. The bootstrapping macro described by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) was also used to assess indirect effects in mediation (see 
www.afhayes.com).
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RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
All variables and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1, along with 
Cronbach’s alpha for each measure. The participant number varies by 
measure as cases were excluded pairwise in the analysis.
Table 1: A summary of descriptive statistics of the measures used:
Variable Measure No. Mean SD Min Max Cronbach’s
alpha
Ought SD Selves Q 132 19.09 4.26 9 30 .55
Ideal SD Selves Q 126 22.56 5.67 10 36 .68
Feared SD Selves Q 120 35.38 6.06 19 48 .72
Self-Esteem RSE 141 28.43 5.17 12 40 .88
Self-
Compassion
SCS 141 72.90 15.56 35 111 .89
Depression PHQ-A 141 7.39 5.03 0 27 .82
Anxiety GAD-7 141 6.34 4.51 0 21 .86
Shame SSA 141 27.79 11.17 6 55 .89
Note: All statistics rounded to 2 decimal points.
The descriptive statistics revealed that the sample represented a group of 
adolescents who, on average, fell within the mild range for depression (5- 
9), the mild range for anxiety (5-9), and moderate levels of self-compassion 
(65-91). As classification bands have not been established for the Selves 
Questionnaire, RSE or SSA, mean scores for each item were calculated, 
and an overall item mean response produced. Participants showed 
average to high levels of self-esteem (RSE item scores range from 1-4 and 
the item mean response was 2.84) and average levels of shame (SSA item 
scores range from 0-3 and the item mean response was 1.46). The Selves 
Questionnaire item scores range from 1-7; the item mean responses were 
2.73, 3.23 and 5.05 for ought, ideal and feared self-discrepancies, 
respectively. This indicated that, on average, participants rated themselves 
closer to their ought and ideal selves, and further away from their feared 
selves. The total mean scores for these self-discrepancy measures were 
also comparable to those found in a non-clinical sample of undergraduates 
in the USA by Carver et ai. (1999: 19.96, 20.34 and 38.53, respectively).
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Cronbach’s alpha is listed in Table 1 for each of the variables studied. 
Acceptable alpha levels fall around .70 and above (Cronbach, 1951); thus, 
all measures demonstrated acceptable or good levels of reliability, except 
the Selves Questionnaire measure of ought self-discrepancy.
Distribution
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted to assess the distribution of 
data points in each of the measures. The following were found to be 
significantly non-normal: anxiety, D(141) = .12, p<001 and depression, 
D(141) = .12, p<001, both of which were slightly positively skewed; self­
esteem, D(141) = .09, p = .008, which showed a slightly leptokurtic 
distribution; and ideal self-discrepancy, D(126) = .11, p = .001, and feared 
self-discrepancy, D(120) = .09, p = .014, which demonstrated slightly 
platykurtic distributions. The remaining measures were significantly 
normally distributed with normal histograms: ought self-discrepancy, D(132) 
= .07, p = .08; self-compassion, D(141) = .06, p = .20, shame, D(141) = .06,
p = .20.
According to Clark-Carter (1997), only one of the variables in a correlation 
pair needs to be normally distributed for use of parametric tests; thus 
Pearson’s r  could be used for correlations for ought self-discrepancy, or 
self-compassion, or shame, with any other variable. With a relatively large 
sample such as this, normality tests may result in statistical significance for 
a relatively small deviation from normality; inspection of the non-normally 
distributed data here indicated that none of the variables showed extreme 
skew or kurtosis, and thus, parametric tests were deemed sufficiently 
robust to use.
For the regression analyses, histograms and p-plots were calculated, all of 
which demonstrated normal distribution of residuals, indicating that linearity 
and homogeneity of variance could be assumed and thus, each regression 
model was stable.
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INFERENTIAL STATISTICS
Correlations
Pearson’s r  was used to calculate intercorrelations between the variables 
studied, as discussed above. All variables and their intercorrelations are 
shown in Table 2, with levels of significance.
Table 2: A summary of the correlations between the variables measured:
Ought
SD
Ideal
SD
Feared
SD
Self-
Esteem
Self-
Comp.
Dep. Anx.
Ought
SD
Ideal
SD
***.54
Feared
SD
***-.49 ***-.32
Self-
Esteem
***-.28 ***-.39 ***.28
Self-
Comp.
***-.29 ***-.35 ***.38 ***.67
Dep­
ression
*.18 **.26 *-.15 ***-.63 ***-.50
Anxiety **.21 **.21 **-.24 ***-.60 ***-.55 ***.68
Shame **.24 ***.31 ***-.28 ***-.58 ***-.62 ***.52 ***.48
Note: All statistics rounded to 2 decimal points. 
*p<05; **p<.01, ***p<001
As expected, there were significant interrelationships between the three 
different types of self-discrepancy: individuals who were closer to their 
feared selves were more likely to rate themselves as discrepant from their 
ought and ideal selves. These correlations support the validity of each of 
the three strands of the Selves Questionnaire as measures of different 
types of self-discrepancy.
Further support for the Selves Questionnaire was evidenced by the 
relationships between self-discrepancies and negative affect: ought and 
ideal self-discrepancies (which are undesirable) were positively correlated 
with depression, anxiety and shame; feared self-discrepancy (which is 
desirable) was negatively correlated with these. Individuals closer to their 
feared selves and more discrepant from their ought and ideal selves, were 
more likely to show higher levels of negative affect, including shame. This 
lends credence to both self-discrepancy theory and the model proposed in
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the current study. These individuals were also less likely to show high 
levels of self-esteem and self-compassion, as demonstrated by the 
relationships between self-discrepancies and these two variables. As 
expected, ought and ideal self-discrepancies were negatively correlated 
with self-esteem and self-compassion; by contrast, feared self-discrepancy 
was positively correlated with self-esteem and self-compassion. This 
pattern of intercorrelations supports the viability of testing a model in which 
self-esteem is a mediator between self-discrepancy and negative affect.
Self-compassion and self-esteem were themselves highly positively 
correlated. Neff and Vonk (2009) also found a significant degree of overlap 
between self-compassion and self-esteem, with comparable zero-order and 
partial correlations of .68 between the two. Furthermore, these two 
variables were each significantly negatively correlated with depression, 
anxiety and shame. Again, the pattern of intercorrelations suggests it is 
feasible to test a model in which self-compassion is a possible moderator in 
the relationship between self-discrepancy and self-esteem.
Regressions
SELF-DISCREPANCY AND SELF-ESTEEM AS PREDICTORS OF 
NEGATIVE AFFECT
Both simple and multiple linear regressions were conducted to test 
Hypothesis 1: self-discrepancy and self-esteem will predict negative affect 
in adolescents.
Simple regression
Self-discrepancy and negative affect, and self-esteem and negative affect 
To investigate whether self-esteem and self-discrepancy predicted negative 
affect in adolescents, simple linear regressions were computed, which 
showed that self-discrepancy significantly predicted negative affect 
(depression, anxiety and especially shame), as did self-esteem. For each 
regression, the assumptions of linearity, normally distributed errors, and 
uncorrelated errors were checked and met.
In the Results section, only ideal self-discrepancy results are reported in 
the main body of text, as this was found to be the most influential self­
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discrepancy type with the greatest impact on negative affect. This is also 
the case for the subsequent multiple, mediated and moderated regressions. 
Analyses were conducted with ought and feared self-discrepancies, which 
produced similar results to those of ideal self-discrepancy (apart from 
feared self-discrepancy, which did not significantly predict depression); 
these can be found in Appendices M-Q. Tables 3-5 summarise the 
regressions of ideal self-discrepancy on negative affect:
Table 3: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting depression from 
ideal self-discrepancy:____________________ ___________ ___________
3 SEP beta Rz
Regression .065
Constant 2.285 1.788
Ideal SD .226 .077 **.256
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Table 4: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting anxiety from ideal 
self-discrepancy:___________ ____________ _________________ _____
3 SEp beta R*
Regression .044
Constant 2.600 1.623
Ideal SD .166 .070 *.209
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Table 5: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting shame from ideal 
self-discrepancy:___________ ____________ ___________ ___________
3 SEP beta R*
Regression .095
Constant 14.122 3.913
Ideal SD .606 .168 ***.308
*p<.05; **p<01; ***p<.001
Tables 6-8 summarise the regressions of self-esteem on negative affect:
Table 6: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting depression from 
self-esteem: ___________________________ ____ ___________
3 SEP beta R"
Regression ,397
Constant 24.813 1.850
Self-esteem -.613 .064 ***-.630
*p<.05; **p<01; ***p<.001
Table 7: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting anxiety from self- 
esteem: _______________________________ ___________
3 SEP beta R*
Regression 357
Constant 21.171 1.714
Self-esteem -.522 .059 ***-.598
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 8: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting shame from self­
esteem:
P SEp beta R2
Regression .333
Constant 63.259 4.327
Self-esteem -1.248 .150 ***-.577
*p<.05; **p<01; ***p<.001
These results revealed that self-discrepancy and self-esteem, separately, 
predicted negative affect. Self-esteem predicted more variance than did 
self-discrepancy, and ideal self-discrepancy was consistently a better 
predictor of depression and shame (but not anxiety) than was ought or 
feared self-discrepancy (see Appendix M).
Simple linear regressions were conducted to demonstrate self-discrepancy 
as a predictor of self-esteem (again, ideal self-discrepancy was the 
strongest predictor - see Appendix N). Table 9 summarises the significant 
regression of ideal self-discrepancy on self-esteem:
Table 9: Simple linear regression analysis summary predicting self-esteem from 
ideal self-discrepancy:____________________ ___________ ___________
P SEp beta R2
Regression .149
Constant 36.366 1.754
Ideal SD -.352 .075 ***-.386
*p<05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Multiple regression
Self-discrepancy and self-esteem and negative affect 
Despite accounting for a significant, although small, amount of variance in 
negative affect when tested alone, when self-discrepancy was combined 
with self-esteem in a multiple regression, self-esteem was the main 
predictor of negative affect and the contribution from ideal self-discrepancy 
was not significant. This was true of each of the three measures of 
negative affect. These results are represented in Tables 10-12:
Table 10: Multiple linear regression analysis summary predicting depression from 
ideal self-discrepancy and self-esteem:________________________________
P SEP beta R2
Regression .397
Constant 24.383 3.047
Self-esteem -.608 .074 ***-.625
Ideal SD .012 .067 .014
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<001
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Table 11: Multiple linear regression analysis summary predicting anxiety from ideal 
self-discrepancy and self-esteem:____________ ___________ ___________
P SEp beta R2
Regression 358
Constant 21.895 2.822
Self-esteem -.531 .068 ***-.608
Ideal SD -.021 .062 -.026
*p<05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Table 12: Multiple linear regression analysis summary predicting shame from ideal 
self-discrepancy and self-esteem:______________________________ _____
P SEp beta R2
Regression .341
Constant 56.483 7.082
Self-esteem -1.165 .172 ***-.539
Ideal SD .196 .156 .099
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
These results suggest that the variance seen in negative affect previously 
attributed to self-discrepancy is, in fact, most likely due to self-esteem 
effects, which were large and significant, whereas self-discrepancy did not 
emerge as a significant predictor of depression, anxiety or shame (see 
Appendix O for similar results for ought and feared self-discrepancy).
SELF-ESTEEM AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN SELF-DISCREPANCY AND 
NEGATIVE AFFECT
Mediated regression analyses were conducted to test Hypothesis 2: self­
esteem will mediate the relationship between self-discrepancy and negative 
affect (see Appendix P for ought and feared self-discrepancy results).
Mediated regression
Self-discrepancy, self-esteem and negative affect
Self-esteem was tested as a mediator between self-discrepancy and 
depression, anxiety and shame. Three mediation analyses were computed 
which showed self-esteem partially mediated the relationship between ideal 
self-discrepancy and each of the three negative affect measures.
Ideal self-discrepancy significantly predicted self-esteem (R2 = .149, 
F(1,124) = 21.775, (3 = -.352, p<001). It also significantly predicted 
depression (R2 = .065, F(1,124) = 8.661, (3 = .226, p = .004), anxiety (R2 =
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.044, F(1,124) = 5.643, p = .166, p = .019) and shame (Ft2 = .095, F(1,124) 
= 12.958, p = .606, p<.001).
When self-esteem was added to each regression, it significantly predicted 
depression (R2 change = .332, F(2,123) = 40.559, (3 = -.608, p<001), 
reducing the ideal self-discrepancy beta to a non-significant level ((3 = .012, 
p = .854), demonstrating partial mediation:
c(Sc) = .226 (.077), p = .004 
Ideal SD ---------------------------------- ► Depression
a(Sa) — 
-.352 (.075)
p<001
Self-Esteem
b(Sb) = 
-.608 (.074)
p<.001
Figure 2: Partial mediation of the effect of self-discrepancy on depression via self­
esteem
Self-esteem also significantly predicted anxiety (R2 change = .314, F(2,123) 
= 34.283, (3 = -.531, p<001), reducing the ideal self-discrepancy beta to a 
non-significant level ((3 = -.021, p = .737), showing partial mediation:
c(Sc) = .166 (.070), p = .019 
Ideal SD ---------------------------------- ► Anxiety
a(Sa) — 
-.352 (.075)
p<001
Self-Esteem
b(Sb) = 
-.531 (.068)
p<001
Figure 3: Partial mediation of the effect of self-discrepancy on anxiety via self­
esteem
Lastly, the addition of self-esteem to the regression model also significantly 
predicted shame (R2 change = .247, F(2,123) = 31.889, (3 = -1.165, 
p<001), reducing the ideal self-discrepancy beta to a non-significant level 
(P = .196, p = .213), showing partial mediation:
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c(Sc) = .606 (.168), p<.001 
Ideal SD ---------------------------------- ► Shame
b(Sb) = 
-1.165 (.172)
a(Sa) = 
-.352 (.075)
p<.001p<001
Self-Esteem
Figure 4: Partial mediation of the effect of self-discrepancy on shame via self­
esteem
Sobel tests (Sobel, 1986) indicate a significant mediated pathway when the 
absolute value of z is greater than 1.96. This was true of each of the above 
mediations, with z-values as follows: depression, z = 4.075; anxiety, z = 
4.022; shame, z = 3.857. Additional verification was sought through the 
Bootstrap technique (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) and produced similar 
results (see Appendix R).
The analyses presented above are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
effect of ideal self-discrepancy on depression, anxiety and shame is 
mediated by self-esteem. In all cases, analyses suggested partial 
mediation.
SELF-COMPASSION AS A MODERATOR BETWEEN SELF­
DISCREPANCY AND SELF-ESTEEM
A moderated regression analysis was conducted to test Hypothesis 3: self­
compassion will moderate the relationship between self-discrepancy and 
self_esteem (see Appendix Q for ought and feared self-discrepancy 
results).
Moderated regression
Self-discrepancv, self-esteem and self-compassion 
A single moderation analysis was conducted which did not show self­
compassion as a significant moderator of the relationship between self­
discrepancy and self-esteem, as shown in Table 13:
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Table 13: Moderated regression analysis summary predicting self-esteem from 
ideal self-discrepancy, self-compassion, and the interaction between these two 
variables (not significant):__________________________________________
P SEP beta R2
Regression .479
Constant 23.476 7.210
Ideal SD -.433 .304 -.475
Self-compassion (SC) .117 .095 .354
SD*SC .004 .004 .326
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
The interaction between self-compassion and self-discrepancy did not 
significantly predict self-esteem, thus, self-compassion did not emerge as a 
significant moderating factor between self-discrepancy and self-esteem in 
adolescents.
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DISCUSSION
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The current study investigated the validity of a theoretically-driven model of 
the relationship between self-discrepancy and the processes by which it 
may be related to negative affect, especially shame, in adolescents. The 
results partly confirmed the first hypothesis, provided evidence for the 
second, but did not show support for the third. When no other variables 
were controlled for, self-discrepancy predicted adolescent negative affect. 
However, when self-esteem was included simultaneously with self­
discrepancy, self-esteem emerged as the only significant predictor in all 
three models. Subsequently, support was found for the proposal that self­
esteem mediates the relationship between self-discrepancy and negative 
affect. Self-compassion, however, was not found to significantly moderate 
the relationship between self-discrepancy and self-esteem.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DISCREPANCY, SELF-ESTEEM AND 
NEGATIVE AFFECT
The current study found that both self-esteem and self-discrepancy, when 
tested independently of each other, predicted negative affect in 
adolescents. However, self-esteem predicted a much greater amount of 
variance in negative affect. Furthermore, when self-discrepancy and self­
esteem were entered simultaneously as predictors of negative affect, self- 
discrepancy did not emerge as a significant predictor of depression, anxiety 
or shame. Thus, the most plausible interpretation of the findings seems to 
be that the observed relationship between self-discrepancy and negative 
affect is largely explained by self-esteem. Consistent with this, the 
mediation analysis revealed that the direct effect between self-discrepancy 
and each type of negative affect was significantly weakened by the 
inclusion of self-esteem in the models. Therefore, the analysis is consistent 
with the proposal that self-esteem is a potential mediator in the relationship 
between self-discrepancy and negative affect. However, caution should be 
applied in this interpretation, as it is only one proposed way in which the
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variables may be modelled and, although based on theory, the causal steps 
model (see Baron & Kenny, 1986) cannot imply causal links within a cross- 
sectional design.
Effect of self-discrepancy
Consistent with the current findings, Ozgul et al. (2003) found that self­
discrepancy (as measured by the Selves Questionnaire) was related to 
negative affect, but its contribution to the prediction of emotional states was 
not significant after controlling for self-concept (the beliefs about one’s 
personal attributes). In the current study, it appears to be the valence of 
self-evaluation (i.e., self-esteem) which has greater predictive utility with 
respect to negative affect than the magnitude of discrepancy within the self. 
The Selves Questionnaire illuminates individuals’ self-discrepancies, but 
perhaps does not tell us enough about how an individual interprets their 
self-discrepancies. As per attribution theory (Seligman, 1975), if 
discrepancies between selves are not perceived in an internal, stable or 
global manner, they may not necessarily lead to low self-esteem and 
negative affect. As there was no way of knowing how participants 
interpreted their self-discrepancies, it is possible that some adolescents 
identified and considered personally salient self-traits and discrepancies, 
whilst others simply gave responses to meet task requirements. Thus, high 
self-discrepancy may not have had a significant impact on self-esteem and 
negative affect unless it was interpreted negatively. This resonates with 
Beck’s (1976) cognitive model, in which it is not negative thoughts per se 
which influence mood, but the individual’s interpretation of them and the 
meaning made of them in relation to the self. Similarly, it appears that it is 
not self-discrepancy itself which leads to negative affect, but the way in 
which the discrepancy is evaluated against the self, which is likely to 
damage self-esteem, and thus be related to negative affect.
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory proposed that different types of 
self-discrepancy are associated with specific types of negative affect; 
however, support for this hypothesis has been mixed (Tangney et al., 
1998). The current analysis suggested that discrete types of self­
discrepancy exerted differential influences over the different types of 
negative affect. In support of SDT, ideal self-discrepancy predicted more
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variance than ought self-discrepancy in depression and shame. However, 
ideal and ought self-discrepancies predicted similar amounts of variance in 
anxiety (SDT posits that ought self-discrepancy would be more likely to 
lead to agitation-related emotions). In fact, feared self-discrepancy 
predicted the most variance in anxiety in the current study. In the 
prediction of self-esteem, ideal self-discrepancy again was the strongest 
predictor out of the three self-discrepancy types. Moretti and Higgins 
(1990) found ideal self-discrepancy was a significant predictor of self­
esteem, even when variance according to the positivity of actual self­
attributes was held constant.
The current study’s finding that ideal self-discrepancy was the most 
influential self-guide, in terms of self-esteem and negative affect, is 
consistent with how ideal self-discrepancy has been fore-grounded in the 
extant literature. By definition, an ideal is the utmost for which one could 
strive: an exemplar of perfection. This could therefore have more all- 
encompassing effects on one’s self-esteem and emotional state if it is not 
achieved. By contrast, ought self-discrepancy is more specifically related 
to the kind of person one thinks one should be and, therefore, is restricted 
to traits concerned with duty and obligation and less likely to include 
desired attributes. Although there may be some overlap between the two 
(and in the current study they were highly intercorrelated), who one ideally 
wants to be is not necessarily the same as who one thinks one ought to be. 
This is consistent with various theories in the literature, such as those 
proposed by Colby, James, or Rogers, for example (as cited in Higgins, 
1987), which stress the distinctiveness of ought versus ideal selves. An 
additional distinction is made with feared self-discrepancy, which was a 
greater predictor of anxiety in the current study, suggesting that the notion 
of an anti-ideal is more likely to lead to agitation than dejection, especially 
in this adolescent age group. Feared self-discrepancy was significantly 
negatively correlated with both ought and ideal self-discrepancies. Self­
discrepancies would therefore appear to be conceptually related, but 
discrete constructs, which have different emotional and self-evaluative 
effects.
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Mediating effect of self-esteem
Given the relationship described above between self-discrepancy and self­
esteem and negative affect, it was unsurprising to find that self-esteem was 
a significant partial mediator of the relationship between self-discrepancy 
and negative affect. The mediation model in the current study proposed 
that self-discrepancy predicts negative affect because being self-discrepant 
damages self-esteem. As the results established a partial mediation of 
self-esteem on the relationship between self-discrepancy and negative 
affect, this suggests that the pathway between the latter two variables 
cannot be totally explained by self-esteem. It may be that there is a direct 
path between self-discrepancy and negative affect, or that there is an 
alternative or additional mediator to self-esteem which is at work, but which 
was not measured by the current research. Although it is not possible to 
imply causal relationships, one possible interpretation of the mediation 
finding is that, for many adolescents, self-discrepancy is related to a 
reduction in self-esteem which, in turn, is related to experiences of 
depression, anxiety and shame. This is consistent with research by 
Higgins (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, 1999; Moretti & Higgins, 1990), in which 
non-ideal self-states are thought to lead to lower self-worth and feelings of 
dejection or agitation. Such experiences are more likely to manifest in 
individuals whose self-discrepancies are personally and contextually 
relevant (Higgins, 1999). Although most of the extant research has focused 
on adult experiences, Harter (1999) suggests that all adolescents 
experience some actual-ideal discrepancy and that, when this is significant 
and within a personally relevant domain, it is likely to lower self-esteem.
SELF-COMPASSION AS A MODERATOR BETWEEN SELF­
DISCREPANCY AND SELF-ESTEEM
Contrary to the prediction, self-compassion was not a significant moderator 
of the relationship between self-discrepancy and self-esteem. This is 
inconsistent with existing research which highlights self-compassion as a 
potential protective factor against emotional distress due to its non- 
judgmental, accepting attitude to the self: the antithesis of the negative self- 
evaluation involved in self-discrepancy and low self-esteem (e.g., Gilbert, 
2000; Neff, 2003a). The literature suggests that individuals high in self­
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discrepancy will exhibit low self-esteem when self-compassion is low, but 
this was not supported by the analysis. However, it makes both theoretical 
and intuitive sense that, in the face of self-discrepancy, self-esteem could 
remain protected if individuals were accepting and non-judgmental about 
their shortcomings (i.e., if they showed high self-compassion). This notion, 
therefore, requires further attention.
Protective potential of self-compassion
Previous research has shown self-compassion to be a potential buffer 
against psychological distress, with associations with reduced depression 
and anxiety (Leary et al., 2007; Neff, 2003a). Less is known about the 
mechanisms through which these associations occur. Raes (2010) 
suggests and finds evidence for self-compassion as a protective factor 
against negative affect through its positive influence on rumination and 
worry. He refers to rumination as repetitive thinking about oneself in an 
evaluative way. Specifically, the ‘brooding’ aspect of rumination, which he 
refers to as self-critical pondering, is a unique mediator between self­
compassion and depression. Self-esteem is affected by how one evaluates 
oneself; therefore, one would expect that self-compassion (if it reduces 
rumination) might buffer against self-esteem damage from evaluating 
oneself in a discrepant, and possibly negative, way. Raes found similar 
results for worry as a mediator between self-compassion and anxiety. If 
self-compassion reduces worry, this might be another way in which it 
protects against self-discrepancy, especially against ought self­
discrepancy, which is most likely to lead to agitated emotions, such as 
anxiety (Higgins, 1987). As of yet, the literature on self-compassion has 
not explored its potential impact on self-esteem, but this would appear to be 
a useful area of future research in elucidating its protective effects and how 
these might be useful for highly self-discrepant adolescents.
Relationship between self-compassion and self-esteem
The importance of the relationship between self-compassion and self­
esteem was highlighted by the current study’s correlational analyses, which 
revealed high intercorrelations between these two variables. Both are also 
highly negatively correlated with depression, anxiety and shame. Clear 
distinctions have been made between self-compassion and self-esteem
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(Leary et al., 2007), lending support to the notion that they are two separate 
constructs. It makes theoretical and intuitive sense that individuals high in 
self-compassion would show high self-esteem, as self-compassionate 
people do not devalue themselves in the face of adversity. However, it may 
be possible to bolster self-esteem without increasing self-compassion, and 
this might explain why self-esteem interventions have been criticised as 
having little impact on positive outcomes (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2003; 
Swann, 1996). Self-esteem may be bolstered in one situation, but not 
translated to others, prompting domain-specific self-esteem, which is 
therefore fragile, and potentially still contingent upon validation and 
approval from others (Ceci & Ryan, 1995), or upon factors such as success 
and attractiveness (Neff & Vonk, 2009). There are other potentially 
negative corollaries of high self-esteem, such as its association with 
narcissism, social comparison, ego defensiveness, and self-worth 
contingency (Neff, 2009). Self-compassion, on the contrary, is not 
concerned with self-evaluation and comparison towards others, and 
therefore may avoid the potentially negative corollaries of self-esteem, 
whilst providing additional, wider-spread benefits, such as the reduced 
negative affect suggested by the current research. Furthermore, Neff 
(2009) suggests it may be easier to raise self-compassion (which simply 
requires kind acceptance of our limitations) than to increase self-esteem, 
which previously has proved problematic (Baumeister et al., 2003).
In the current study, self-compassion and self-esteem were highly 
intercorrelated, raising the question of the distinctiveness of these concepts 
in the current sample. Neff and Vonk (2009) also found high 
intercorrelations between self-esteem and self-compassion. These 
observations might explain the non-significance of the current study’s 
moderation analysis: if one considers that self-compassion and self-esteem 
are highly intercorrelated, it is possible that the interaction term between 
self-compassion and self-discrepancy (when entered into the same model 
as self-compassion alone) cannot contribute to the model as a unique 
predictor.
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Relationship between self-compassion and self-discrepancy
Another potential explanation as to why a significant moderating effect of 
self-compassion was not found between self-discrepancy and self-esteem 
is that, by nature, individuals with high self-compassion may not perceive 
themselves as self-discrepant in the first place. Correlational analyses 
revealed significant negative relationships between self-discrepancy and 
self-compassion, suggesting that high levels of these two variables tend not 
to occur simultaneously. Theoretically, it stands to reason that self­
compassion and self-discrepancy would be mutually exclusive due to the 
high warmth and lack of self-criticism involved in the former, and the cold 
judgment and negative self-evaluation implied by the latter (Gilbert & Irons, 
2009). If highly self-compassionate adolescents tend not to recognise self­
discrepancies, then their self-compassion is not likely to show statistically 
significant moderation effects on self-esteem. Alternatively, self- 
compassionate individuals may simply set lower, or less unrealistic, 
standards for themselves, and therefore, have less chance of failing to fulfil 
these, making them less likely to perceive themselves as self-discrepant.
The nature of adolescence
One final hypothesis is that the adolescent age of the sample affected the 
likelihood of a significant moderating effect of self-compassion being 
revealed. Adolescence can be a particularly turbulent time in terms of self- 
identity, self-evaluation, and self-esteem (e.g. Erikson, 1968; Gilbert & 
Irons, 2009; Shore, 1994). Therefore, if self-compassion is to have a 
moderating effect on the relationship between self-discrepancy and self­
esteem in adolescence, self-compassion may have to be particularly high 
for this effect to manifest itself statistically. A young person might have to 
be especially self-compassionate to combat being self-discrepant in a 
typical adolescent environment, where fitting in with one’s peers and 
fulfilling both their and one’s own set of values is critically important to 
identity development.
It seems that the most helpful message to take from the findings is the 
potential benefit of encouraging adolescents to have realistic self­
perceptions and an accepting attitude towards themselves in the face of 
falling short of self-standards. This is the very essence of the self-
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compassion ethos. Self-compassion’s influence on negative affect could 
be investigated further by research from intervention studies; for example, if 
randomised control trials were conducted which showed a reduction in 
depression, anxiety or shame following an intervention to promote self­
compassion, this would enhance the hypothesis that self-compassion can 
improve negative affect. In spite of the current research’s unsupported 
moderation analysis, self-compassion was strongly and negatively 
correlated with all three negative affects. Although causality cannot be 
inferred in a cross-sectional design, and additional variables cannot be 
ruled out, these findings stress the importance of future research in 
investigating the effects on negative affect of enhancing self-compassion.
Despite the current study providing no support for self-compassion as a 
moderator between self-discrepancy and self-esteem, this issue requires 
further attention. Not only is there a strong intuitive and theoretical basis 
for considering self-compassion as an effective protective factor against 
self-discrepancy, there is also robust support for its general mental health 
benefits. In particular, Neff and Vonk (2009) found it predicts a significant 
amount of variance in depression and anxiety when controlling for self­
esteem. This suggests that the lack of a significant result for the 
moderation hypothesis in the current study may be a product of its 
methodological limitations, rather than a flaw in its theoretical 
underpinnings. Thus, an exploration of the study’s strengths and limitations 
may further elucidate this topic, and lead to a greater understanding of the 
full range of results found.
LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
In giving a critique of the work, particular attention will be paid to the 
practical elements which may have either helped or hindered the research 
process. These have been outlined according to the design, measures and 
sample employed in the study.
Design
The research aimed to test discrete hypotheses, rather than a fully 
explicated model; for this reason, regression was the most appropriate
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choice of analysis, rather than structural equation modelling (SEM), which 
was probably not appropriate with a relatively small sample size of 141 (see 
Lightsey et al., 2006). However, SEM would have given a more holistic 
explanation of how self-discrepancy, self-esteem, self-compassion and 
negative affect relate to one another.
Regressions are useful in helping to establish the direction of effects (see 
Orth et al., 2011). However, due to the current study’s cross-sectional 
design, caution should be exercised in interpreting causal relationships, 
because alternative, untested variables cannot be ruled out as also having 
an influence on relationships. The hypotheses tested in this study, albeit 
theoretically-driven, are but one way of modelling the variables. 
Furthermore, the causal steps approach of Baron and Kenny (1986) cannot 
demonstrate causality in a cross-sectional design. Consequently, the most 
appropriate interpretation of the results is that the current data support a 
model in which self-esteem is postulated as a potential mediator in the 
relationship between self-discrepancy and negative affect.
It is possible that even the variables which are tested can confound any 
inferences made about directionality and causality; this may be due to 
feedback loops from outcome variables, in turn, affecting predictive 
variables. Taking shame as an example: H. Lewis (1971) suggests that the 
experience of shame is likely to cause further introspection, resulting in 
negative evaluation of the entire self as incompetent and worthless, an 
evaluation which is likely to lower self-esteem. Therefore, it is possible 
that, rather than self-esteem predicting negative affect in this study, it was 
negative affect which predicted self-esteem. Likewise, although self­
discrepancy may impact on one’s sense of self-esteem, it could be that an 
individual is more likely to rate themselves as self-discrepant if they have 
low self-esteem in the first place. One cannot completely rule out these 
alternative hypotheses. However, in terms of self-esteem and negative 
affect, the former is deemed more likely to be a cause, rather than a 
consequence of the latter (e.g., Mann et al., 2004; Orth et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, in incorporating the self-discrepancy aspect, previous 
evidence suggests a pathway through which failure to fulfil personal 
standards leads to low self-esteem and to being depressed (Harter, 1990;
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Higgins, 1989). The current data do not conclusively support this, but 
neither do they refute this possibility.
Measures
Self-report measures are commonly employed in psychological research; 
however, their use raises some concerns about the validity of results, 
especially due to potential response distortions and the psychometric 
properties of the scales used. Response distortions include phenomena 
such as central tendency responding and social desirability bias. When 
self-report measures are used to assess all variables, as in the current 
study, not only can responses for each measure become contaminated, but 
also the correlations between each measure, thus distorting the influence of 
the variables and the relationships between them.
In terms of psychometric properties, it is of the utmost importance that 
adequate levels of reliability and validity are established, in order for 
research findings to be meaningful. This was true of the current study. The 
SSA was the least studied of all the questionnaires used, owing to its very 
recent construction. However, preliminary results indicate good levels of 
reliability and validity (John et al., in prep.). Furthermore, Cronbach’s 
alphas conducted for each measure, as part of the current study, implied 
good levels of reliability.
Regarding validity, the constructs studied here were, by their very nature, 
perceptual and attitudinal and, therefore, suitable for measurement by self- 
report (e.g. Spector, 1994). Howard (1994) suggests that this is an 
appropriate methodology for studying human characteristics, such as the 
self.
One of the strengths of the study’s self-report measures was the use of 
idiographic instruments, where possible. These included the SSA and the 
Selves Questionnaire, which ask respondents to provide personal 
examples of times they have felt ashamed, or traits that are personally 
relevant to them, respectively. Pelham and Swann (1989) comment on the 
usefulness of this type of self-report over nomothetic measures, where 
participants respond to pre-determined examples, which may or may not be
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of personal relevance to them. Moretti and Higgins (1990) compared 
nomothetic and idiographic measures of self-discrepancy and found ideal 
self-discrepancy predicted self-esteem whilst controlling for variance in 
actual self-ratings, only in the idiographic results.
The usefulness of these measures could have been enhanced in the 
current study by employing content analysis to further explore the 
qualitative nature of adolescents’ experiences of shame and self­
discrepancy. This may have yielded additional data about the relationships 
between self-discrepancy and negative affect, potentially not picked up by 
purely quantitative analysis.
In exploring the impact of questionnaire measures on participant 
responses, one might consider the impact of the Selves Questionnaire and 
the fact that it requires respondents to rate their own view of ideal, ought 
and feared selves, and not how they perceive others to rate these self­
guides. This may influence the outcome of shame-proneness, for instance, 
which is deemed most likely to result from an actual/own versus ideal/ofher 
discrepancy (Higgins, 1987). However, one could argue that the way an 
individual thinks about their own standards cannot help but be influenced 
by others: people’s feelings about themselves heavily depend on how they 
think other people see them (Cooley, 1902). Therefore, is it possible to 
have self-evaluation without the implied presence of others?
This notion is given credence by Leary et a/.’s (1995) sociometer model, 
which asserts that people are motivated to do well in aspects of life which 
will enhance their social inclusion. Thus, their self-evaluations (which will 
impact on perceived self-discrepancy and levels of self-esteem) are 
affected by the standards they adopt from others and their performance in 
domains which they think other people value. This may be particularly true 
of adolescence, when young people are moving away from the standards 
developed via their family of origin, but placing increasing levels of 
importance on the values and evaluations of their peer groups (Buhrmester, 
1996). Adolescent selves cannot possibly exist in a vacuum, when they are 
founded on and influenced by perceptions of the evaluations of other 
people.
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Sample
The reliability of a study can be seen as a property of its sample, rather 
than the measures it employs (see American Educational Research 
Association et al., 1999). Although college students may be seen as an 
important population, their results may not necessarily show good 
generalisability and are certainly unlikely to apply to clinical samples 
(Lightsey et al., 2006). A more heterogeneous sample is likely to give 
better external reliability and generalisability, but heterogeneity was limited 
in the current study along the lines of age (16 to 18 year-olds), educational 
attainment (college students), ethnic diversity (mainly White British) and 
socioeconomic status (mainly middle class). These factors make the 
sample less likely to be representative of Britain’s adolescent population. 
Furthermore, the study may have benefitted from a larger sample size.
There are a number of ways in which the current study’s limitations may 
have impacted on the results achieved. In improving the research and 
further contributing to the literature around adolescent experiences of the 
self and emotional consequences, it is essential to look towards its 
implications for future research.
FUTURE RESEARCH
It would be beneficial to extend the current study in a number of ways. A 
larger sample size would make SEM analysis viable, which would 
holistically test the proposed model. An increased sample size might also 
expand the heterogeneity of the participants; testing the model with a more 
diverse sample of adolescents, in terms of age, education, religion, culture 
and ethnicity, would make the results more generalisable to the wider 
adolescent population. Further exploration of the results could entail a 
study of gender differences in self-discrepancy, self-esteem, self­
compassion and negative affect, or a more in-depth analysis of the sub­
factors involved in these measures. It would also be worth considering the 
model within a clinical sample, given the potentially preventative application 
of self-esteem or self-compassion promotion for mental health problems 
associated with self-discrepancy and shame.
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As aforementioned, an intervention study of self-compassion may help 
elucidate its potential as a moderating factor between self-discrepancy and 
self-esteem. This may also establish some directionality within the model, 
helping to confirm cause-and-effect relations. To this end, future research 
should also look to control for additional variables which might affect self­
esteem and negative affect, in order to rule out alternative hypotheses.
Lastly, richer data could be accrued by complementing the current means 
of data collection with some qualitative measures. These could include 
content analysis of participants’ examples of desired self-guides and 
experiences of shame, as measured by the idiographic nature of some of 
the questionnaires employed here.
In the interest of disseminating psychological research to the wider public, 
the preliminary results of this study were presented at a conference at the 
University of Surrey on 23rd April this year, and the finalised results are due 
to be fed back to psychology students and teachers at the participating 
colleges at a later date.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The current study adds to the existing literature on the self and its 
relationship to negative emotion in adolescence. Firstly, it lends support to 
SDT’s assertion that different self-discrepancies predict specific negative 
affects and that this is evident within an adolescent population. Ideal self­
discrepancy was shown to be the strongest self-discrepancy predictor of 
depression and shame in adolescents. However, self-esteem was a much 
more significant factor, which partially mediated the relationship between 
self-discrepancy and negative affect. One implication might be that self- 
discrepant adolescents are likely to have reduced self-esteem and this, in 
turn, may lead to experiences of depression, anxiety and shame.
This study has highlighted the importance of self-compassion as a 
protective factor against negative emotion. Self-compassion was tested as 
a moderating factor between self-discrepancy and self-esteem, but was not 
found to be significant. However, there are a number of reasons why this
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might have been the case, including nuances within self-compassion’s 
relationships with both self-esteem and self-discrepancy, and the 
complexity of adolescence, in terms of self-development. Additionally, 
some methodological limitations have been outlined, which may have 
affected the findings. Despite these, the correlational analyses revealed 
that self-compassion was strongly negatively correlated with depression, 
anxiety and shame, suggesting that it could be useful to explore the impact 
of enhancing self-compassion on both self-esteem and negative affect.
The clinical implications of this study include closer inspection of the 
protective qualities of both self-esteem and self-compassion against 
negative affect in adolescents. Bolstering self-esteem may make young 
people less vulnerable to damage from self-discrepancies, and therefore 
reduce or prevent experiences of depression, anxiety, and shame. 
However, prior research suggests that self-esteem interventions are not 
always effective. Although self-compassion was not revealed as a 
significant moderator between self-discrepancy and self-esteem, there is a 
growing evidence-base for its protective powers, over and above self­
esteem enhancement, and this requires further attention. Future research 
should be directed towards larger, more diverse samples of adolescents, 
perhaps even with a clinical population, where one would expect 
experiences of self-discrepancy, self-esteem and negative affect to be 
more extreme. The literature would benefit from intervention studies using 
self-esteem and self-compassion promotion in self-discrepant adolescents, 
in order to help clarify causal relationships between self-discrepancy, self­
esteem, self-compassion, and negative affect.
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APPENDIX A:
Initial information for colleges
SURREY
UNIVERSITY OF
Holly Winton, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
h.winton@surrev.ac.uk
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITY
A study of emotions and identity in young people
I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of Surrey. As part of 
my training, I am undertaking some research into the experience of shame 
in adolescence. For this project, I need a large number of young people, 
between the ages of 16 and 18, to complete some questionnaires about 
shame, self-perception and feelings.
I am writing to offer your psychology department a lesson or presentation 
on mental health awareness or further education in psychology, in return for 
your students’ participation in my research. This would take the form of 
filling out some simple questionnaires, over the course of a 1-hour period 
(approximately), in which I would also give my presentation/lesson 
(questionnaire completion should take approximately 25 minutes). Not only 
could I deliver a presentation of relevance and interest to your students, but 
the experience of taking part in psychological research may also be of 
value to them, especially those going on to pursue degrees in psychology, 
giving them a taste of the research process in this field.
I am hoping to recruit participants in the summer term, but I am aware that 
this is a busy time for colleges and students. In the event that a pen-and- 
paper administration of my questionnaires is not possible, I am able to set 
up an electronic version of the study, for participants to complete online in 
their own time.
This research has been given a favourable ethical opinion by the Faculty of 
Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey.
If this is something the college would be interested in, I would love to hear 
back from you, so that I can provide you with further information. Please 
email me at h.winton@surrev.ac.uk.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Holly Winton
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of Surrey
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APPENDIX B:
Information for participants
SURREY
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F
WANT TO TAKE PART IN A 
PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH PROJECT?
Holly Winton, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
h.winton@surrev.ac.uk
A study of emotions and identity in young people
My name is Holly Winton and I am training to become a clinical 
psychologist. I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. 
Before you decide, you need to know what you will be asked to do. Please 
take the time to read this information sheet.
This research has been given a favourable ethical opinion by the Faculty of 
Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey.
The research
The aim of this study is to investigate young people’s experiences of 
shame, self-identity (how they view themselves) and self-compassion 
(feelings of kindness towards themselves). Specifically, I want to discover 
if how you view yourself makes you more or less likely to experience 
shame, and if self-compassion is likely to reduce feelings of shame.
What you will be asked to do
I am going to ask young people from your college to fill in some 
questionnaires. These questionnaires look at different feelings to do with 
self-identity, shame, self-compassion, depression, anxiety and self-esteem.
I need as many young people as possible to fill in these questionnaires, in 
order to help me with my investigations.
You do not have to take part in this study. If you do not want to, then do 
not complete the questionnaires. There are some puzzles at the back of 
the questionnaire booklet which you can complete instead, if you do not 
wish to make it obvious that you are not participating in the study.
However, if you would like to take part, please complete the “Consent form” 
at the front of your questionnaire booklet and answer all the questions in all 
the questionnaires. If you decide half-way through the questionnaires that 
you wish to withdraw from the study, this is also okay. Simply draw a line 
through any questionnaires you have already completed, and discontinue 
with the remaining questionnaires. I will collect all the questionnaire 
booklets at the end of our session and the consent forms will be separated 
from these so that your data is made anonymous. This means that no one 
will know who provided which answers in the booklet.
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Appendix B (contd.):
Writing up the research
I am hoping that this research will discover something new and previously 
unstudied about shame in adolescents. If it does, then this research might 
be published in a scientific journal. It might also be used to help 
professionals working with young people who are experiencing problems in 
their lives. However, nobody will know who took part in this research, and 
your name and college will not be on any of the information that is 
published or available to others.
What else you need to know
Some questionnaires ask about feelings of depression, anxiety and low 
self-esteem, however, they are not measures for diagnosing these 
difficulties. Only I will ever see your responses and, because they are 
anonymous, I will not be able to trace your answers back to you as a 
participant. This means I will not be able to give individual feedback to 
participants about their answers.
Because of the questionnaires’ content regarding feelings of depression, 
anxiety and low self-esteem, some young people may find it upsetting to 
answer these questions, as they may connect them to troubling thoughts 
and experiences from the past and/or the present. Think about how it 
might feel for you to answer questions on these topics and, if you are 
concerned about them affecting you, then you should not complete the 
questionnaires.
If you feel that any of the questions have upset you in any way, you may 
wish to talk to someone, such as your form tutor or college counsellor. 
Please do so. If you are very upset by any of the issues, you may need to 
contact your GP. Here are some other numbers you may wish to contact if 
you think you need to talk to someone about your feelings:
• The Samaritans: 08457 90 90 90
• Childline: 0800 11 11
• Youth2Youth Helpline: 020 8896 3675
• Connexions: 080 800 13 2 19
If you have any questions or concerns about taking part in this study, 
please contact me at h.winton@surrev.ac.uk. You will also be given the 
opportunity on the day to ask me any questions face-to-face before 
choosing whether or not to participate.
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APPENDIX C: 
Consent form
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F
SURREY
Holly Winton, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
h.winton@surrev.ac.uk
CONSENT FORM
A study of emotions and identity in young people
Please complete this form if you are happy to continue with the study.
Please tick box:
• 1 have read and understood the information sheet for the above 
study and have been able to ask questions. 1 have been given a full 
explanation of the study and 1 understand what 1 need to do.
• 1 understand that the project will not contain any information that 
will reveal my name or the name of my college.
• 1 understand that the only people who will have access to the 
information collected during this study are Holly Winton and her 
supervisors at the University of Surrey. 1 understand that the 
project might become a published piece of work; if this happens, 
nobody will know the names of the people that took part in the 
study.
• 1 understand that the project (and material relating to it) is kept in 
securely locked premises.
• 1 understand that 1 can change my mind at any time and decide that 1 
do not want to take part any more. 1 will not need to say why 1 have 
changed my mind.
• 1 understand that the only reason that any of my answers would be 
disclosed would be if they raised concerns that 1, or someone else, 
was at risk of harm.
• 1 confirm that 1 have read and understood the above and freely agree 
to take part in this study.
Participant name:_____________ Researcher name: HOLLY WINTON
Age/class:___________________ Researcher signature:___________
Participant signature:__________ Date: ________________________
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APPENDIX D: 
Favourable ethical opinion
€ '  OF
sjgt Adtiii Coyle
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee 
Urtwertity Of Surrey
Holly Wiïiton
Trainee Clinieal FSycholoyiii 
Department of I'sydidogy 
UnhtTsily of Surrey
fprvlty cf 
Arts end I
A3
C-iidt-.-.?.5ii--cy-5U2 IJ<
T:+44tor4!SS!!»«
f: +44 jaiHO «ÏSCS:
mrtwywut
2!*’ June 2D11 
Dear 1 lolly
Refettneet ^ l î - P S Y - i l  RS
Title (rf PrûjéOli Shame in udulmcence: Dues scIF-xIiscrcpanty predict shame, and can 
ieiF»compasxion moderate this rclatinaship
Thank you for your Te-iohntissim ofilw  above proposal.
The Faeuhy o r Aria and Human Sciences Ethics Committee lias given a fnvomahle ethical 
opinion.
IMherc nre any siftntlleanl cltsnges to your (Tuposa! s%hleh require further scrutiny, please 
contact tbs Facility Ethics. Comntlnee before proceeding with yattr Preject.
Yours sincerctv
Dr Adrian C ü \I 
Chair
m  1 2 0
’•••I 'rTAR5 A history of shaping the future since 1891
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Appendix D (contd.):
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences
Ethics Committee
Chair’s Action
Ref:
Name of Student:
Title of Project:
Supervisor:
Date of submission: 
Date of re-submission:
612-PSY-11 RS ’
HOLLY WINTON
Shame in adolescence: does self-discrepancy 
predict shame, and can self-compassion 
moderate this relationship?
MARY JOHN, DR LAURA SIMONDS
3rd MAY 2011
20th JUNE 2011
The above Project has been re-submitted to the FAHS Ethics Committee.
A favourable ethical opinion has now been given.
Signed: v
D{
dt-AÀ Quv,
Adrian Coyle
Chair
Dated: July 2 .0  n
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APPENDIX E: 
Debrief sheet
SURREY
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F
A study of emotions and identity in vounq people
RESEARCH DEBRIEF
Thank you for taking part in my study. Here is a brief explanation of what I am 
researching:
The questions you answered will give me a score on three things:
1) Your level of shame: this means how bad you feel about yourself when you 
do something bad or disappoint yourself or someone else.
2) Your level of what is called “self-discrepancy”: this means the difference 
between who you think you actually are and who you think you should be 
or would like to be.
3) Your level of self-compassion: this means how kind you are to yourself.
I want to use the answers that you and other young people have given me to 
understand how self-discrepancy might make a person feel shame. For example, 
if you think you should always be honest, but you often are not, does this make you 
feel bad about yourself? I also want to know if self-compassion affects this. For 
example, if a person is kind to themselves, then they may not feel so bad if they 
are not always honest, even if they think they should be.
I am studying this because people in your age group are at a point in their lives 
where their identity is very important. It is important for psychologists to know if 
aspects of young people’s identities might make them feel bad about themselves, 
and to understand how they can help young people, for example, by teaching them 
how to be kinder to themselves.
Again, if you are distressed by answering any of the questions in this study, please 
talk to your form tutor or college counsellor. If you are very upset by any of the 
issues raised, you may wish to contact your GP. Here are some other numbers 
you may wish to contact if you think you need to talk to someone about your 
feelings:
• The Samaritans: 08457 90 90 90 www.samaritans.org
(A 24-hour service providing confidential and non-judgmental emotional support for 
people experiencing feelings of distress or despair).
• Childline: 080011 11 www.childline.org
(A counselling service for children and young adults, which offers confidential 
advice for any problem of any nature).
• Youth2Youth Helpline: 020 8896 3675 www.youth2youth.co.uk
(A helpline run by young people for young people up to the age of 19. Email them
at any time, or call them on Mondays or Thursdays 6.30pm to 9.30pm).
• Connexions: 080 800 13 2 19 (now part of Directgov Young
People) www.direct.gov.uk/en/YoungPeople/index
(A service providing advice to young people on topics including health and 
relationships, work and careers, money and housing, crime and justice, 
and learning).
Thank you again for your participation, and if you have any questions, please do 
not hesitate to talk to me today, or to email me at h.winton@surrey.ac.uk
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APPENDIX F: 
Participant instructions
SURREY
UNIVERSITY OF
Holly Winton, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
h.winton@surrev.ac.uk
A study of emotions and identity in vounq people
PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS
This booklet contains 6 short questionnaires. Please read all of the information at 
the start of each questionnaire and answer ALL the questions and ALL of the 
questionnaires. Even if you are not sure of an answer, please pick one. There are 
no wrong or right answers, you just have to pick the answers that best describe 
you. Please work on your own.
If you want to participate, please make sure you have completed the “Consent 
form” at the start of the questionnaire booklet. If you do not want to participate, you 
do not have to: simply do not complete the questionnaires. If you initially give your 
consent to participate, but half-way through completing the questionnaires, you 
decide you want to withdraw your participation, simply draw a line through any 
questionnaires you have already completed, and discontinue with the remaining 
questionnaires. The consent sheets will be separated from the questionnaires 
when you hand these in, so that your answers will be anonymous and no one will 
know what you wrote.
At the back of this booklet are some puzzles and things to read for if you complete 
the questionnaires before the allotted time is up, or if you decide that you would 
like to withdraw your participation and would like to do so without this being 
obvious.
If you have any further questions before starting the study, please ask me now.
If you are distressed by answering any of the questions, please talk to your form 
tutor or college counsellor. If you are very upset by any of the issues raised, you 
may wish to contact your GP. Here are some other numbers you may wish to 
contact if you think you need to talk to someone about your feelings:
• The Samaritans: 08457 90 90 90 www.samaritans.org
(A 24-hour service providing confidential and non-judgmental emotional support for 
people experiencing feelings of distress or despair).
• Childline: 0800 11 11 www.childline.org
(A counselling service for children and young adults, which offers confidential 
advice for any problem of any nature).
• Youth2Youth Helpline: 020 8896 3675 www.youth2youth.co.uk 
(A helpline run by young people for young people up to the age of 19. Email them
at any time, or call them on Mondays or Thursdays 6.30pm to 9.30pm).
• Connexions: 080 8001 3219 (now part of Directgov Young
People) www.direct.gov.uk/en/YoungPeople/index
(A service providing advice to young people on topics including health and 
relationships, work and careers, money and housing, crime and justice, and 
learning).
Thank you very much for taking part in this study.
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APPENDIX G:
Selves Questionnaire
SELVES QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire will ask you about the type of person, or 
“se lf that you are. There are 3 types of self: “ought”, 
“ideal” and “feared”. You will find more information about 
these on the following 3 pages.
Please read each page and follow its instructions for 
completing this questionnaire. Work through each page 
slowly and carefully and do pause or rest if you feel you 
lose concentration at any point.
Please also remember to write clearly, so that your 
answers can easily be read and understood.
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YOUR “OUGHT” SELF
Your “ought” self is the kind of person you believe you have the duty or 
obligation to be. It’s defined by the personality traits you think you ought to 
possess, or feel obligated to possess. It’s not necessary that you actually 
have these traits now, only that you believe you ought to have them.
Please list 7 traits that you think you ought to have. Next to each trait, 
please rate how similar you think you are to each of these “ought” traits, 
using the scale below as your guide:
SCALE:
I am just like this trait I am the opposite of this trait
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6--------------7
EXAMPLE:
Imagine you think you ought to be truthful and think that, mostly, you are, 
then you might write the following:
TRAIT: Being truthful RATING: 2
Now please complete the following: 
TRAIT:
1.  
2.  
RATING:
Rating (1-7):_______
Rating (1-7):_______
3.   Rating (1-7):
4. _____________________________________ Rating (1-7):
5. _____________________________________ Rating (1-7):
6. _____________________________________ Rating (1-7):
7.   Rating (1-7):
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YOUR “ IDEAL” SELF
Your “ideal” self is the kind of person you’d really like to be. It's defined by 
the personality traits you would ideally like to have. It’s not necessary that 
you actually have these traits now, only that you believe you want to have 
them.
Please list 7 traits that you want to have. Next to each trait, please rate 
how similar you think you are to each of these “ideal” traits, using the scale 
below as your guide:
SCALE:
I am just like this trait I am the opposite of this trait
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6--------------7
EXAMPLE:
Imagine you think you’d like to be kind to others but think that often you are 
not, then you might write the following:
TRAIT: Being kind RATING: 5
Now please complete the following:
TRAIT: RATING:
1.   Rating (1-7):________
2. _____________________________________  Rating (1-7):
3. _____________________________________  Rating (1-7):
4. _____________________________________  Rating (1-7):
5. _____________________________________  Rating (1-7):
6. __________________ _^_________________ Rating (1-7):
7.   Rating (1-7):
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YOUR “ FEARED” SELF
Your “feared” self is the kind of person you fear being or worry about being. 
It’s defined by the personality traits you think you might become in the 
future but that you’d rather not become. It’s not necessary that you have 
these traits, only that you want to avoid having them.
Please list 7 traits that you worry about having. Next to each trait, please 
rate how similar you think you are to each of these “feared” traits, using the 
scale below as your guide:
SCALE:
I am just like this trait I am the opposite of this trait
1------------- 2--------------3--------------4---------  5--------------6--------------7
EXAMPLE:
Imagine you worry that you are not very friendly, but think that you nearly 
always are, then you might write the following:
TRAIT: Not very friendly
Now please complete the following:
TRAIT:
1. ____________________________
2.  
3. ___________________________
4. ___________________________
5. ___________________________
6. ____________________________
7.  
RATING: 6
RATING:
Rating (1-7):_______
Rating (1-7):_____ !_
Rating (1-7):_______
Rating (1-7):_______
Rating (1-7):  ______
Rating (1-7):_______
Rating (1-7):_______
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APPENDIX H:
Shame Scale for Adolescents
SHAME SCALE FOR ADOLESCENTS
It is common for young people to experience feelings of shame. However, 
people vary in the type of situation that makes them feel shame or 
ashamed. Shame can occur when you have done something or when 
someone else has done something to you.
Here are some examples of situations that might make young people feel 
shame:
• You are being bullied
e You make a mistake in front of your whole class and everyone laughs
• You do badly in a test and you feel like you let yourself or your family 
down
e Your family can’t afford to buy you all the newest gadgets or most 
fashionable clothes
• You are horrible about your best friend behind his/her back
IMPORTANT
Can you think of some situations that have happened recently where you 
have felt shame? Please write down a few situations like the examples 
above:
1.____________________________
2.
3.
Please go to next page.
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Now read each item below and circle the box next to how you would 
generally think and feel in situations like the ones you have written down.
EXAMPLE: Thinking back to times when you have felt shame you need to 
rate how much you thought “I am rubbish at everything”.
Not at all A little bit Quite a bit A lot
^ ----------^
I thought “I am rubbish at everything” 0 1 2 T 7 T
Complete the statements below thinking back to the times you have
elt shame.
When I felt shame...... Not at all A little bit Quite a bit A lot
I thought “I have let other people 
down"
0 1 2 3
I felt worthless and small 0 1 2 3
I thought “Other people must think I 
am no good"
0 2 3
I thought “I am a nasty person" 0 1 2 3
I wanted to shout and scream 0 1 2 3
I felt angry at other people 0 1 2 3
I wanted to seek revenge 0 1 2 3
I thought “No one likes me” 0 1 2 3
I felt disappointed 0 1 2 3
I thought “Other people must think I 
am stupid"
0 1 2 3
I wanted to punch walls or break 
things
0 1 2 3
I felt sad 0 1 2 3
I had a horrible feeling inside 0 1 2 3
I thought “I am no good” 0 1 2 3
I felt embarrassed 0 1 2 3
I thought “Other people must think I 
am nasty”
0 1 2 3
I thought “I am stupid" 0 1 2 3
I felt frustrated 0 1 2 3
I thought “It is better if I was not 
around”
0 1 2 3
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APPENDIX I:
Self-Compassion Scale
HOW I TYPICALLY ACT TOWARDS MYSELF IN DIFFICULT TIMES
Please read each statement carefully before answering. To the left of each 
item (under “Your rating”, indicate how often you behave in the stated 
manner, using the following scale:
SCALE:
Almost Never Almost always
1--------------------2--------------------- 3--------------------- 4--------------------- 5
Your
rating:
Statements:
1 I’m unkind to myself when I feel I’m not “good enough” .
2 When I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely, or afraid I tend to focus 
on and worry about everything that’s wrong.
3 When things are going badly for me, I remember that 
difficulties are part of life, and that everyone goes through 
them.
4 When I think about things I don’t do well, I feel separate and 
cut off from everybody else in the world.
5 I try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling sad, angry, 
lonely, or afraid.
6 When I fail at something important to me I feel completely 
stupid.
7 When I’m sad, angry, lonely or afraid, I remind myself that 
lots of other people have these feelings too.
8 When times are really difficult, I am very hard on myself.
9 When something upsets me I try to notice my emotions and 
not get carried away by them.
10 When I feel not “good enough” in some way, I try to remind 
myself that other people sometimes feel this way too.
11 I’m unkind and impatient towards the parts of my 
personality/me I don’t like.
12 When I’m having a really hard time, I give myself the caring 
and kindness I need.
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13 When I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely, or afraid, I feel most 
other people are usually happier than I am.
14 When something really upsetting happens, I try to take a 
balanced view of things.
15 I try to see my failures as part of life.
16 When I see parts of myself that I don’t like, I get down on 
myself/give myself a hard time.
17 When I fail at something important to me, I try to not make it 
a bigger deal than it is.
18 When I’m really struggling, I feel like other people usually 
have an easier time of it.
19 I’m kind to myself when things go wrong and I’m feeling bad.
20 When something upsets me I get carried away with my 
feelings and “lose it.”
21 I can be a bit mean to myself when I’m feeling bad or upset.
22 When I’m feeling sad, angry, lonely or afraid, I try to be 
curious about my feelings and not ignore them.
23 I tell myself I’m still okay when I make a mistake or don’t do 
well at something.
24 When something painful happens I make a big deal out of it.
25 When I fail at something that’s important to me, I feel alone 
in my failure.
26 I try to be understanding and patient towards the parts of my 
personality/me that I don’t like.
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APPENDIX J:
Patient Health Questionnaire for Adolescents
PATIENT HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ADOLESCENTS 
Instructions:
How often have you been bothered by each of the following symptoms during the 
past two weeks? For each symptom put an “x” in the box beneath the answer that 
best describes how you have been feeling.
(0) 
Not 
at all
(1)
Several
days
(2) 
More 
than half 
the days
(3)
Nearly
every
day
1. Feeling down, depressed, irritable, or 
hopeless?
2. Little interest or pleasure in doing 
things?
3. Trouble falling asleep, staying 
asleep, or sleeping too much?
4. Poor appetite, weight loss, or 
overeating?
5. Feeling tired, or having little energy?
6. Feeling bad about yourself -  or 
feeling that you are a failure, or that 
you have let yourself or your family 
down?
7. Trouble concentrating on things like 
school work, reading, or watching 
TV?
8. Moving or speaking so slowly that 
other people could have noticed?
Or the opposite -  being so fidgety or 
restless that you were moving 
around a lot more than usual?
9. Thoughts that you would be better 
off dead, or of hurting yourself in 
some way?
In the past vear have vou felt depressed 
sometimes? □ Yes
or sad most days, even if you 
□ No
felt okay
If you are experiencing any of the problems on this form, how difficult have these 
problems made it for you to do your work, take care of things at home or get along 
with other people?
□ Not difficult at all □ Somewhat difficult □ Very difficult □ Extremely difficult
Has there been a time in the past month when vou have had serious thouahts 
about ending your life?
□ Yes □ No
Have vou EVER, in vour WHOLE LIFE, tried to kill vourself or made a suicide 
attempt? □ Yes □ No
If you have had thoughts that you would be better off dead, or of hurting 
yourself in some way, please discuss this with your college counsellor or
GP.
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APPENDIX K:
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment-7
GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER ASSESSMENT
Please complete the following:
Over the last 2 weeks, how often 
have you been bothered by any of 
the following problems?
(please circle the best answer)
Not at 
all
Several
days
More 
than half 
the days
Nearly
every
day
1. Feeling nervous, anxious or on 
edge
0 1 2 3
2. Not being able to stop or control 
worrying
0 1 2 3
3. Worrying too much about 
different things
0 1 2 3
4. Trouble relaxing 0 1 2 3
5. Being so restless that it is hard to 
sit still
0 1 2 3
6. Becoming easily annoyed or 
irritable
0 1 2 3
7. Feeling afraid as if something 
awful might happen
0 1 2 3
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APPENDIX L:
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about 
yourself. If you strongly agree tick the Strongly Agree box. If you agree 
with the statement, tick Agree. If you disagree, tick Disagree. If you 
strongly disagree, tick Strongly Disagree.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly
Disagree
I feel that I am a person 
of worth, at least on an 
equal plane with others.
I feel that I have a 
number of good 
qualities.
All in all, I am inclined 
to feel that I am a 
failure.
I am able to do things 
as well as most other 
people.
I feel I do not have 
much to be proud of.
I take a positive attitude 
toward myself.
On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have 
more respect for 
myself.
I certainly feel useless 
at times.
At times I think I am no 
good at all.
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APPENDIX M:
Simple linear regression analysis summaries predicting negative
affect from ought and feared self-discrepancies
Predicting depression from ought self-discrepancy:
P SEp beta R*
Regression .033
Constant 3.290 1.989
Ought SD .215 .102 *.182
Predicting anxiety from ought self-discrepancy:
P SEP beta R2
Regression .045
Constant 2.066 1.774
Ought SD .224 .091 *.212
Predicting shame from ought self-discrepancy:
P SEp beta R2
Regression .059
Constant 15.624 4.363
Ought SD .637 .223 **.243
Predicting depression from feared self-discrepancy (not significant):
P SEp beta R2
Regression .024
Constant 11.895 2.708
Feared SD -.127 .075 -.153
Predicting anxiety from feared self-discrepancy:
P SEP beta R2
Regression .058
Constant 12.707 2.387
Feared SD -.180 .066 **-.242
Predicting shame from feared sell-discrepancy:
P SEP beta R2
Regression .076
Constant 45.724 5.859
Feared SD -.507 .163 **-.275
Note for all tables: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<001
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APPENDIX N:
Simple linear regression analysis summaries predicting self-esteem
from ought feared self-discrepancies
Predicting self-esteem from ought self-discrepancy:
P SEP beta R2
Regression .076
Constant 34.804 2.000
Ought SD -.334 .102 **-.276
Predicting self-esteem from feared self-discrepancy:
P SEP beta R2
Regression .075
Constant 20.135 2.710
Feared SD .234 .075 **.275
Note for all tables: *p<05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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APPENDIX O:
Multiple linear regression analysis summaries predicting negative
affect from ought and feared self-discrepancies and self-esteem
Predicting depression from ought self-discrepancy and self-esteem:
P SEp beta Rz
Regression .397
Constant 24.537 2.877
Self-esteem -.610 .069 ***-.628
Ought SD .011 .084 .009
Predicting anxiety from ought self-discrepancy and self-esteem:
P SEp beta Rz
Regression .360
Constant 19.800 2.661
Self-esteem -.510 .064 ***-.584
Ought SD .054 .078 .051
Predicting shame from ought self-discrepancy and self-esteem:
P SEp beta R*
Regression .341
Constant 57.172 6.691
Self-esteem -1.194 .161 ***-.552
Ought SD .238 .195 .091
Predicting depression from feared self-discrepancy and self-esteem:
P SEp beta R*
Regression .398
Constant 24.350 2.588
Self-esteem -.619 .073 ***-.636
Feared SD .018 .062 .021
Predicting anxiety from feared self-discrepancy and self-esteem:
P SEp beta R2
Regression .364
Constant 22.807 2.387
Self-esteem -.502 .067 ***-.575
Feared SD -.062 .057 -.084
Predicting shame from feared sell -discrepancy and self-esteem:
P SEP beta R*
Regression .348
Constant 69.346 5.989
Self-esteem -1.173 .168 ***-.543
Feared SD -.232 .143 -.126
Note for all tables: *p<05; **p<01; ***p<.001
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APPENDIX P:
Mediated regression analysis summaries of the effect of ought and
feared self-discrepancies on negative affect via self-esteem
c(Sc) = .215 (.102), p = .037 
Ought SD ---------------------------------- ► Depression
a(Sa) = 
-.334 (.102)
b(Sb) = 
-.610 (.069)
p<01 p<.001
Self-Esteem
Partial mediation of the effect of ought self-discrepancy on depression via self­
esteem.
c(Sc) = .224 (.091), p = .015
Ought SD ---------------------------------- ► Anxiety
a(Sd) — 
-.334 (.102)
b(Sb) = 
-.510 (.064)
p<01 p<001
Self-Esteem
Partial mediation of the effect of ought self-discrepancy on anxiety via self-esteem.
c(Sc) = .637 (.223), p = .005 
Ought SD ---------------------------------- ► Shame
a(Sa) = 
-.334 (.102)
b(Sb) = 
-1.194 (.161)
p<.01 p<001
Self-Esteem
Partial mediation of the effect of ought self-discrepancy on shame via self-esteem.
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Mediation of the effect of feared self-discrepancy on depression via self­
esteem was not conducted because feared self-discrepancy was not shown 
to significantly predict depression in the original simple regression.
c(Sc) = 180 (.066), p = .008
Feared SD ---------------------------------- ► Anxiety
a(Sa) = 
-.234 (.075)
b(Sb) = 
-.502 (.067)
p<.001
Self-Esteem
Partial mediation of the effect of feared self-discrepancy on anxiety via self-esteem.
c(Sc) = -.507 (.163), p = .002 
Feared SD ---------------------------------- ► Shame
a(Sd) — 
-.234 (.075)
b(Sb) = 
-1.173 (.168)
p<.01 p<001
Self-Esteem
Partial mediation of the effect of feared self-discrepancy on shame via self-esteem.
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APPENDIX Q:
Moderated regression analysis summaries of the effect of the 
interaction between self-compassion and both ought and feared self­
discrepancies on self-esteem
Predicting self-esteem from ought self-discrepancy, self-compassion, and the 
interaction between these two variables (not significant):
P SEp beta Rz
Regression .456
Constant 17.214 7.538
Ought SD -.227 .373 -.187
Self-compassion (SC) .182 .100 .548
SD*SC .002 .005 .118
Predicting self-esteem from feared self-discrepancy, self-compassion, and the 
interaction between these two variables (not significant):
P SEP beta ' R2
Regression .458
Constant 23.237 8.790
Feared SD -.309 .251 -.362
Self-compassion (SC) .061 .119 .185
SD*SC .004 .003 .724
Note for all tables: *p<05; **p<.01; ***p<001
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APPENDIX R:
Mediation results using Bootstrap technique
Partial mediation of the effect of ideal self-discrepancy on depression via 
self-esteem:
Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variables :
DV — PHQtotal
IV = IDEALtot
MEDS = SEStotal
Sanple size 
126
IV to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff se t p
SEStotal -.3461 .0742 -4.6664 .0000
Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b paths)
Coeff se t p
SEStotal -.6040 .0766 -7.8826 .0000
Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)
Coeff se t p
IDEALtot .2275 .0773 2.9429 .0039
Direct Effect of IV on DV (c1 path)
Coeff se t p
IDEALtot .0185 .0686 .2700 .7876
Model Summary for DV Model
R-sq Ad] R-sq F dfl df2 p
.3790 .3689 37.5328 2.0000 123.0000 .0000
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Appendix R (contd.):
Partial mediation of the effect of ideal self-discrepancy on anxiety via self­
esteem:
Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variables:
DV = GADtotal
IV = IDEALtot
MEDS = SEStotal
Sample size 
126
IV to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff se t p
SEStotal -.3461 .0742 -4.6664 .0000
Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b paths)
Coeff se t p
SEStotal -.4849 .0684 -7.0875 .0000
Total Effect of IV on DV {c path)
Coeff se t p
IDEALtot .1586 .0668 2.3754 .0191
Direct Effect of IV on DV (cr path)
Coeff se t p
IDEALtot -.0092 .0613 -.1497 .8812
Model Summary for DV Model
R-sq Adj R-sq F dfl df2 p
.3209 .3098 29.0582 2.0000 123.0000 .0000
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Appendix R (contd.):
Partial mediation of the effect of ideal self-discrepancy on shame via self­
esteem:
Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variables:
DV = SSAtotal
IV = IDEALtot
MEDS = SEStotal
Sample size 
126
IV to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff se t p
SEStotal -.3461 .0742 -4.6664 .0000
Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b paths)
Coeff se t p
SEStotal -1.2026 .1738 -6.9187 .0000
Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)
Coeff se t p
IDEALtot .6065 .1685 3.5997 .0005
Direct Effect of IV on DV (c' path)
Coeff se t p
IDEALtot .1904 .1556 1.2232 .2236
Model Summary for DV Model
R-sq Ad] R-sq F dfl df2 p
.3483 .3377 32.8617 2.0000 123.0000 .0000
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RESEARCH LOG
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research questions 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, MRP ✓
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information
technology and literature search tools
Year 1 Literature Review, Qualitative Group Project, MRP
✓
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating research 
methods
Year 1 Literature Review, SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, 
MRP
✓
4 Formulating specific research questions 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, MRP V*
5 Writing brief research proposals 
SRRP, MRP ✓
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols 
MRP ✓
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, 
including issues of diversity, and structuring plans accordingly 
SRRP, MRP
✓
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics committee 
MRP ✓
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research 
SRRP, MRP ✓
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research 
Qualitative Group Project, MRP ✓
11 Collecting data from research participants 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, MRP ✓
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions 
Research Methods lectures, SRRP, Qualitative Group 
Project, MRP
✓
13 Writing patient information and consent forms 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, MRP ✓
14 Devising and administering questionnaires 
SRRP, MRP ✓
15 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS settings 
N/A
16 Setting up a data file 
Research Methods lectures, MRP V*
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS 
Research Methods lectures, MRP ✓
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses 
SRRP, MRP ✓
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis 
SRRP, MRP ✓
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis 
SRRP, MRP V*
21 Summarising results in figures and tables
Evaluations of group effectiveness on both Child & Family
and Specialist placements, SRRP, MRP
✓
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project ✓
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23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative 
methods
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project ✓
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data 
analysis
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, MRP
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts
SRRP to MDT and fellow trainees, MRP to fellow trainees
and attendees at Surrey’s PsychD(Clin.) 40th Anniversary
conference
✓
27 Producing a written report on a research project 
SRRP, Qualitative Group Project, MRP
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses 
MRP ethics application and appeal, Viva Examination ✓
29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed 
journals or edited book
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice 
SRRP ✓
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GROUP QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ABSTRACT 
Does working in an eating disorder service have an impact on 
therapist body image?
JUNE 2 0 1 0 -YEAR 1
Introduction: Body image disturbance is central to the diagnosis of eating 
disorders and one of the most challenging symptoms to treat. The current 
research aimed to investigate the personal consequences for therapists 
working with eating disorders, especially in terms of the impact on their own 
body image perceptions.
Method: Five trainee clinical psychologists were recruited as participants 
in this qualitative study. All were White British females, aged 25 to 30, who 
had previously been or were currently engaged in therapeutic work with at 
least one eating disorder client. A semi-structured interview schedule was 
developed to examine the research question; questions were broad and 
open-ended. Interviews lasted approximately 20 minutes, were audio 
recorded, transcribed and analysed using interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA). Three master themes were present and rich in evidence: 
comparisons, increased awareness, and behavioural change.
Results: Comparisons were drawn between relating to clients with eating 
disorders, and those with other difficulties. Participants also revealed an 
increased awareness of their own body images and eating behaviours, their 
clients’ experiences, and the physical impact of having an eating disorder. 
As well as cognitive changes, they reported changes in their own eating 
behaviours since working with people with eating disorders. These 
appeared to fade when this type of work was discontinued.
Discussion: Although three clear themes emerged, the experience of 
therapists working with eating disorders is likely to be diverse, idiosyncratic 
and affected by a multitude of factors. The study was limited by some 
methodological issues, including variability amongst how interviews were 
conducted by each of the five different researchers, and the impact their 
personal interests and experiences were likely to have had on information
Portfolio -  Volume I
elicited from participants. The findings highlight some important clinical 
implications: self-reflexivity seems key to preparing trainees for the 
potential impact of eating disorder work, and space should be provided for 
therapists to explore and reflect on these aspects. Through these 
processes, therapists may become more self-aware and responsive to 
client needs, whilst managing their own reactions to working with eating 
disorders through supervision and reflective practice.
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ADDITIONAL APPENDICES TO 
VOLUME I
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“PSYCHOLOGY FOR ALL”
BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY CONFERENCE: 
TEACHING SLIDES FOR A SELF-ESTEEM W ORKSHOP
Evidence-based advice on how to feel good about
yourself
26th MARCH 2011
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Slide 1
Evidence-based advice on how to  
feel good about yourself.
Ramesh Perera-Delcourt 
Kaanan Bhavsar 
Gina Christoforidis 
Holly Winton
Trainee Clinical Psychologists 
University of Surrey
W ith  thanks to  :
Rupi Johal 
Dr Paul Davis
Slide 2
Self-Esteem
• The extent to  which people value and accept 
themselves;
• Reflected in: how people th ink  about
themselves, tre a t themselves and relate to  
others;
• Everyone has some level o f self-esteem !*
• Higher self-esteem is associated w ith  bette r 
physical and mental health.
Slide 3
Format of the workshop
• Using a fic tiona l character to  keep workshop 
'safe';
• Think about how to  apply the  ideas to  
yourself;
• Please ask questions e ither during or at the 
end.
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The cognitive-behavioural model
• Central idea: The way tha t we th ink  about 
events affects how we feel.
• Based on experim ental evidence from  
cognitive psychology.
• Now popular form  o f therapy, 'Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy' (CBT).
Slide 5
W hat do you see?
Slide 6
• People can see and think about the same 
thing differently;
• This affects how people feel:
• "There is nothing either good or bad, but 
thinking makes it so" [Hamlet]
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'The noise in the night'
• You are asleep in bed one night.
• Suddenly, you are woken up by a noise 
downstairs.
• W hat goes through your mind?
• How do you feel?
• W hat do you do next?
Slide 8
Slide 9
The cognitive-behavioural model of low self­
esteem
• Types of Unhelpful Thoughts:
-  Perfectionist Standards;
-  Self-Criticism;
-  Anticipating Failure;
-  "Mind-reading."
• Types of Unhelpful Behaviours:
-  Avoidance of situations which might threaten self­
esteem;
-  Unhelpful behaviours (related to above thoughts);
-  Ignoring positives & Focusing on negatives.
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Slide 10
The cognitive-behavioural model of 
low self-esteem: example
• 'Jane':
-  Mid 30s;
-  Never been particularly confident; 
-W orsened recently due to stress:
• Returned to work after first-time maternity 
leave;
• High-powered marketing consultant.
-  Feels strained, emotionally drained and like 
she can't cope.
Slide 11
Jane's thoughts-feelings-behaviour cycle
|THOUGHTS |
Mind-reading: "People will think I can't do my job properly." 
Anticipate Failure: "I was worried I would make a mistake." 
Perfectionist Standards: "I had to get everything right or 
everyone would think I'm incapable." 
Self-Criticism: "I'm stupid, worthless, a failure."
^  \
| BEHAVIOUR |
Unhelpful Behaviour: "I stayed up all night preparing
materials for meetine." c , 
Avoidance: "I've tried to avoid going to these meetings."
Unhelpful Behaviour: Stay quiet in meetings.
Focus on negatives: "One of the ideas was a complete 
disaster."
Ignore positives: "She just said she liked my idea because 
she feels sorry for me."
| FEELINGS |
Anxious
Sad
Slide 12
How to improve self-esteem
• Cognitive-behavioural approach: identify 
thoughts that are contributing to negative mood;
• Challenge self-critical thoughts;
• Doing things differently also important.
-  e.g. Decreasing avoidance and unhelpful behaviours like 
over-preparation.
• Focusing on thoughts in this session.
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Small-Group Exercise
• Discuss how to help Jane challenge her 
self-critical thoughts:
• W hat's the  evidence fo r her thoughts?
• Is she focusing on the  negative?
• W hat's the bigger picture?
• Is she listening to  tha t self-critical voice again?
• W hat m ight a friend say to  her?
Slide 14
Challenging one's own thoughts
• Applying th is to  oneself can be hard I
• 'Confirm ation bias': people attend to  and 
rem em ber in form ation  tha t fits  w ith  the ir 
current beliefs.
• Harder to  spot fo r ourselves w hat we can see 
fo r others.
Slide 15
The 'head-heart' connection
• "Believe it  when I see it " :  Need to  experience 
alternative perspective, not just th ink  it.
• Act d iffe ren tly  in order to  challenge old 
thoughts and support new ones.
• "Behavioural Experiments"
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Behavioural Experiments: 
a step-by-step guide
Slide 17
Step 1: Belief to  be tested
What belief am I testing?
"If I make a mistake in front of my colleagues, 
everyone will think I'm incapable."
What's another way of looking at it? What else could 
happen? (Alternative belief ratings 0-100%)
Some people may laugh at me, but others may not 
(20%)
People w on't ignore me and will include me in 
discussions (15%)
Slide 18
Step 2: Planning
What do I fear will happen? What am I predicting? 
(with belief ratings 0-100%)
Everyone will laugh at my ideas and ignore me (95%)
I will lose my job (70%)
What exactly is my plan? (How will I test my beliefs 
and how will I gather evidence?)
At the next meeting, I will prepare less and deliberately 
put some mistkes into my presentation.
What will I be tempted to do (safety behaviours)?
Avoid going to the meeting;
Go quickly over the slides with mistakes on.
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Step 3: The Experiment
What actually happened?
I went to the meeting. I had 3 slides with errors on. I 
left them  up for 30 seconds each. No-one commented 
at all!
Slide 20
Step 4: Reflections
Re-rate beliefs
Everyone will laugh at my ideas and ignore me (50%)
I will lose my job (50%)
Some people may laugh at me, but others may not (65%) 
People won't ignore me and will include me in 
discussions (65%)
What have I learned from the experiment? What is the 
next step?
I'm beginning to believe that it is OK to make mistakes in 
my work, but am not 100% convinced. I would like to  do 
more work to reinforce these new, more helpful beliefs.
Slide 21
Summary
• Self-esteem is about how we th ink  about 
ourselves;
• Identify your thoughts which make you feel 
bad about yourself;
• Challenge these thoughts verbally and w ith  
'behavioural experim ents';
• Employ some o f the  o ther strategies in the 
handout to  increase your positive experiences 
and beliefs about yourself.
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Questions and Feedback
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PRESENTATION TO  
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT PARTICIPANTS: 
TEACHING SLIDES FOR AN A-LEVEL PSYCHOLOGY
W ORKSHOP
Clinical psychology and mental health: A 
psychological perspective on depression
29th SEPTEM BER 2011
Portfolio -  Volume I
242 
Slide 1
UNIVERSITY OFh SURREY
Clinical Psychology and 
Mental Health:
A psychological perspective 
on depression
Holly Winton
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
h.winton@surrey.ac.uk
Slide 2
Clinical Psychology in brief:
• Psychology tries to explain human 
behaviour and experiences using 
scientifica lly developed theories
• Aim  of clinical psychology:
° Reduce psychological distress 
° Enhance psychological wellbeing 
° Using approaches based on 
psychological theories and evidence
Slide 3
Clinical Psychology in brief:
• Accepts biological factors, but focuses 
on psychological and social factors.
• Instead o f diagnosis, uses 
“form ulation” (conceptualisation) in 
order to make sense (together w ith the 
individual) o f that person’s difficulties.
• Treatm ent = “talking therapies”
° Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT)
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Problems seen by clinical 
psychologists:
• Depression
• Anxiety
• Psychosis
• O bsessive-com pulsive d isorder (OCD)
• Post-traum atic stress d isorder (PTSD)
National Institute for Health & Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) guidelines 
recom mend psychological therapy for 
all these problems
Slide 5
P resenta tion  focus:
Depression 
CBT approach
Form ulation o f a fictional c lien t’s 
problem
Slide 6
D epression:
What do you already know?
W hat is depression?
• Any 5 sym ptom s nearly every day for 
at least 2 weeks:
° Emotional symptoms: how you feel 
° Behavioural symptoms: what you do 
° Physical symptoms: bodily changes 
° Cognitive symptoms: how you think
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Slide 7
Depression -  symptoms:
Slide 8
Sad Changes in 
activity levels
Sleep disturbance Hopelessness
Irritable Being passive Loss of energy Loss of self­
esteem
No interest in 
pleasures or 
activities
Poor care of 
self and others
Changes in 
appetite and 
weight
Pessimism and
negative
thoughts
Feeling down 
in the dumps
Suicide
attempts
Loss of 
concentration
Self-blame
Depression -  some statistics:
• No.1 psychological disorder in the Western 
world
• Growing in all age-groups, but especially in 
teenagers
• Up to 20% people experience symptoms of 
depression over course of life
• Average age of first onset: 25-29 years old
• Up to 80% suicides are in sufferers of 
depression
• Typically treated with antidepressants:
° May sometimes control symptoms, but may not 
guarantee a depression-free life
Slide 9
Depression -  N ICE guidelines:
National Institute for Health & Clinical 
Excellence: 
• Mild: CBT (6-8 sessions), exercise, 
self-help
• Moderate: anti-depressants, CBT (16- 
20 sessions)
• Severe: CBT + anti-depressants
• Chronic: CBT + anti-depressants
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CBT Formulation:
After assessment, develop an explanation 
of depression with the individual: 
What is the individual’s relevant life 
history? 
• What might have made the person 
vulnerable?
° Early experiences tha t may have had 
negative im pact 
° Beliefs about the self, the world and the 
future
° Trigger incident that happened im m ediate ly 
before the problem
Slide 11
CBT Formulation (contd.):
W hat does the current problem look 
like? 
• W hat m ight be helping to maintain the 
problem ?
° Emotional: feelings 
° Behavioural: actions 
° Physical: bodily changes 
° Cognitive: thoughts
Slide 12
Case Study -  “Jane”:
Jane is 21 years old. She is currently in her second year at university and lives at home with her mother. She 
has recently broken up with a long-term boyfriend and she feels she is suffering from depression. She is 
worried that, with her mood the way it is, she will not be able to  do her degree and she will be nothing but a
Jane reported a history of depression since the age of six, when her mother remarried. Jane's parents were not 
together very long before she was born, and separated soon after her birth; she has never really known her 
real father and has only met him a couple o f times. Jane grew up sharing a home with just her mother at 
first and, later, her step-father Her biological father married a woman with whom he now has three children
Jane does not have happy memories of her childhood She believes her step-father never accepted her
Likewise, the fact that her father chose to see her on only a few  occasions fe lt like another rejection. Jane's 
step-father was highly critical of her. especially if she made a mistake, and would show his aggression 
towards her both verbally and physically. Jane’s relationship with her mother subsequently suffered 
because, rather than stand up for her daughter against this man, her mother also criticised Jane, and she 
grew up feeling that she was never good enough
At school she excelled both academically and in the field of sport, but does not remember receiving praise for 
her efforts. She felt if she could “be the best ", she could win people’s love and affection, and when her 
peers came to her for help with their work she felt needed and wanted.
W hen Jane is depressed, she feels sad and lonely, and doesn't want to  do anything. She notices that she 
constantly feels tired and can’t seem to concentrate on anything. Her appetite also fluctuates and she gets 
painful headaches. According to Jane, she copes by staying in bed for a few  days until her mood has lifted, 
but admits th is is not particularly helpful, as it often makes her feel worse about herself. W hen she is 
depressed, she tends to snap at people, so she purposely avoids seeing her friends when she feels like 
this. She also loses interest in her hobbies, such as sport and fitness and will stay in bed for days on end 
Spending so much time on her own makes her more focused on the thoughts racing through her head about 
being worthless and alone. She doesn't th ink anybody cares about her, and she doesn't see how she can 
get through the rest o f her university degree.
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Work in pairs (5-10min):
• W hat is Jane ’s relevant history?
° Early experiences 
° Beliefs about self, world, future? 
° Trigger incident
• W hat are Jane ’s sym ptom s?
° Emotional 
° Behavioural 
° Physical 
° Cognitive
• Are these maintaining the problem?
Slide 14
Formulation of Jane’s depression:
Earty Experlnces
Step-dad corning into my life and not accepting me 
Mum not standing up for me
My real dad only saw me once or twice, which modo me (eel unwanted
I'm unwanted
I'm worthless
No one cares about me
If I'm good at things, people will like me
If I'm the best. I tiave a purpose and I'm not worthless
Break-up of 5-year relationship 
Start of second year at university
Thoughts
There's no one to care for me 
I'm going to fail
Behaviour
Hostile, snappy 
Aggressive (towards myself
Emotions
Upset sad
Don "I feel like doing anything 
(apathetic)
Stop doing things: jogging, 
seeing friends 
Stop gong out 
Stay in bed
Can't sleep/sle 
Appetite is up 
Headaches 
Difficulty cone
3p too much 
and down
Nitrating
Slide 15
CBT treatment:
• W orks by breaking the cycle of the 
“hot-cross bun”
• A t cognitive level:
° Challenging negative thoughts
• A t behavioural level:
° Dropping safety-seeking behaviours
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Q and A:
Any questions?
• About clinical psychology?
• About CBT?
• About depression?
.
• Other mental health problems?
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UNIVERSITY OF SURREY'S 
PSYCHD(CLIN) 40th ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE: 
PRESENTATION SLIDES ON SHAME RESEARCH
GROUP
Shame in young people
23rd APRIL 2012
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Slide 1
S h a m e  i n  Y o u n g  
P e o p l e
Mary John, Laura Simonds, Susie Chester, Helen Taylor, Heidi 
Ling & Holly Winton 
23 April 2012
• The nature of shame and its measurement: the 
for Adolescents (SSA) -  a new tool (Laura Simor
• The Test of Self-Conscious Affect -  potential pr< 
measuring adolescent shame (Helen Taylor)
• Self-discrepancies and shame (Holly Winton)
• Shame, anger and self-compassion (Heidi Ling)
• Conclusions and implications (Mary John)
The significance of sharr
• A norm al and necessary aspect o f developn
• Shame prom otes se lf-developm ent through 
and, in tu rn , influences th e  developm ent of 
interpersonal relating
• However, elevated shame is associated w itl 
psychological and behavioural problem s in 
young people
• it is not currently clear w h at role sham e pi; 
developm ent o f these problems in adults a 
people
Slide 2
Outline of talk
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Slide 3
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Slide 6
Shame and guilt
Shame
Primary Function Maintain others' Meet standards and
acceptance; preserve rules
self-esteem
Behavioural Outcome Withdrawal, avoidance Atonement, reparation
(bypass -  aggression)
Focus Evaluation of whole self Evaluation of specific
action
Attribution Internal, global, stable Internal, specific, 
unstable
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Development of shame
• Evidence that pre-requisites of shame present by 3 years of 
age
• Requires, overtime:
• Ability to  self-reflect
• Acquisition o f cultural standards, rules, goals
• Ability to  make attributions
• Adolescence is a particularly sensitive period because of 
changes in:
• Physical appearance
• Social relations and contexts
• Identity
• Self-reflection and social perspective-taking un ive rs ity  o f
T9 SURREY
Shame-promoting factors
Several implicated
• Insecure attachm ent
• Sibling favouritism
• Abuse/trauma
• Family environm ent/interactions
• Socialisation to  standards and rules
Importance o f self-discrepancies
• Shame is elevated in children whose parents perceive a greater 
discrepancy between the child's perceived actual qualities and 
the qualities the parents expect the ir children to  possess (ideal- 
actual discrepancy)
i  UNIVERSITY OF
t  SURREY
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Measurement
• Test o f Self-Conscious Affect -  TOSCA-A (June Price Tangney)
• Hypothetical scenarios with items to tap shame, guilt, pride 
and embarrassment
• Example:
• You break something at a friend's house and then hide it
• I would think "This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it or 
replace it"
• I would avoid seeing that friend for a while
. Scaling: not at all likely, unlikely, maybe (half and half), likely, 
very likely
Criticisms:
• Requires a double imaginative feat
• Culture-bound UNIVERSITY OFt  SURREY
Slide 8
Our Aims
• To develop a new measure of shame proneness that does not 
rely on hypothetical scenarios
• To assess the psychometric properties of the new measure
• To test hypotheses about the relationship between shame, 
self-discrepancy, social anxiety, anger and self-compassion
• Four stages in the process (next slide...)
UNIVERSITY OFi l  UiVO I JV/r
SURREY
Slide 9
Interviews (n=12): W hat is 
shame? W hat makes you feel 
shame? W hat is shame like? I 1
Shame Scale fo r Adolescents -  22 
items. Completed by 642 young 
people. Factor Analysis. Reliability 
and va lid ity  tests.
I Shame Scale fo r Adolescents -  19 items. Relationships between shame and social anxiety, anger, self-discrepancy and self- corn passion.___________________
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What makes you feel shame?
Status
"fam ily  can't afford 
som eth ing everyone else 
has"
C om petence
"n o t doing well in a test"
Shame
Appearance
Relationships
broke a promise "w hen I d o n 't look as good 
as the  o the r girls"
What happens when you feel 
shame?
• I suppose the feeling is to cry
• Felt frustrated
• Curl up in a ball and hide away
• Wanting to escape
• I wanted to hit him
• I wanted to change who I was
• I wanted to disappear
• I wanted to hurt myself
u n i v l k s i t t  o r
SURREY
Shame Scale for Adolescents
• A sem i-id iographic measure
• Respondents are given examples o f s itua tions th a t m ight 
make young people feel shame
• Respondents are asked to  th in k  o f recent situations 
where they have fe lt shame
• They th in k  o f up to  3 situations and w rite  them  down 
(optiona l)
• They are then  asked to  rate how they would generally 
th in k  and feel in situations like those they have w ritten  
dow n/considered
4 UNIVERSITY Of
'T  SURREY
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Example items
Complete the statements below thinking back to the times you have felt shame.
When I felt shame.. . . Not ât  A little Qui te A lot 
all bit a bit
I thought "I have let other people down" 0 1 2  3
I fe lt worthless and small 0 1 2  3
I thought "Other people must think I am no good" 0 1 2  3
I thought "I am a nasty person" 0 1 2  3
I wanted to shout and scream 0 1 2  3
I fe lt angry at other people 0 1 2  3
I wanted to seek revenge 0 1 2  3
I thought "No one likes me" 0 1 2  3
I fe lt disappointed 0 1 2  3
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Psychometric properties o f th e  SSA 
Com parison w ith  th e  TOSCA-A 
Helen Taylor
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
N=550
Overall alpha = .93
âm1 iF " i
J f
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All at p< 001
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Slide 17
N=315
A ■ k
■ I* Wm mw \ ¥
' p<.001
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Slide 18
Relationship between the 
TOSCA-A and the SSA
SSA:
Negative 
Evaluation 
of Self
Outward
Expression
Internalised
Affect
Total
score
TOSCA- Shame .4 6 " .14* .4 7 " .4 7 "
A:
Guilt .4 6 " .13* .4 4 " .4 5 "
But:
-The Shame and Guilt subscales o f the TOSCA-A were highly 
correlated w ith each other (r=0.78, p<0.001).
UNIVERSITY OF
^ SURREY
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Validity of the TOSCA-A
•Questions that are raised:
•The high correlation betw een Shame and Guilt in the  
TOSCA-A questions th e  validity o f th e  scale; does it really 
m easure these em otions separately?
•W hy w ere  th e  TOSCA-A Shame and Guilt scores found to  be 
negatively correlated w ith  age whilst SSA scores w ere not 
correlated w ith  age?
&§URREY
Self-discrepancies and shame
H olly  W in ton
Theory and rationale
Higgins' (1987) self-discrepancy theory:
- self-discrepancies lead to negative affect
- actual-ideal self-discrepancies: dejection-related emotions 
(including shame)
Lewis' (1971) cognitive attribution theory:
- shame results from a global negative attribution that the self 
has failed to live up to certain standards
UNIVERSITY OF
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Shame, self-discrepancy and self­
compassion in adolescents
• Hypothesis:
• Self-discrepancy w ill predict shame (when 
controlling for anxiety and depression)
• Measures:
• Self-discrepancy: Selves Questionnaire
• Shame: Shame Scale for Adolescents
• Self-compassion: Self Compassion Scale
• Anxiety & depression: GAD-7, PHQ9,
• Self-esteem: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
• Participants:
• N = 141 16-18 year-olds, non-clinical SURREY
Correlations [*p<o5;**p<oi]
**.54
**-.49 **-.32
**.24 **.31 **-.28
**-.29 **-.35 **.38 **-.62
*.18 **.26 *-.15 **.52 **-.50
**.21 **.21 **-.24 **.48 **-.55
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Regression analyses
Using hierarchical regression analyses, ideal, ought and feared 
self-discrepancies contribute significantly to the prediction of 
shame beyond both anxiety and depression (additional 
variance explained is 3-5% with the overall models accounting 
for 25-31% of the variability in shame)
However, when self-esteem is entered in the analysis, self­
discrepancies do not contribute significantly to the prediction 
of shame
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Shame and anger and the role of self-compassion
Heidi Ling
\  UNITE RSITYOF
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Self Compassion as a Mediator
Background theory
• H.Lewis (1971): the acute pain of shame leads to anger ('humiliated 
fury')
• Gilbert and Irons (2005) created a model of self compassion and a 
treatment (CMT) for combatting the painful experience of shame.
• Increasing self compassion creates a self soothing ability and self 
reassurance which act as an antidote for the threat one feels when 
experiencing shame (Gilbert and Irons, 2005; Gilbert and Proctor 
1996).
If self compassion protects against the pain of shame, can it prevent 
shame leading to anger?
^SURREY
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Self compassion as a Mediator
Self compassion
Trait AngerShame
(.32**)
•Conditions of mediation met: Shame was a significant predictor of 
trait anger and self compassion, self compassion was a significant 
predictor of trait anger when controlling for shame.
•Condition not fully met: The standardised regression coefficient 
between shame and trait anger reduced when controlling for self 
compassion but remained significant.
•Self compassion is a partial mediator of the relationship between 
shame and trait anger.
•Sobel test statistic= 5.44, p<0.001 [N=145] UNIVERSE
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Self Compassion as a mediator
• Results suggest that shame leads to anger in some young 
people because self compassion is low. 
Clinical Implications 
• Increasing self compassion in shame-prone individuals may 
protect against the pain o f shame and reduce anger.
• Support for using interventions designed to increase self 
compassion.
M urrey
Conclusions & Implications
• Conclusions
• It is possible to engage young people with the concept of shame
• The SSA shows good psychometric properties in a heterogeneous 
sample of 11-18 year olds
• SSA scores show predicted associations with measures of 
negative mood, self-esteem, anger, self-discrepancy and self­
compassion
• SSA completion does not make universal assumptions about the 
nature of shaming experiences, potentially increasing its 
applicability to diverse samples
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Conclusions & Implications
Implications:
• Internalisation of unrealistic self-standards may be a risk factor 
for shame but a major limitation is the cross-sectional nature of 
the evidence-base
• Self-compassion may be an important factor in protecting against 
shame proneness; however, research is limited and lacks 
intervention studies
• Given its idiographic focus, the SSA may be suitable for use in 
clinical settings with young people (e.g. in initial formulation, 
assessing management of shame reactions overtime)
• Future work needs to address the development of shame- 
proneness in young people using longitudinal studies
4 '  UNIVERSITYOF
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